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Summary 
This study examines the claims for a priveleged status for 
the language of science fiction. The analysis of a series of 
invented languages, including 'nadsat', 'newspeak' and 
'Babel-17', establishes that beneath these constructions 
lie deep-seated misconceptions about how language works. 
It is shown that the various theories of language, implicitly 
or explicitly expressed by writers and critics concerned 
with invented languages and neologism in science fiction, 
embody a mistaken view about the relation between language 
and the imagination. Chapter two demonstrates, with particular 
reference to the treatment of time and mind, that the themes 
on which science fiction most likes to dwell, reflect very 
closely the concerns of philosophy, and as such, are particularly 
amenable to the analytical methods of linguistic philosophy. 
This approach shows that what science fiction 'imagines' 
often turns out to be a product of the deceptive qualities 
of the grammar of language itself. The paradoxes of a psuedo-
philosophical nature, in which science fiction invariably 
finds itself entangled, are particularly well exemplified 
in the work of Philip K. Dick. Chapter Three suggests that 
by exploiting the logically impossible, by making a virtue of 
the tricks and conventions which have become science fiction's 
stigmata (time-travel, telepathy, etc.), Dick indicates a 
means of overcoming the genre's current problems concerning 
form and seriousness. In conclusion it is demonstrated through 
the work of J. G. Ballard, that any attempt to throw off 
science fiction's 'pulp' conventions is likely to lead the 
genre further into the literary wilderness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
~s the fifth month. That was your first Martian word, 
Martha," Penrose told her. "The word for five. And if 
Davas is the word for metal, and Sornhulva is chemistry 
and/or physics, I'll bet Tadavas Sornhulva is literally 
translated as: 'Of-Metal-Matter-Knowledge.' Metallurgy, 
in other words. I wonder what Mastharnorvod means." It 
surprised her that, after so long and with so much 
happening in the meantime, he could remember that. 
"Something like 'Journal', or "Review', or maybe 
'Quarterly.' .. 1 
In this passage from H. Beam Piper's 1957 story 'Omnilingual', a 
group of archaeologists on Mars are attempting to read the Martian 
language. The Martian words above, consist of a "purely arbitrary 
but consistently pronounceable system of phonetic values for 
letters .. 2 which Martha Dane, the archaeologist/linguist heroine, 
has grafted onto the symbols of Martian texts. Her first word, the 
word for month, was deduced from the title page of what she assumes 
to be a Martian magazine. Hence the assumption that the latter part 
of the header might be 'Journal' or 'Monthly'. Before one begins to 
point out how presumptuous such assumptions about Martian language 
and civilisation are, one must make a distinction between 
assumptions which are Piper's, and assumptions which are his 
characters' . 
What we do know is that Martian civilisation died out fifty thousand 
years ago, that they were oxygen breathing bi-peds, that they had 
two sexes, lived in cities, used electricity, had universities and a 
highly advanced technology. Such assumptions as Piper has built in 
fit almost exactly those prescribed by C. F. Hockett in his essay 
'How to Learn Martian' • 
He outlines his optimistic case thus: 
If there are Martians, and they are intelligent and have a 
language and if they do have upper respiratory and 
alimentary tracts shaped much like our own, and ears much 
like ours, and, finally, if they do make use of these 
organs in speech communication - given all these ifs, then 
the procedures of Ferdinand Edward Leonard will work, and 
he will be able to "break" the phonemic system of the 
language. 3 
Ferdinand Edward Leonard is Hockett's first Martian linguist, and 
the difficulties he outlines in the above essay apply to a living 
language. With a dead language one has to assume all the above. In 
Piper's tale, we are given no reason to believe that the long dead 
Martians were very different from human beings. In fact, the 
characters not only assume human characteristics in the Martians, 
but Western European characteristics in the language. Phonetic 
pronunciation, with pre-fixes, suffixes, nouns, verbs, qualifiers, 
and even a similar method of counting to our own, are assumed. If, 
however, the Martian language were constructed differently, along 
the lines of Chinese, for example, assigning phonetic values to its 
symbols would result in a linguistic disaster. The assumption that 
Martians count in a similar way to ourselves and name their 'years' 
and 'months' (what is a Martian month?) in such an apparently 
logical way is similarly preposterous. 
To date, there have been several studies of the language of science 
fiction. The emphasis of many of these studies is on how the 
languages of science fiction measure up to the science of 
linguistics. Not surprisingly, as with the other sciences of 
science fiction, one generalfY finds a rag-bag of ill-informed and 
occasionally novel dramatisations of a garbled or crackpot theory. 
Until recently deriding the science in science fiction is what 
passed for criticism, which is unfortunate because, although I'm 
neither a linguist nor a physicist, building a faster-than-light 
drive seems as likely as deciphering an alien language. 
2 
Scientific implausibility is, I believe, to a greater or lesser 
extent, crucial to science fiction structuring. The implausibility 
of Piper's linguistics may be due either to his own shortcomings or 
those of the linguistics of 1957. His larger point, that the lack 
of a Rossetta stone, a bi-lingual, in the case of trying to decipher 
alien languages, might be offset in the case of an advanced 
civilisation, by a genuine universal such as the table of elements, 
is an interesting and contentious issue among linguists. The idea 
appeals to the universal nature of science. When the archeologists 
discover the table of elements on the wall of the Martian 
university, one of them remarks 
"That isn't just the Martian table of elements; that's the 
table of elements. It's the only one there is," Mort 
Trantor almost exploded. "Look, hydrogen has one proton 
and one electron. If it had more of either it wouldn't be 
hydrogen, it'd be something else. And the same with all 
the rest of the elements. And hydrogen on Mars is the same 
as hydrogen on Terra, or on Alpha Centauri, or in the next 
galaxy-,,4 
The conclusion of the story is that "physical science expresses 
5 
universal facts; necessarily it is a universal language." As 
such 'Omnilingual' is a particular instance of science fiction 
attempting to talk about what it sees as the foundations, if not the 
limits of knowledge. What we consider to be the foundations of 
knowledge are continually being called into question by shifting 
world-views. The question of how subtly the assumptions underlying 
such world views are built into one's native language, whatever 
one's view on the matter, tends to draw the protagonists into an 
area which is properly the realm of philosophy. 
3 
What one defines as the 'realm' of philosophy has been increasingly 
unclear since the English philosophers, including Wittgenstein, 
redefined it earlier this century. The work of these philosophers 
is generally paraphrased as being concerned with 'the limits of what 
can be said', and that there are realms of philosophy and the 
imagination which will not, because of the grammar of language, 
admit articulation. 
Science fiction, it would appear, routinely finds itself pushing up 
against these limits. By giving full rein to the imagination it 
would seem that science fiction, like philosophy, must stretch the 
limits of language, and advance into the realm of that which cannot 
be said. 
This is all completely wrong. Wittgenstein could not be said to be 
concerned with the limits of what can be said, he was merely 
concerned with what can't be said. The distinction may seem 
trivial, but it is crucial. Wittgenstein's view of language is 
somewhat analogous to Einstein's view of the universe. It is finite 
but unbounded. This idea is only difficult because, in the case of 
Einstein's universe, part of the logic of a finite universe seems to 
be that there is something that is not the universe. This is the 
problem that Russell found himself entangled in when he formulated 
his so-called 'paradox'. In fact, Wittgenstein would say that it is 
only the 'grammar' of the word 'universe', or of Russell's 'class of 
classes', which lead one to look for the opposite or negative case. 
It is as nonsensical to look. for things which one cannot say as it 
is to look for things which are not part of the universe. 
4 
Wittgenstein always held that what can be thought can be expressed 
and expressed clearly. He also believed that the puzzles and 
paradoxes of philosophy arose from a lack of clarity in an 
expression, or use of words. Science fiction, concerned as it is 
with cosmology, and the limits of the universe, knowledge and the 
mind, invariably finds itself tangling with such paradoxes. In my 
first chapter I examine a series of invented languages, and 
establish that beneath these constructions lie deep-seated 
misconceptions about how language works. The various theories of 
language, explicitly or implicitly expressed by writers and critics 
concerned with invented words and languages in science fiction, are 
a particular case of the capacity of language to mislead. 
In my second chapter, I demonstrate with particular reference to the 
treatment of time and the mind, that the areas in which science 
fiction most likes to dwell are roughly identifiable with those of 
philosophy, and as such are particularly amenable to 
Wittgensteinian analysis. I show that in science fiction, the 
imagination does not hit its head on the linguistic ceiling, but 
wilfully imprisons itself within its accidents of structure. What 
science fiction often 'imagines' turns out to be the product of the 
deceptive qualities in the grammar of language. 
In the third chapter, I show, through the work of Philip K. Dick, 
that by exploiting the logically impossible; by making a virtue of 
the tricks and conventions which have become science fiction's 
stigmata (time-travel, telepathy, etc.), the genre can pull free of 
the vicious circle in which it finds' itself. 
5 
By grounding these conventions in concrete situations and imagining 
the consequences of these philosophical indiscretions in terms of 
human behaviour, Dick gives the reader a purchase on the relation 
between language, knowledge and the imagination. 
In my final chapter, I suggest that the formlessness which science 
fiction currently languishes in is directly due to its attempts to 
throw off its 'pulp' conventions. Having indicated the importance 
of these conventions to the structuring of science fiction, I 
establish J. G. Ballard as what Vonnegut might term "the central 
figure of wrong-headedness" in any attempt to re-establish science 
fiction's credentials as the speakeasy of philosophy. 
6 
CHAPTER ONE 
INVENTED LANGUAGES IN SCIENCE FICTION 
Science fiction writers have always found the need to describe or 
represent the strange languages of their projected worlds. When 
Wells' Time Traveller first meets the f10i he describes their speech 
as "a strange and very sweet and liquid tongue", he goes on to 
observe how they spoke in "soft,cooing notes to each other"l. The 
reader is given little or no purchase on the E10i's language outside 
these few remarks. The Time Traveller manages to establish the 
meaning of a few of their words, but in general converses with them 
in signs and gestures. With language, as with many other aspects of 
science fiction, Wells sets the pattern for the rest of the genre. 
Indeed, to be fair, this tendency to ignore or belittle the language 
problems encountered by adventurers in strange lands, and 
concentrate on more colourful pursuits, is a tradition long 
established by the travelogue. Jonathan Swift, Edgar Allen Poe and 
the majority of early science fiction writers sought to emulate this 
form in order to lend an air of authenticity to their fantastic 
adventures. 
It seems probable that the limitations of the travelogue form 
precipitated science fiction into disguising itself in the far more 
fashionable form of the novel. The "realism and exhaustive 
presentation" of life, which Henry James saw as the objective of the 
'The Novel', clearly cannot be achieved without the kind of minute 
7 
attention to dialogue which he saw as essential and Wells saw as 
time-consuming. These are the beginnings of a dispute about the 
importance of characterization, which continues to dog science 
fiction. In his study, The language of 1984 W.F. Bolton remarks 
that one difference between 'real life' and fiction is, 
In life the individual creates the discourse, but in 
fiction the discourse - including the dialogue - creates 
the character3 . 
The 'quarrel', as Edel and Ray call it, between James and we11s 4 
has, I believe, far reaching implications for those who would study 
science fiction, and I will return to this issue when I have 
established more fully the elements which comprise the argument. 
Meanwhile, many critics have penetrated science fiction's disguise 
and accused it of a lack of characterization. Several explanations 
for this 'crucial' deficiency have been put forward. Briefly these 
explanations seek either to establish that the science fiction 
writer's concern is with ideas as opposed to character, or that the 
presentation of a depersonalized, unindividualistic society is a 
reflection of a social tendency which began with industrialisation 
and it is the science fiction writer's duty to represent. Scott 
Sanders, in his essay 'The Disappearance of Character', asserts, 
in the twentieth century science fiction as a genre is 
centrally about the disappearance of character, in the same 
sense in which the eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
bourgeois novel. is about the emergence of characterS. 
Sanders' account of the problem of characterization is fine in so 
far as it is an account of how science fiction depicts the loss of 
identity in over-regulated societies. Both Zamayatin's We and 
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four address this issue overtly. In each 
8 
case the struggle against the enforced disintegration of identity is 
modulated through the character's own perceptions. The difference 
between this approach and that of much other science fiction which 
Sanders claims is about 'the disappearance of character', is that in 
the work of Asimov or Clarke, for example, the reader is hard 
pressed to find a character to disappear. It might be argued that 
this is a covert approach to the problem and that no attempt is made 
to establish character in the first place. However, if the reader 
is presented with character types, indistinguishable from one 
another, unashamed props for a shaky plot, the tendency is to put it 
down to incompetent writing rather than design. 
Patrick Parrinder seeks a more fundamental reason for science 
fiction's failure to embody its characters more fully, and locates 
it in an inability or reluctance to "describe beings who do not 
share a common language with us"6. He continues, 
While the central feature of alien intelligence is its 
possession of a different language, its peripheral features 
consist of a multitude of different sign-systems, including 
such things as physical characteristics, behaviour patterns 
and sexual roles, by which a Martian Ms Brown might be 
distinguished from her human counterpart7 . 
Thus an alien being, lacking the same physiological apparatus as 
ourselves might communicate with lightwaves, or smell, or even 
twitches of the antennae. Further,-as in Aldiss's Dark Light Years, 
this being might behave in a manner that we would hesitate to call 
intelligent. Commenting on Stanislaw Lem's Solaris and The 
Invincible, Parrinder establishes anthropomorphism as a limiting 
factor when attempting to confront the 'utterly alien'. 
9 
lem's novels do not go beyond the human viewpoint, and are 
thus the eloquent statements of an impasse. In order to 
bridge this impasse and adopt an alien viewpoint, it is 
necessary to offer some sort of verbal representation of 
alien language. This is normally done by subjecting the 
writer's own language to a controlled stylistic 
distortion8 . 
He relates such 'distortion' to the representation of dialect 
through phonetic spelling, and the use of archaic grammatical forms 
in historical fiction. His larger point is that 
consideration of alien encounters involves the 
modification, rather than the wholesale abandonment, of the 
idea of rounded characterisation championed by Virginia 
Woolf and lately by Ursula LeGuin9 . 
Such a modification is likely to require a compromise on the part of 
the writer, and probably the critic as well. 
Writing on leGuin's left-Hand of Darkness Parrinder remarks that the 
ending of the story relies on the validity of such archetypes as the 
father, the son, and the "fierce provincial boy". He continues 
The artistic dilemma here is a genuine one, for it is 
almost impossible to evoke the archaic flavour of romance 
without at the same time reverting to other kinds of 
cultural conservatism that the writer might wish to 
avoid 10 . 
The solution, however, is not to abandon traditional literary 
techniques and conventions, or to advocate the adoption of modernist 
narrative techniques. The fragmented forms of the 'New Wave' 
writers are not necessary, according to Parrinder, to cope with the 
depiction of new worlds and strange intelligences. 
10 
To avoid what he calls a 'Wittgensteinian impasse' he concludes 
"Man", 
must find ways of speaking of that which is novel, and he 
does so by imitation and recombination of the modes of 
discourse already at his command. Science fiction provides 
a particular instance of this, building up its stories of 
the strange and new by instituting a dialogue with what we 
already know. In this complex construction that is the SF 
story we may find bound together . . . the elements of 
romance, fable, epic and parodyll. 
Thus for 'SF ' these stylistic and structural borrowings make the 
strange and new accessible to the reader by presenting it in 
familiar terms; by giving it an intelligible form. This, arguably, 
is the only way in which the "new thing" may be depicted. or 
understood. 
Having invoked the spirit of Hittgenstein it is clear, that the 
problem with which we are dealing is not purely a stylistic one. 
The flight of science fiction writers to new and alien worlds seems 
to be constantly grounded by the limits of language. This, I 
believe, is what Parrinder has suggested in quoting the last line of 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus1 2 . The writings of 
Stanislaw Lem, he contends, "reveal a fascination with forms of 
'intelligence ' which are as little anthropomorphic as it is possible 
to be"13, an enthusiasm which is curtailed by the delimiting 
factor of language itself. 
11 
My partial objective in this present study is to dispel the notion 
that language in some way limits the expression of new ideas and 
concepts. What Wittgenstein shows in the Tractatus is that the 
limits of language and the limits of thought are so inextricably 
linked that it makes no sense to say that one limits the other. 
Jerzy Jerzebski notes in the work of lem a balance between 
innovation in material and linguistic innovation, 
the more daringly the author transgresses empirical 
plausibility, the more clearly he must fall back upon the 
literary convention of the story. Having freed his vision 
of the imaginary world from anthropocentism and 
geocentrism, he must allow them in again through the back 
door14. 
Gilbert Ry1e would describe the idea that we could use words without 
presupposing reference to human behaviour, as a "category-mistake". 
To this extent the whole discussion of making the lutterly alieni 
intelligible is & category-mistake 1S . Something lutter1y alieni 
is by definition unintelligible. This tendency of science fiction 
to proceed from premises which embody & category-error or in some 
way confront what is logically impossible, is to a greater or lesser 
extent the source of its narrative and stylistic ills. On a more 
mundane level, attempting to treat novelistica1ly of alien beings 
and people of the future, given the kind of sleight of hand that 
requires regarding dialogue, is to take a commitment to formal 
realism to its extreme. 
12 
The language in this example from the beginning of Philip K. Dick's 
The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch is typically tantalizing. 
In the miserably high-number conapt building 492 on the 
outskirts of Marilyn Monroe, New Jersey, Richard Hnatt ate 
breakfast indifferently while, with something greater than 
indifference, he glanced over the morning homeopape's 
weather-syndrome readings of the previous day. 
The Key glacier, Ol'Skintop, had retreated 4.62 Grables 
during the last twenty-four hour period. And the 
temperature, at noon in New York, had exceeded the previous 
day's by 1.46 Wagners. In addition the humidity, as the 
oceans evaporated, had increased by 16 Selkirks 
.......... Hnatt pushed the 'pape away, and picked up the 
mail which had been delivered before dawn ....... it had 
been some time since mailmen crept out in daylight 
hoursl6. 
It is something of a relief in this passage to find that we are on 
earth, in New Jersey, and that mailmen still come around. What a 
homeopape looks like, or what a Grable is, we can only guess. 
Nevertheless the passage is quite informative. Hnatt lives in an 
unattractive apartment somewhere in future New Jersey, and climactic 
changes, notably an increase in temperature, prevent people going 
out in the day. Later we find that Hnatt owes "ten and a half 
skins" on his apartment, we are invited to guess how or why skins 
(What sort of skins?) could ever come to be used instead of money. 
All through the passage Dick is trying to make his future world seem 
strange and new, whilst simultaneously keeping the narrative flow as 
smooth as possible. Note that by the second paragraph the homeopape 
has become a "pape". By the third paragraph "conapt" has become 
"apt". It is generally true that most of what is called linguistic 
innovation in science fiction is a variety of slang, or jargon. 
Some of the coinages tell us something about the projected world, 
some merely make it more·mysterious. Anthony Burgess pushes this 
device to an extreme when he embodies the slang of his future world 
in a narrative that is largely first person. 
13 
A Clockwork Language: "Nadsat" and Riddley Walker 
In A Clockwork Orange "Nadsat" is a kind of teenage argot patterned 
along the lines of cockney rhyming slang. Rhyming slang has its 
origins in the London underworld. Conversation in rhyming slang 
would theoretically only be intelligible to the criminal fraternity, 
thereby excluding police, bystanders, hangers-on etc .. "Nadsat" 
serves the same end for Alex and his "droogs" in the world of a 
Clockwork Orange, most of the vocabulary being concerned with food, 
drink, drugs, sex and crime. When A Clockwork Orange was first 
published, it was without a glossary of terms. Burgess leaves the 
reader to decipher "Nadsat" himself. This is a less formidable task 
than it first appears, chiefly because with "Nadsat" translation is 
merely substitution. Thus the following passage from the first page 
of A Clockwork Orange may easily be rendered in present day usage. 
Our pockets were full of deng, so there was no real need 
from the point of view of crasting any more pretty polly to 
tole hock some old veek in an alley and viddy him swim in 
his blood while we counted the takings and divided by four, 
nor to do the ultra-violent on some shivering starry 
grey-haired ptitsa in a shop and go smecking off with the 
till's guts. l ? 
Our pockets were full of money, so there was no real need 
from the point of view of stealing any more money to knock 
over some old man in an alley and watch him swim in his 
blood while we counted the takings and divided by four, nor 
to do the ultra-violent on some shivering ancient 
grey-haired 'chick
' 
in a shop and go laughing off with the 
till's guts. 
14 
However I could have chosen to render the passage in rhyming slang 
which would, arguably, have been more true to the piece taken in its 
fictional context. I might even have translated it into French. 
The status of these versions of the original passage vis-a-vis 
meaning is a curious one. Indeed the notion that all these passages 
have the same 'meaning', the very fact translation is possible at 
all, is at the heart of the confusion over the referential nature of 
language. The various translations of a passage may appear to have 
approximately the same meaning or sense, the illusion is therefore 
fostered that the words refer to something, a ghostly something, a 
concatenation of objects and actions. Meaning thereby is reduced to 
something like an object of thought. Getting rid of this ghostly 
'object of thought' clearly involves changing deeply seated 
attitudes toward language, and the overhaul or complete demolition 
of current models of how meaning arises. 
If then my rendering of the passage does not have the same meaning 
as the original, what exactly is its relationship? In the above 
passage I have substituted words in current English usage for Nadsat 
words. This substitution is only possible because with Nadsat, as 
with any slang, there is no significant deviation from the grammar 
and syntax of the dialect within which the slang operates. The 
meaning of individual words such as "deng" and "veck" is easily 
inferred from the syntax and context. More difficult words such as 
"brosay" or "smeck" may easily be deciphered by anyone with a 
knowledge of phrase-book Russian. 
15 
By using Russian as the model for his Nadsat vocabulary, Burgess 
implies the extent of Russian influence on his future Britain. But 
implication is all it ever is. Such an influence is never 
explicitly mentioned in the text. However, in discussing the role 
of Nadsat, the inference of Russian influence may be entered as an 
element contributing to the meaning arising from the book as a whole. 
Thus the role of a word is defined by its relation to the other 
words in the sentence, and the piece as a whole. And although in 
principle the words "devotchka", "chick" and "girl" are 
interchangeable they serve different roles in the context of the 
piece. More importantly one could get no closer to discerning these 
shades of meaning by examining the object of the word, in this case 
a girl, and in trying to ascertain what Alex means when he used the 
word we can.only look at Alex's other statements. When reading B 
Clockwork Orange the temptation is, at first, to stop at every 
strange word and see what its translation is, however, towards the 
end of the book I was not conscious of making English substitutions 
for Nadsat words such as "malenky", "litso", "droog", "gulliver" 
etc .... I was moreover prepared to guess at the meaning of other 
words if I thought their precise translation was not critical. When 
Alex says his "mum had laid out" a "malenky bit of supper - a couple 
of lomticks of tinned sponge-meat with a shive or so of kleb and 
butter, a glass of the old cold moloko 18 ." we know what Alex is 
talking about without being able to form a precise picture. 
16 
This, as Bolton notes, is a characteristic of slang 
IFunction words l like articles, conjunctions, pronouns, 
prepositions, and other grammatical words such as parts of 
Ito bel, are all perfectly standard, as is their 
arrangement in the sentence. Those properties of language, 
essential to intelligibility, are, unlike slang, very slow 
to change22 . 
These function words are essential to intelligibility, but they do 
not guarantee it. 
It would be ,possible to increase the incidence of slang words in a 
Clockwork Orange. The last sentence of paragraph one, chapter one, 
might be rendered thus: -
Or you peet moloko with noshes in it, as we used to skazat 
and this would sharpen you up and make you ready for a 
lomtick of grahzny twenty-to-one, and that was what were 
peeting this evening 11m nachinating the raskazz with. 
It is easy to see why Burgess did not take this more extreme 
option. A balance must be maintained between the intelligible and 
the barely intelligible. The author wants his reader to work without 
having to be a code breaker. This principle of balance we may see 
as a recurring and decisive factor in the construction of languages 
in science fiction. 
Burgessls chief concern is to establish the vitality of his narrator 
Alex. The language of A Clockwork Orange achieves this through 
"linguistic exhibitionism" (as Burgess calls it )23. The reader 
ought to feel genuine pathos when Alex is subjected to the horrors 
of aversion therapy; when ·the agents of the state seek to mechanize 
him. 
18 
The suggestion at the end of the book is that even as the plaything 
of political forces which he does not understand, Alex still has 
freedom of choice, he is not a conditioned thing. He is free once 
again to rape and terrorise and listen to Beethoven. Punishment, as 
far as Burgess is concerned, is one thing, aversion therapy quite 
another. Indeed the book is no more than a condemnation of aversion 
therapy, or rather, negative conditioning. The only metaphor which 
the book extends is its title. By default almost, the character of 
Alex rises from the obfuscation of Nadsat. In the sense that 
Burgess has failed to integrate the language with essential elements 
of the plot, it is a failed experiment. I suspect that the choice 
of Russian as a source for Nadsat is little more than an excuse for 
a sideswipe at communism. 
Given that Burgess has deviated from the Wells ian pattern and made 
the attempt to dramatise the language of his future world, his 
contribution to raising the language consciousness of science 
fiction writers deserves recognition. Walter E. Meyers in his essay 
'The future History and Development of the English Language ,24 and 
his subsequent book Aliens and Linguists,2S testifies to an 
appalling lack of attention to linguistic matters throughout the 
whole of science fiction. This is all the more surprising 
considering that science fiction frequently deals with the 
confrontation of differing language communities (so-called 'first 
contact l stories) and have "communication in general and language in 
particular as their central concern" 26 . 
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Meyers, whilst agreeing with C. F. Hockett that science fiction 
writers have been slow to assimilate linguistics to all the other 
sciences they purport to have knowledge of, is not particularly 
critical of their slipshod attempts. Indeed, the scientific 
accuracy often demanded and rarely achieved, is likely to remain 
outside the scope of science fiction as long as criticism fails to 
encourage it. The lack of formal integrity in Riddley Walker, for 
example, belies the critical and popular acclaim which the book has 
received. The plot (by now a cliche) concerns how in a 
post-holocaust society, the remnants of our civilisation, technology 
and language, are transformed into the myths and legends of that 
future society. In Chapter 6 the "Eusa Story" is told. This sample 
of text describes the war which wiped out the technological 
civilization which we are encouraged to believe was the culmination 
of our own, 
Eusa had thay Nos.uu thay Master Chaynjis. He run them 
thru the Power Ring he mayd the 1 Big 1. Eusa put the 1 
Big 1 in barms then him & Mr Clevver droppit so much thay 
kilt as meene uv thear oan as thay kilt enemies. Thay wun 
the Warr but the Ian wuv poyzen from it the ayr & water as 
we1 27 
This is less like science fiction than a Benny Hill sketch. If the 
passage is read aloud it sounds like nothing more than stage yokel. 
A writer's idea of how a country bumpkin might speak. The "1 Big 1" 
refers to the holocaust, the atomic bomb. Eusa is a combination of 
st. Eustace and the inventor of the bomb. Apart from some rather 
uninventive coinages the unsuspecting reader is the victim of 
nothing more than systematic mis-spelling. 
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Riddley Walker is about the rediscovery of gunpowder 2,000 years 
after the holocaust. The plot unfolds through the protagonist, 
Riddley Walker, walking backwards through the game of 
chinese-whispers which Hoban has constructed. The net effect of 
Hoban's mysticism, obfuscation and phonetic spelling, is 
frustration. Tales of post-holocaust societies are common enough. 
Walter M. Miller's Canticle for Leibowitz 28 being the most notable 
in the manner in which it deals with the interpretation of the 
language of technology by the new scholars. Miller tells a tale of 
the rediscovery of electricity and the eventual rebuilding of 
technological society with intelligence and humour. Hoban takes 
Miller's basic plot and overlays it with mysticism and pointless 
mis-spelling. I have not cited Hoban's book merely to declare it a 
futile exercise in word play. On the contrary Riddley Walker 
exemplifies a method in the construction of a future language, 
which, through its sheer banality brings into sharp relief the 
distinction between sense and nonsense, innovation and novelty, in 
the invention of languages. 
In the case of both Burgess and Hoban considerable energy has been 
invested in representing speech of the future. The misreading of 
ancient texts which is essential to Riddley Walker's effect is given 
the lie by the ease with which its thinly disguised English can be 
read. We might ask why the protagonists have so much trouble 
understanding these old texts when their language is so similar in 
pronunciation to present day language. Thus the language of the 
book, far from being integral to the metaphor is counterproductive 
to it. 
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By jumping so rapidly from what I have called the Wellsian approach 
to languages, to the thoroughgoing dramatisations of Burgess and 
Hoban, I have avoided the complexities of Parrinder's 
middle-ground. Note, however, that the worlds of Riddley Walker and 
Clockwork Orange are not particularly strange to us. The reader is 
not startled by the impossible, the paradoxical, or anything 
conceptually difficult at all. The language merely adds spice to a 
dreary piece of future fiction. what appears to be formal 
innovation is not particularly innovative, and importantly does not 
reflect conceptual innovation. 
Given that linguistic innovation does not entail new ideas, is the 
reverse also true? The temptation is to think that science fiction, 
in trying to describe the 'new thing' often falls short through 
linguistic necessity. Wittgenstein however would disagree. In his 
preface to the Tractatus he remarks "what can be said can be said 
clearly", later he says 
When an answer cannot be put into words, neither can be the 
question be put into words. 
The riddle does not exist. 
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to 
answer it29 . 
If we must draw a limit to the expression of thought that limit must 
be drawn in language "on the other side of the limit will simply be 
30 . 
nonsense" . It is important not to think of language and thought 
as if they were related by some kind of correspondence, or even a 
casual connection. Only then is it possible to discuss new words, 
ideas and objects without having to worry about whether the tail is 
wagging the dog. 
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One of science fiction's set pieces is to posit a situation where 
someone or something possesses a sense which we do not have. Wells 
in, 'The Country of the Blind ' , imagines the reverse situation. The 
people in the valley in which his traveller, Nunez, is stranded, 
have been blind for so many generations that they no longer have the 
vocabulary or concepts to grasp what sight is. Instead of becoming 
their ruler as he had expected, the traveller, in his attempts to 
convince the blind people of his superiority, is merely branded an 
idiot and a madman. 
Even the gi~l with whom he falls in love treats his talk of sight as 
"the most poetical of fancies"31. The important point of this 
story is not that they can't understand his speech, or lack the 
concept of sight, what matters is that he is unable to demonstrate 
that this wonderful extra sense gives him any advantage over the 
blind people, or enables him to do things better or more quickly. 
If he had been able to demonstrate that sight enabled him to plough 
a field more quickly or some such thing, it might have set the blind 
people thinking that sight would indeed be a desirable thing even 
though they have no idea what it entails. In such a situation we 
can imagine the word entering their vocabulary without their ever 
'understanding ' what light or colour are. In the context of the 
story however, although Nunez speaks the truth, what he says is 
nonsense. The people of the village have no use for his visions. 
What he says is nonsense precisely because what he says does not 
materially affect their behaviour. We can see here that it is not 
only difficult to discern the difference between sense and nonsense, 
but it has nothing to do with what is true 32 . 
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Nunez is a little like our archetypal science fiction writer, 
attempting to evoke awe and wonder at his feats of imagination; 
using strange words and strange concepts. Even if there are 
philosophical and scientific truths embodied in these "poetical 
fancies", convincing the reader of this requires more than 
veracity. At some stages in this study it might appear that I, like 
the medicine man in 'The Country of the Blind', advocate the putting 
out of the visionaries eyes. In fact I have no wish to censure 
science fiction for lack of scientific accuracy or for tendencies 
toward fantasy. What I do hope to show is that the chosen themes of 
science fiction are likely to lead it, like Nunez, into areas where 
language creates conceptual tangles rather than resolves them. 
Wells amply demonstrates in a story containing almost no neologisms, 
that where language is concerned the mundane can often serve better 
than the flamboyant. Nevertheless the story of twentieth century 
literature is largely given over to style wars, and James Joyce the 
voice that launched a thousand books. 
Theories at the Bottom of the Jargon: Science Fiction and Realism 
Joyce's pre-occupation with technique throughout his life was a 
restless dissatisfaction with modes of representation which proved 
inadequate to the task of presenting the world as he saw it. Roger 
Fowler in Linguistics and the Novel writes, 
Joyce articulates the thoughts of Leopold Bloom in an 
artificially constructed language which, by convention, has 
come to be accepted as the representation of a fragmented 
unfocused consciousness of that sort 33 . 
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Joyce, with Ulysses, employed a technique which, much in the way a 
coined word passes into the language, has passed into the syntactic 
tool box of the modern writer. In fact as Fowler suggests, Joyce's 
method of representing consciousness has become a convention. 
When Joyce presents Bloom's consciousness, he is making a statement 
on the possibility of knowing more intimately, more intimately than 
Henry James would admit, the mind of an individual. Joyce's 
technique articulates a view of Bloom which cannot be checked off 
against an objective phenomenon in the 'real' world. His innovation 
is to represent a relationship; to dramatize a fictional 
relationship with a character, in a manner which extends the limit 
of fiction. Joyce's mode of representation determines point of 
view, proximity, texture of thought etc... It may seem blasphemous 
now to make a form/content distinction by observing that although 
Joyce's subject matter, (that is the forms of human behaviour with 
which he is concerned) was in many ways new, daring even, it is the 
very familiarity of the setting and the relationships of the 
characters to each other which has caused his technical innovations 
to be so well received. 
Lotman argues a similar point, suggesting that paradigmatic 
conservatism varies in inverse proportion to syntagmatic 
innovation. If this is true it bodes ill for science fictional 
stylistics. The "cognitive estrangement"34 as Suvin describes it, 
apparently so essential to science fiction, would seem to preclude 
striking this balance. 
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A commitment to novelty. "the new thing". as Parrinder calls it. is 
likely to encourage narrative conservatism if the science fiction 
text wishes to conform to the requirements of what Ian Watt calls 
"formal realism". 
Science Fiction. considered in the light of Watt's definition of 
"formal realism". is a strong candidate for the ideal form of the 
novel. Watt sees the novel as the literary form which "most fully 
reflects (the) individualistic and innovating reorientation"3~ 
which characterises the philosophical realism of the early 
eighteenth century. He continues: -
The novel is thus the logical literary vehicle of a culture 
which. in the last few centuries. has set an unprecedented 
value on originality. on the novel. and it is therefore 
well named 36 . 
Although the life portrayed in science fiction is often fantastic. 
its "realism". any novel's realism as Watt observes. "does not 
reside in the kind of life it presents, but in the way it presents 
it". The technique of "formal realism" is the pretence that 
language is being used in an ordinary way. 
Linguistic innovation is thrust upon the science fiction writer. He 
must innovate language as surely as he must update the technology of 
his future world. He must spice his language with neologism as he 
decorates his new worlds with new gadgets. As we have seen the 
neologisms of science fiction disturb the reader whilst 
simultaneously trying to make him feel comfortable in the scenario. 
The same is arguably true of metaphor . 
. 
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Watt counterpoises metaphorical or poetical language against what he 
sees as the distinctive "realist" narrative mode of the novel. He 
enumerates various technical characteristics of the novel 
emphasising how 
(they) all seem to contribute to the furthering of an aim 
which the novelist shares with the philosopher - the 
production of what purports to be an authentic account of 
the actual experience of individuals. This aim involves 
many other departures from the traditions of fiction 
besides those already mentioned. What is perhaps the most 
important of these, the adoption of a prose style to give 
an air of complete authenticity, is also closely related to 
one of the distinctive methodological emphases of 
philosophical realism37 . 
In Watt's view the novel is concerned with essentially new 
experiences as opposed to universals or absolutes; with 
particularities rather than generalities; and because the individual 
only has identity through consciousness in a particular time and 
place, the background of the novel would seem to require solid 
referents in the real world. Watt compares the reader of a novel to 
the member of a jury in a court of law; the reader assesses the 
novel as if it were evidence, as if it were a report on human life. 
The narrative method whereby the novel embodies this 
circumstantial view of life may be called its formal' 
realism; formal because the term realism here does not 
refer to any special literary doctrine or purpose, but only 
to a set of narrative procedures which are so commonly 
found together in the novel, and so rarely in other 
literary genres, that they may be regarded as typical of 
the form itself. Formal realism, in fact, is the narrative 
embodiment .... the premise, or primary convention, that 
the novel is a full and authentic report of human 
experience, and is therefore under an obligation to satisfy 
its reader with such details of the story as the 
individuality of the actors concerned, the particulars of 
the times and places of their actions, details which are 
presented through a more largely referential use of 
language than i~ common in other literary forms 38 . 
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Watt sees the poverty of the novel's formal conventions as the price 
it must pay for its realism. Because it is not possible to isolate 
any particular style which will distinguish a fictional from a 
non-fictional text, the technique of formal realism is dependent on 
the author's intention, not to deceive, but to pretend to refer to 
people and recount events. According to Watt when reading such a 
text "blind " , as it were, it would not always be possible to 
ascertain whether people and places referred to had referents in the 
real world or were part of the pretence of the author. It is a 
feature of formal realism that, as John Searle writes, 
the author will refer to real places and events 
inter-mingling these references with the fictional 
references, thus making it possible to treat the fictional 
story as an extension of our existing knowledge 39 . 
Searle is here saying that the fact that the fictional and 
non-fictional are treated alike, that they are linguistically 
indistinguishable, is a crucial factor in the coherence of a piece 
of fiction. Implicit in this statement is the erroneous assumption 
that fiction can be mistaken for the non-fictional; that one could 
pick up a novel, for example, and believe that it was an accurate 
transcription of events. In fact, as Kenner points out in Joyce's 
Voices 40 , every era has its literary and artistic styles, which 
although often invisible at the time, given a little distance, 
temporal or cultural, can be discerned quite clearly. Given a 
single page of text one would in most cases not only be able to 
distinguish whether it was fiction or non-fiction, one would in all 
likelihood be able to determine when it was written within a 30 year 
window. 
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Searle cannot seriously be saying that he confuses fiction and 
non-fiction, hence his argument is a discourse on the nature and 
importance of reference. 
In Expression and Meaning Searle attempts to establish 'The Logical 
Status of Fictional Discourse' within his larger theory of speech 
acts (or illocutionary acts as he prefers to term them). Searle 
classifies speech acts into five basic categories. The class which 
we are here most interested in is the "assertive" class. This class 
includes "statements, assertions, descriptions, and 
characterisations" all of which Searle sees as characterising a work 
of fiction. In his view there is no such "illocutionary act" as 
writing a novel; the author of a work of fiction "pretends to 
perform a series of illocutionary acts, normally of the assertive 
type."41 
The rules which establish these "utterances" as assertions, he 
calls, "vertical rules that establish connections between language 
and reality". What makes fiction possible, he suggests, is a set of 
"horizontal conventions" which are extralinguistic and non-semantic, 
and "break the connection between the words and the world 
established by the vertical rules". Without changing the meanings 
of the words this set of horizontal conventions suspends 
the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary 
acts to the world. In this sense, to use Wittgenstein's 
jargon, telling stories is really a separate language game; 
to be played it requires a separate set of conventions, 
though these conventions are not meaning rules; and the 
language game is not on all fours with illocutionary 
language games, but is parasitic on them42. 
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Searle's position is therefore that the meaning which emerges from 
fictional discourse is essentially the same as that of "serious" or 
non-fictional discourse, but of a lower order because the assertions 
are only pretended. The intermingling of the two forms of 
discourse, which he suggests makes it possible "to treat the 
fictional story as an extension of our existing knowledge", seems in 
this model to be dependant on the closeness with which the pretended 
assertion approximates a real assertion. 
The criteria for such closeness in turn depends on a "background of 
assumptions and practices which are not themselves represented as 
part of the literal meaning,,43 Searle is arguing that the 
coherence of a work of "naturalist" fiction depends on the 
intermingling of fictional and non-fictional discourse made possible 
through the extralinguistic "assumptions" which they share. 
Because the 'intermingling' of the fictional and non-fictional seems 
to threaten the operation of his vertical rules, Searle, in the 
tradition of Frege and Strawson states the following axiom, 
1. Whatever is referred to must exist44 . 
this first postulate of existence being the foundation of the axiom 
of identity and Searle's own axiom of "identification". Existence 
here does not exclude fictional characters because, 
One can refer to them as fictional characters precisely 
because they do exist in fiction. 45 
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and he continues, 
and 
To make this clear we need to distinguish normal real world 
talk from parasitic forms of discourse such as fiction, 
playacting etc .... 46 
I should emphasise that my account of parasitic forms of 
discourse does not involve the view that there are any 
changes in the meanings of words or other linguistic 
elements in fictional discourse. If we think of the 
meaning conventions of linguistic elements as being (at 
least in part) vertical conventions, tying sentences to the 
world, then it is best to think of the tacit conventions of 
fictional discourse as being lateral or horizontal 
conventions lifting, as it were, the discourse away from 
the world. But it is essential to realise that even in 
"Little Red Riding .Hood", "red" means red. 47 
Consistent with the theory of i1locutionary acts, the words "hood", 
"riding", and "little" must also have their "normal" meaning. Yet 
when combined in the sentence "Little Red Riding Hood was walking 
through the forest one day.", they have not the status of a 'real' 
i11ocutionary act because the assertion is 'pretended'. If however 
I said, "One day Little Red Riding Hood was walking through Epping 
forest.", I would be pretending to refer to Little Red Riding Hood 
(a fictional character whom I have created), and actually referring 
to the real Epping forest. However, the assertion as a whole is 
only pretended, although grammatically it follows the convention of 
a real assertion. 
Searle'S method of procedure might be described as "rearguard 
action", he takes up a clearly indefensible position, and though 
fighting fiercely, concedes, (with exceptions to rules he has 
established and a wealth of footnotes,)so much ground that, when one 
appears to have won the argument one wonders exactly what he was 
defending. 
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Such is his argument concerning fictional reference. He appends a 
footnote to his axiom of existence, as follows, 
"Exist" has to be construed tenselessly. One can refer to 
what has existed or what will exist as well as to what now 
exists 48 . 
This is one of Searle's more remarkable footnotes. Aside from its 
implications for philosophy as a whole, it obviates or negates a 
great deal of Searle's own argument concerning fiction. Given that 
it is possible to create any fiction situation or character that the 
imagination will allow, Searle's footnote renders it impossible to 
"fail of reference", when we talk of things fictional. Thus 
references to Napoleon, Mrs. Sherlock Holmes, and little green men 
are all equally admissible. 
Despite such magnanimity, he asserts that the language of science 
fiction, perhaps because a story set in another world raises 
questions about background assumptions, is not so straightforwardly 
parasitic in its operation as naturalistic fiction. Thus Searle 
remarks, 
What counts as coherence in the world of science fiction 
will not count as coherence in a work of naturalism. What 
counts as coherence will be in part a function of the 
contract between author and reader about the horizontal 
conventions 49 . 
This view directly contradicts Searle's previous statement that the 
horizontal conventions lido not alter or change the meanings of any 
words of other elements of the language"; because in science fiction 
words and their meanings ~ altered. Science fiction gives words 
new uses, it invents words and as we have seen, may even propose new 
languages. 
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The extension of language in this way is just one aspect of how 
fiction and literature as a whole extend the ordinary limits of 
language and contribute to linguistic change. In failing to take 
account of the importance of fiction in promoting linguistic change, 
Searle's account of lithe status of fictional discourse", is 
inadequate, not only to science fiction but to literature as a whole. 
If a particular science fiction story presents a new concept and 
gives it a name, in order to be able to use that name, a setting and 
a series of relationships dictating its use must be established. 
The reader learns through the course of the story the use, and 
therefore the meaning oP the new word. The reading of a piece of 
science fiction is thereby, in some ways, analogous to the learning 
of a language. This is crucial, because even the simplest works of 
science fiction invariably involve the reader in the learning of new 
words or new uses for words. 
Marc Angenot in his essay 'The Absent Paradigm' comments that 
SF has, little by little, created its own vocabulary which 
is to a large degree used in common by different writers 
and has penetrated everyday language: android, cyborg, 
robotics, chronolysis. It is quite possible that such 
words as airship, aeronautics, cosmonaut, and television 
were first emgloyed in fiction and only later entered 
common usageS . 
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Samuel Delany likewise notes that a member of the editorial board of 
The Oxford Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (sic) has 
testified that 
science fiction is the most fertile area of writing in the 
production of new words which endure in the language - a 
position held up to the mid-thirties by poetrySl. 
The above observations suggest a special status for the language of 
science fiction. Delany in an appendix to his novel Triton writes, 
science fiction is science fiction because various bits of 
technological discourse (real, speculative, or pseudo) -
that is to say the 'science' - are used to redeem various 
other sentences from the merely metaphorical, or even the 
meaningless, for denotative description/presentation of 
incident. 
Such sentences as "His world exploded", or "She turned on 
her left side," as they assume the proper technological 
discourse (of economics and cosmology in one; of switching 
circuitry and prosthetic surgery in the other) leave the 
banality of the emotionally fuzzy metaphor, abandon the 
triviality of insomniac tossings, and through the labyrinth 
of technical possibility, become possible images of the 
impossibleS2 . 
Delany is suggesting that rather than construe a phrase like "his 
world exploded", or "she looked straight through him" as 
metaphorical, in science fiction one might give them a literal 
interpretation. Someone's planet might blow up or a girl might see 
through someone's body. This "extending of semantic possibilities", 
because it presents the metaphor as "real", Peter S. Alterman has 
called "the concretizing of a metaphor"S3. 
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In his essay Delany suggests that the semantic possibilities for 
speculative fiction are not only more numerous, but also "richer" 
than those of naturalistic fiction or mundane fiction (MF). Patrick 
Parrinder responds that he "suspects" that "what Delany wishes to 
argue is that SF is capable of generating more thoroughly "writerly" 
texts (to use Barthes's term) than is realism"S4. Parrinder 
attributes Delany's comments to a certain overzealousness on behalf 
of the "SF fraternity". 
Delany's contention that meaningful SF is necessarily more 
"plurivalent" than MF seems to assume that MF both posits 
and relies on automatic agreement between its writers, 
narrators, characters and readers as to the location of the 
"empirical world". Not only does all fiction rest on some 
degree of conflict about the nature of the world (even if 
it is only the conflict between the man slipping on the 
banana skin and the spectator), but a great deal of modern 
fiction has been devoted to exploding the myth that such 
conflicts can eventually been resolved. In a novelist like 
Virginia Woolf, the "mundane", is only the lowest common 
denominator among the individual solipsisms which it is the 
writer's real concern to project. 55 
However, the very notion of fantasy appears to rely on a "general 
agreement" about what can or cannot happen. Joanna Russ extends 
Delany's definitions arguing that IIfantasy is fantasy because it 
contravenes the real and violates it.", she goes on, 
science fiction stands in some kind of paradoxical relation 
to both fantasy and naturalism, in much the same way that 
satire stands in relation to both fantasy (the 
exaggeration) and actuality (the model) ...... Critics 
outside the field, who assimilate science fiction to 
fantasy, tend to neglect both the straightforward realism 
of most science fiction (I'm talking about style, remember) 
and the oddities that such realistic matter-of-factness 
produces ..... events in a science fiction story are first 
and foremost What Happened .... they are to be taken as 
literally true in the same sense that events in any 
naturalistic novel are to be taken as literally true S6 
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It is this commitment to 'realism ' , scientific language, the 
authentic report, the slavish pursuit of scientific accuracy in 
science fiction, which gives rise to a remarkable tendency which 
seeks to validate its technology. 
What counts as coherence in a work of science fiction seems largely 
to be based on the application of such principles which a critic 
would never dream of applying to a work of "naturalistic fiction". 
This kind of criticism is itself pseudo-science. 
Frederic Jameson attempts to raise this principle to a precept in an 
essay entitled 'World-Reduction in Le Guin: The Emergence of Utopian 
Narrative ' , 
One of the most significant potentialities of SF as a form 
is precisely this capacity to provide something like an 
experimental variation on our own empirical universe;57 
Jameson, writing on Le Guin's Left Hand of Darkness 58 , notes that 
in "extrapolating one of our own Earth seasons" and pushing it to 
its "ultimate conclusions" Le Guin is "experimenting on a principle 
of systematic exclusion". Jameson examines the effects of this 
principle of systematic exclusion in "other thematic areas of the 
novel", notably in its treatment of sex and of industrialisation. 
The concept of "kemmer", he claims. "does away with all that is 
problematical about sex," and that the absence of an industrial 
revolution in Karhide labels capitalism as a disease of "change and 
meaningless momentum". Jameson1s criticism and conclusions are 
quite frankly not applicable to the book he is ostensibly examining. 
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The "problems" which Genly Ai encounters on Gethen, his feelings 
of estrangement when living in a world of ambisexual "human beings", 
as opposed to men and women, constitute the dramatic conflict of the 
book. It is nonsense to say that "Le Guin does away with all that 
is problematical about sex", the book is an explicit examination of 
the ideology of sexuality as it applies to our own culture. 
The "problems" are there in the cultural baggage of the first person 
narrator. The exact makeup of the world is less important than 
Genly Ails reactions to it. Because of the stripping down and 
extending process used in the construction of the world of Gethen, 
few of the elements of The Left Hand of Darkness are unfamiliar. 
The most notable concept requiring neologism is "kemmer", in our 
terms it refers to an alternative sexuality. Although the novel 
draws heavily on Eastern culture, it could still be said to operate 
on the "one-step-beyond " principle, in that it alters the world in 
only one crucial aspect. 
The coinage "kemmer" is a good example of a neologism, which unlike 
others to which I have referred, has no use outside the fictional 
context. The nearest equivalent to "in kemmer" would be to "be on 
heat", with the crucial difference that for the ambisexual 
Gethenians the period of sexual activity which is kemmer, determines 
their sexuality for the rest of the cycle. We understand the 
coinage by relating the behaviour of human beings and animals to the 
behaviour of LeGuin's fictional characters. 
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Wittgenstein remarks in Philosophical Investigations 
The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference 
by means of which we interpret an unknown language 59 
Wittgenstein, it must be remembered, characterises language as a 
form of human behaviour, and language may not be considered outside 
the system of language-games because it is through sharing in the 
playing of the language-game that language is connected with our 
life. Linguistic change is not caused by new concepts, and new 
concepts are not brought about through changes in language. 
It is the playing of the language-game, essentially & learning 
process, which promotes change. Wittgenstein remarks in On Certainty 
When language games change, then there is a change in 
concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words 
change60 . 
The fact that "kemmer" has no use outside its fictional context 
(none that I can think of anyway), i.e. the language-game of LHO, 
does not mean that it means less than "robot", which has. Both 
rely, as Wittgenstein says, on a certain amount of "stage-setting" 
and their importance is determined by their role within it. 
When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets 
that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is 
presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense 61 
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Thus, the word coined in a piece of fiction may have no use in the 
non-fictional world simply because the "stage-setting" which gave 
the word meaning in its fictional context is inappropriate to the 
larger context. Such words as have found their way into our 
language, Orwell's "doublethink" for example, do so because the 
author patterns his work around a world of human behaviour which is 
either contemporary or of the not-too-distant future. The 
compatibility of the linguistic community of Nineteen Eighty-Four 
with our own does not, however, guarantee that any other of its 
neologisms will cross into popular speech. 
Jameson's accusation that the world depicted by LeGuin is 
inadequate, betrays a curiously literal attitude to language. Does 
the world of the text have to be present as if we could gaze down 
upon in like Gods? I might ask, why should we be able to construct 
a coherent world from LeGuin's descriptions? 
Jameson is obviously more concerned with what is not there than what 
is. He would like to be able to build a kind of mental model from 
The Left Hand of Darkness about which he could say, "That bit is 
nicely made, but that bit is innacurate." Just as Ulysses is said 
to contain a map of Dublin, Jameson would like to see a map of 
Gethen. Riddley Walker and The Silmarillion & Dune actually have 
maps of their respective territories included with the text. Marc 
Angenot, commenting on this tendency in science fiction, remarks 
"For the SF writer the 'map' and the 'ground' are necessarily 
"confused"62. Angenot a£tempts, to show that it is the absence of 
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paradigms in 'SF discourse' which make such discourse 
distinguishable from what he terms "realistic" discourse. He 
asserts that invented words in science fiction create a 
"paradigmatic mirage" and hence his distinction between neologisms 
and "fictive words". The paradigmatic structures apparently 
necessary for meaning to arise from a realist text are somehow 
missing in science fiction. Thus the Martian word "Nususumu" (which 
is an animal I think) implies the absent paradigm "the whole Martian 
language". 
The fictive word inserted in the syntagmatic structure of the text 
evokes for the reader a paradigm implied in the text, or "paradigms 
of his own world", which he must extend, or elaborate on through a 
series of conjectures. Angenot writes, 
The syntagmatic insertion of the fictive word creates the 
illusion of paradigmatic structure, which supposedly 
corresponds to empirical constructions 63 . 
What he means is that the grammar of the sentence into which the 
"fictive word" is inserted implies a referent in the real world. 
And when Angenot writes 
The existence of a language (Martian) even if represented 
by only a few queer quotations, implies the existence of 
intelligent life and a "fictive" referential world. 64 
he implies that the "referential world" of realistic fiction is 
somehow more wholly present than in the text. Because the world of 
Cethen or Nineteen Eighty Four are not part of the reader's 
experience, are "illusory general systems". they do not warrant the 
kind of investigation which the world implied in naturalistic 
fiction does. The reader accepting this reads science fiction in a 
"conjectural mode", accepting also the "delusive" character of the 
. 
semantic paradigms. Angenot further distinguishes the "lexical 
creations" of Lewis Carroll in The Hunting of the Snark from 
invented words in science fiction. 
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The SF writer does not lead the reader to a semantic dead 
end as Carroll does: he leads the reader to believe in the 
possibility of reconstituting consistent paradigms - whose 
semantic structures are supposedly homologous to those in 
the fictive textual IIworld ll . 
The syntagmatic insertion of the fictive word creates the 
illusion of a paradigmatic structure, which supposedly 
corresponds to empirical constructions6~ 
Thus invented words in science fiction although not utterly without 
meaning, (like those of The Hunting of the Snark) are deficient in 
the same. And if I read the latter quotation above correctly, 
deficient because the paradigmatic structure does not truly 
correspond to real lIempirical constructions ll , in short because it 
has no object. 
This, I maintain, is why Angenot calls Carroll's neologism semantic 
IIdead ends ll . Carroll does not describe to Angenot's satisfaction the 
"borogroves" or the "Snark", does not provide an object of thought, 
and therefore fails in Angenot's view to impart meaning to the words. 
A study of the construction of Newspeak and its function in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, will establish that the word coinages of science 
fiction need neither be "semantic dead ends" nor IIsemiotic lures ll , 
and that it is Angenot, imperfectly adopting semantic field theory, 
who is confusing IImapll and IIgroundll. 
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liThe question is,1I said Alice, "whether you .£J!.!l make words mean so 
many different things." 
liThe question is,1I said Humpty Dumpty, "Which is to be the master -
that's all." (Through the Looking Glass. Ch. 6). 
Orwell's Language: A Question of Who is the Master 
It is worth observing at the outset that Orwell's IINewspeak" and 
Burgess's "Nadsat" play very different roles. "The purpose of 
Newspeak", according to the anonymous author of the appendix of 
Nineteen Eighty-Four 
was not only to provide a medium of expression for the 
world view and mental habits proper to the devotees of 
Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought 
impossible66 . 
Newspeak is to be seen as deliberately constructed to serve the 
political ends of Ingsoc (English Socialism) whereas the ideological 
colouring of "Nadsat" inheres in its role as a kind of teenage slang. 
Nineteen Eighty-Four is, as John Wain observes, a polemical approach 
to the question of how completely human beings can be dominated. 
Orwell's satire deals with the more pervasive mechanisms whereby 
human freedoms are gradually restricted. The mechanisms of 
totalitarianism which Nineteen Eighty-Four dramatizes are those 
which Orwell perceives in post-war England. He merely exaggerates 
and distorts them in order that they may be more clearly shown. 
Further, the world which· he depicts is immediately recognisable, 
particularly to the reader of the fifties. 
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As Irving Howe points out, it is only "one step" beyond the world of 
194867 . The poverty and decay, the lies and the propaganda, are 
instantly recognisable to the Londoner who has lived through a 
world-war. Orwell restricts technical advance to such areas as 
enable the totalitarian state greater power over the people whom it 
governs. 
Further, as W. F. Bolton remarks 
He thought that literacy and electronic media with their 
political and commercial blandishments threatened the 
subjugation, not the liberation, of the human mind68 . 
Orwell runs together the features of two, ostensibly opposed 
ideologies, and rationalises them into a single totalitarian state. 
Nineteen Eighty-Four is effective as a warning because the insidious 
mechanisms of which Orwell warns, made overt in his novel, may dimly 
be perceived in the reader's own life. Howe criticises Orwell's 
"questionable view of the dynamics of power in a totalitarian 
state." He writes 
As he (Orwell) portrays the party oligarchy in Oceania, it 
is the first ruling class of modern times to dispense with 
ideology. It makes no claim to be ruling on behalf of 
humanity, the workers, the nation or anyone but itself; it 
rejects as naive the rationale of the Grand Inquisitor that 
he oppresses the ignorant to accomplish their salvation. 
O'Brien, the representative of the Inner Party, says "The 
Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not 
interested in the good of others; we are interested solely 
in power." The Stalinists and Nazis, he adds, had 
approached this view of power, but only in Oceania has all 
pretense to serving humanity - that is, all ideology - been 
discarded69 . 
When the ideology has been rationalised out of a totalitarian 
system, all that remains is orthodoxy. And it is "all those smelly 
little orthodoxies" "contending for our souls"70 that Orwell 
consistently attacks. 
"Newspeak" is a satire on political language as Orwell saw it. His 
views on the matter are quite clearly stated in his essay 'politics 
and the English Language ' 
In our time it is broadly true that political writing is 
bad writing. Where it is not true, it will generally be 
found that the writer is some kind of rebel, expressing his 
private opinions and not a "party line". Orthodoxy, of 
whatever colour. seems to demand a lifeless, imitative 
style?l. 
For Orwell the euphemisms and the vagueness of political writing 
merely mask lies. This is one of several examples which he gives. 
Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent 
trudging along the roads with more than they can carry: 
this is called transfer of population or rectification of 
frontiers .... Such phraseology is needed if one wants to 
name things without calling up mental pictures of them72. 
Orwell's appendix to Nineteen Eighty-Four 'The Principles of 
Newspeak I , covers approximately the same ground as 'politics and the 
English Language ' but in addition gives us some insights into the 
construction of Newspeak itself. 
Newspeak attains dramatic form on only three occasions in 1984. 
However its tone, syntax and characteristic doublethink are 
overtured throughout in the slogans and jingles which pour out of 
telescreens, and the mouths of the citizens of Oceania. Winston, it 
must be remembered, is engaged in rewriting history. 
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His job is to doctor articles in The Times such that they accord 
with the account of history which the party currently espouses. All 
this is done in an early form of Newspeak. 
1 
times 3.12.83 reporting bb dayorder double plus ungood refs 
unpersons rewrite fullwise upsub antefiling73 
In Old speak (or standard English) this might be rendered: 
The reporting of Big Brother's Order for the Day in The 
Times of December 3rd 1983 is extremely unsatisfactory and 
makes references to non-existent persons. Rewrite in full 
and submit your draft to higher authority before filin9. 74 
Clearly Newspeak is a precise and concise language that is not 
easily mastered. We are given to believe that to some extent without 
intelligence and literacy one would remain outside the ideological 
grip of the party. This is why the proles remain relatively free. 
The primitive emotions which the party seeks to either eliminate or 
control, can only be destroyed or replaced through the agency of 
language. The constant indoctrination, the Thought Police etc., are 
in 1984 necessary only because Newspeak is not yet the normal means 
of communication. But 
A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language 
would no more know that equal had once had the secondary 
meaning of 'politically equal ' , or that free had once meant 
'intellectually freel, than for instance~person who had 
never heard of chess would be aware of the secondary 
meanings attached to queen and rook. There would b~ many 
crimes and errors which it would be beyond his power to 
commit, simply because they were nameless and therefore 
unimaginable 7S . 
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His job is to doctor articles in The Times such that they accord 
with the account of history which the party currently espouses. All 
this is done in an early form of Newspeak. 
1 
times 3.12.83 reporting bb dayorder double plus ungood refs 
unpersons rewrite fullwise upsub antefiling73 
In Oldspeak (or standard English) this might be rendered: 
The reporting of Big Brother's Order for the Day in The 
Times of December 3rd 1983 is extremely unsatisfactory and 
makes references to non-existent persons. Rewrite in full 
and submit your draft to higher authority before filing. 74 
Clearly Newspeak is a precise and concise language that is not 
easily mastered. We are given to believe that to some extent without 
intelligence and literacy one would remain outside the ideological 
grip of the party. This is why the proles remain relatively free. 
The primitive emotions which the party seeks to either eliminate or 
control, can only be destroyed or replaced through the agency of 
language. The constant indoctrination, the Thought Police etc., are 
in 1984 necessary only because Newspeak is not yet the normal means 
of communication. But 
A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language 
would no more know that equal had once had the secondary 
meaning of 'politically equal
'
, or that free had once meant 
'intellectually freel, than for instance~person who had 
never heard of chess would be aware of the secondary 
meanings attached to queen and rook. There would be many 
crimes and errors which it would be beyond his power to 
commit, simply because they were nameless and therefore 
unimaginable75 . 
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Symes explains to Winston that the compilers of the Newspeak 
dictionary by reducing the vocabulary seek to 'narrow the range of 
thought' . 
In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, 
because there will be no words in which to express it. 
Every concept that can ever be needed, will be expressed by 
exactly ~ word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all 
its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten 76 . 
Instead of having a great array of words like 'good', 'bad', 
'excellent', 'splendid', 'terrible' etc., the whole semantic (I 
think the structuralists would call it a paradigmatic structure) is 
replaced by 'good' and its negative 'ungood', qualifiers are 'plus' 
and 'double'. So, 'terrible' might be rendered in Newspeak as 
'doubleplusungood'. If language really did work like Newspeak, the 
structuralist model might just have some credibility. In fact the 
system of binary oppositions,such as 'male', 'female', can only work 
in the kind of simplified case which ignores the subtle differences 
in use which a class of words supposedly synonomous, have. The 
paradigm for 'maleness' for example, intersects with so many other 
paradigms, that the concept of a paradigmatic structure is totally 
unworkable as a mode of literary textual analysis. The paradigm of 
'maleness' and 'femaleness' cannot be subsumed under the paradigm 
for 'persons' because animals can be male or female. If the use of 
the word 'male' requires a linguistic paradigm to confer meaning, 
part of that paradigm must be the paradigm for 'adultness' (boy, 
girl, man, woman); a paradigm for gender behaviour, (masculine, 
feminine); a paradigm for social status and its implication of 
behavioural criteria, (gentleman, lady, lout, slag, etc.) The 
circle of references expands by an exponential factor. 
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The idea that 'meaning' emerges from the contracts built into the 
paradigms which lurk behind the words, is a variant on the theory 
that reference has something to do with meaning, and embodies the 
further fallacy that we somehow select the word most suitable to 
what we mean to say. It is as if the sentence were a recipe, and we 
went down to the word supermarket and selected which particular 
brand of tinned tomatoes best suited the dish which we wished to 
cook. 
Orwell's views on language are somewhat ambiguous. His view that 
language somehow clothes thought, that it gives voice to some 
pre-linguistic experience, is quite at odds with the idea embodied 
in Newspeak that a reduction in vocabulary would serve to restrict 
and control thought. In 'Politics and the English Language,77 he 
talks of "letting the meaning choose the word", and suggests putting 
off "using words for as long as possible" in order to "get one's 
meaning as clear as one can through pictures and sens&tions".78 
Reasoning thus, it would be impossible for Ingsoc to achieve its 
goal of making it impossible to think anything in conflict with the 
party line. To resolve this apparent contradiction it is worth 
looking at which aspects of Orwell's views on language find 
themselves embodied in Newspeak. 
In the 'Politics' essay he identifies various linguistiC traits 
which prevent clear expression. The use of dying metaphors, 
pretentious diction and meaningless words are just a few of the 
examples given. Bolton identifies several other of Orwell's 'pet 
peeves', each of which he describes as aspects of 'the general drift 
of language'. 
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These characteristic agencies of language change Bolton sees as 
inevitable and probably irresistible. They are conversion, 
derivation and phrasal-verbs. The first, conversion, refers to the 
interchanging of parts of speech. In Newspeak therefore, we find 
the word 'thought' replaced by 'think', and 'cut' by 'knife'. Any 
word may be used either as a verb, noun, adjective or adverb. 
The second, derivation, is the process of making a new word by 
adding a prefix or suffix. In Newspeak adding I-full, I-wise l , 
'-un', 'plus', etc. modifies the vocabulary limited by conversion. 
The third aspect which Bolton lists, phrasal-verbs, we do not find 
in Newspeak, probably because the practice of altering the meaning 
of a verb by tacking a preposition on to it extends the vocabulary 
rather than shortens it. Newspeak in phasing out the colloquial, 
also phases out phrasal-verbs. Bolton, a little spitefully goes on 
to quote Orwell from an editorial for Polemic in which he commits 
all three offences. 
This is a tendency to play tricks with syntax and produce 
unbuttoned-up and outright meaningless sentences 79 . 
Bolton clearly sees the practice of trying to expunge Americanisms 
and Latinisations from the vocabulary as a kind of linguistic 
jingoism. 
Perhaps such a judgement is a little extreme. Orwell certainly 
exhibits a kind of naive horror at the language of journalists, 
politicians, business men and BBC announcers, but few people would 
disagree that his criticisms of the euphemisms and jargon which 
characterise official reports and political speeches, language 
designed to conceal meaning rather than convey it, are something 
more than criticisms of careless usage. 
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Newspeak's B vocabulary, which we are told consisted of "words which 
80 had been deliberately constructed for political purposes" 
satirises the language of the ministries and Civil Service 
departments. In much the way that the department which deals with 
unemployment is called the Department of Employment, and the 
Ministry which concerns itself with building bigger and better 
weapons is called the Ministry of Defence, the Party deliberately 
embodies a contradiction of the facts in the names of its four 
Ministries. As Goldstein puts it in The Theory and Practice of 
Oligarchical Collectivism such a practice is a kind of 
institutionalised 'impudence'. 
The Ministry of Peace concerns itself with war, the 
Ministry of Truth with lies, the Ministry of Love with 
torture, and the Ministry of Plenty with starvation. These 
contradictions are not accidental, nor do they result from 
ordinary hy~ocrisy: they are deliberate exercises in 
doublethink 1. 
It is misleading to lump together all the various aspects of the 
misuse of language which Orwell identifies, because some of these 
usages are simply carelessness while other practices, as Goldstein 
says, are deliberate, and often subtle in how they achieve their 
effect. It would be foolish to write-off the impenetrable language 
of government reports, for example, as simply inept or lacking in 
style, because the jargon, the euphemisms and the circumlocution are 
deliberately contrived to discourage the casual or lay reader, 
whilst communicating very precisely with the cognocenti. Even if, 
as Orwell points out in the Politics essay, such reports say exactly 
the opposite of what they mean, if you're in the know, you know that 
anyway. 
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Orwell not only embodies this capacity of language to manipulate 
thought within Newspeak, but makes an attempt at manipulating the 
reader through formal means in his organisation of the novel as a 
whole. 
The language of Nineteen Eighty-Four, as George Woodcock notes 82 , 
has a double movement, but the movement of the elements is subtly in 
conflict. In the first movement the physical familiarity of the 
setting takes on an ever more sinister aspect as the book 
progresses. As the action becomes centred on the activities of the 
Thought Police and the Ministry of Love, the tatty but very 
recognisable London gives way to labyrinthine corridors. Initially 
in this first movement or thread, the reader is not asked to accept 
any theory, merely to identify with Winston. This 'human ' interest 
becomes less tangible as the book progresses, and as a development 
lulls the reader into the sense that this world is not her/his own. 
It has some familiar aspects and it coheres, but it is no longer the 
London, the England that he or she knows. The second movement 
involves what Woodcock calls the book's "political and theoretical" 
development. The political philosophy of the Party is manifest 
early in the novel in nonsense slogans, idiotic 'jingles ' and 
snatches of Newspeak. We are given Winston's incomplete and 
unsympathetic view of the politics of 1984, and then a more complete 
account is given in The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical 
Collectivism. 
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In this second thread, the form of the Party's philosophy gradually 
makes it more sensible to the reader. 
Common to all these manifestations is an implied rather than 
articulated criticism of the Party. Even The Theory and 
Practice ... , that part which is reproduced anyway, fails to propose 
an anti-thesis. Consider the element of criticism in the following 
passage from Goldstein's book. 
Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory 
beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of 
them. The Party intellectual knows in which direction his 
memories must be altered; he therefore knows that he is 
playing tricks with reality; but by the exercise of 
doublethink he also satisfies himself that reality is not 
violated. The process has to be conscious or it would not 
be carried out with sufficient precision. but it also has 
to be unconscious, or it would bring with it a feeling of 
falsity and guilt. Doublethink lies at the very heart of 
1ngsoc, since the essential act of the Party is to use 
conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose 
that goes with complete honesty83. 
As in the rest of Goldstein's book, the passage seeks to undermine 
the philosophy of the Party through parody, ridicule, and the 
demonstration of how the Party has debased the language. Rather 
than offer the reader a refutation, it merely hopes that the Party 
will hang itself with its own rope. It is an appeal to shared 
assumptions, to common-sense. No positive action is proposed. When 
the theory of the Party finds in O'Brien its most articulate 
advocate, Winston, and by implication the reader has no counter 
theory with which to respond. When O'Brien asks, " ..... what is it, 
this principle that will defeat Us?" Winston replies. "I don't 
know. The spirit of Man. II' 
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This is the equivalent, in the terms of the book, of saying, "If 
there is hope it lies in the proles". 
It embodies the inadequate, vague hope that has sustained Winston, 
and it is all that remains of the familiar "human" element which 
characterises the earlier part of the book. 
This defamiliarisation is counterpoised by an opposite effect in the 
political content. O'Brien~s piece on "collective solipsism", 
"Already we are breaking down the habits of thought which have 
survived from before the revolution" 84 , if not for the 
'artificially' induced note of fanaticism, is almost plausible. 
Here is O'Brien again, 
We control life, Winston, at all its levels. You are 
imagining that there is something called human nature which 
will be outraged by what we do and will turn against us. 
But we create human nature. Men are infinitely malleable. 
Or perhaps you have returned to your old idea that the 
proletarians or the slaves will rise and overthrow us. Put 
it out of your mind. They are helpless, like the animals. 
Humanity is the Party. The others are outside -
irrelevant85 . 
In this chapter, for the first time, the philosophy of Ingsoc is 
voiced eloquently, in simple powerful language. The language is 
stripped of the jargon which has cluttered previous articulations, 
"the proles" has become lithe proletarians". O'Brien is using 
unambiguous terms accessible to almost anyone. Ingsoc is now 
appealing to common-sense. The reader who has identified 
her/himself with Winston is outmanoeuvred. 
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Orwell's book is an object lesson in self-deception. The reader who 
fails to see that the politics of the early book is as familiar as 
the London in which it is set, is, by the end of the book, through 
the gradual paring away of recognisable 'human' factors, left with 
little else but the politics to call his own. 
Orwell based his model for Nineteen Eighty Four on the writings of 
James Burnham. Orwell summarises Burnham's thesis, as expounded in 
his book The Managerial Revolution, thus: 
Capitalism is disappearing, but socialism is not replacing 
it. What is now arising is a new kind of planned, 
centralized society which will be neither capitalist nor, 
in any accepted sense of the word, democratic. The rulers 
of this new society .... will eliminate the old capitalist 
class, crush the working class, and so organize society 
that all power and economic privilege remain in their own 
hands. Private property rights will be abolished, but 
common ownership will not be established. The new 
'managerial' societies will not consist of a patchwork of 
small, independent states, but of great super-states 
grouped around the main industrial centres in Europe, Asia 
and America. These super-states will fight among 
themselves for the possession of the remaining uncaptured 
portions of the earth, but will probably be unable to 
conquer one another completely.86 
The essay from which this passage is drawn was published in May 
1946. By the August of the same year Orwell had begun to write 
Nineteen Eighty Four. In an essay published in March 1947, Orwell 
reviews a new book by Burnham, The Struggle for the World, he finds 
in this new book less to recommend it than the previous piece, which 
he defends in the following terms, 
The Managerial Revolution .... seemed to me a good 
description of what is actually happening in various parts 
of the world, i:e. the growth of societies neither 
Capitalist or Socialist ... etc. 87 
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Thus in constructing a world which is so familiar Orwell has not 
simply solved ~one of the recurrent problems of Utopian writing~. as 
Woodcock remarks. but is attempting to jerk the reader into greater 
consciousness of an existing political situation through the 
exaggeration (though in some instances Orwell might contend that 
even this was not so) of observable tendencies. 
Nineteen Eighty Four not only theorises on the manner in which 
language circumscribes thought patterns. but it is dramatic and 
practical example of how susceptible the mind is to manipulation 
through form. The concept of Newspeak. providing much of the 
theoretical groundwork. integrates form and content. Bolton argues 
that Orwell ~did not test the linguistic hearsay of his time and 
social class against the "rigour of any theory or even any systematic 
observation" 88 and argues that his views on language. unlike most 
of his views on other aspects of society. were based on assumptions 
about which he was never prepared to brook controversy. This 
argument. that Orwell was a kind of linguistic bigot. is at points 
quite convincing. (Bolton's argument concerning Orwell's 
distinction between speech and writing is informative in this 
respect). But it is a mistake to say that Newspeak simply enshrines 
"all the usages he hated mostll 89 • because some of the essential 
characteristics of Newspeak are features which at the end of 
'Politics' he recommends as rules to rely on "when instinct fails". 
Newspeak, as we have seen. uses a shortened vocabulary of simple 
words that are easy to pronounce. The 8 vocabulary is particularly 
characterised by short. u$ually compound, words. 
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In Newspeak there is no circumlocution. no "wooly" language; it is 
nothing if not concise. Such features seem to concur with Orwell's 
rules. 
ii. Never use a long word where a short one will do. 
iii. If it is possible to cut out a word. always cut it out. 90 
These speculations leave Newspeak. as far as the theory of language 
is concerned. in something of a conceptual vacuum. 
If thought precedes the word. Bolton observes. the theory underlying 
the "thought deleting" qualities of Newspeak conflicts with most of 
the other views which Orwell held. even with his most general view 
about the separability of thought and language. Indeed what Symes 
identifies as the ultimate goal of Newspeak. namely 'duckspeak'. "to 
make articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the 
higher brain centres at all"91. is probably the expression of one 
of Orwell's most persistent complaints about language. He remarks 
in 'Politics'. 
(The) invasion of one's mind by ready-made phrases .... can 
only be prevented if one is constantly on guard against 
them. and every such phrase anaesthetizes a portion of 
one's brain92 . 
This focuses Orwell's remarks as complaints about a tendency to 
string together slogans and prefabricated phrases; to be simply lazy 
and 'unthinking' in one's use of language. Orwell's natural 
tendency to exaggerate raises such a simple idea to a principle. It 
is more difficult to raise the program outlined for Newspeak to a 
principle because the theory underlying it is very suspect. After 
all. as Bolton points out.· "people can long for justice without 
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knowing the word for it", and in Burmese Days the Burmese girl says 
"At least touch me with your lips, then" (there is no Burmese word 
for kiss)" 93 and gets what she asks for. The euphemisms and 
jargon of political language may find their way into everyday 
expressions, and to some extent disguise the meaning of various 
phrases and conceal implications of various ideas, but there must be 
a clear distinction between preventing people from understanding and 
preventing people from thinking. Our range of feelings, emotions 
and concepts is not determined by our ability to articulate them. 
Before we engage in action we do not have to give ourselves a kind 
of mental order; "Raise hand", "swivel eyes" etc ... If our actions 
were dependent on our vocabulary a situation of infinite regress 
would occur whereby we would have to tell ourselves to tell 
ourselves to speak. Bolton's astute, but desperate, observation 
that the appendix to Nineteen Eighty Four is written in the past 
tense, and in standard English, suggests that the appendix is 
written after Newspeak, having failed in its program, has been 
superseded. Perhaps this is an indication that the theory behind 
Newspeak is as cockeyed as the Party itself, and is meant to be. 
However, Orwell is not alone in holding this "one-way street" view 
of the relationship between speech and language. The extreme 
version of the theory is known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which 
holds that "we cannot form concepts for which our native language 
• • 11 94 has no provlslon The diluted form of the theory would hold 
that there is a common underlying structure to all languages, which 
Chomsky calls deep grammar, conditioned by a shared, innate, human, 
language capacity, and ~hat the conceptual differences which we find 
between languages are superficial. The extreme form of the theory 
we find dramatically treated in Samuel Delany's Babel-17. 
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Linguistic Relativity: Babe1-I7, the Tail Wags the Dog 
The action of Babel-I7 takes place on and between the worlds of the 
Earth Alliance. The Alliance War Yards, at Armsedge in the region 
of Bellatrix, and an area of space known as the Specelli Snap. The 
title refers to an "artificial" military language used as a weapon 
by the "Invaders" with whom the Earth Alliance has been at war for 
twenty years. The book traces the development of one Rydra Wong in 
her attempt to find how the language works and who is using it. 
Rydra Wong is twenty-six, beautiful, "the most famous poet in five 
explored ga1axies"9S, a linguist, a te1epath, and a Interstellar 
Space Captain. 
In Delany's novel Rydra Wong's speculations on the nature of 
Babe1-I7 provide a framework and a pretext for more general 
observations on language, society and communication. Because Rydra 
is a poet and a linguist her perceptions on these matters are 
particularly acute. Rydra is the central intelligence. Descriptive 
passages which are not setting the scene or forwarding the action 
are devoted to Rydra's perceptions, and more importantly her 
perceptions of her perceptions. As in the following passage, 
No. 
She didn't 'look at the room.' 
She 'somethinged' at the something.' The first something 
was a tiny vocable that implied an immediate, but passive, 
perception that could be aur~l or olfactory as well as 
visual. 
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The second something was three equally tiny phonemes that 
blended at different musical pitches: one, an indicator 
that fixed the size of the chamber at roughly twenty five 
feet cubical, the second identifying the colour and 
probable substance of the wals - some blue metal - while 
the third was at once a place holder for particles that 
should denote the room's function when she discovered it, 
and a sort of grammatical tag by which she could refer to 
the whole experience with only one symbol for as long as 
she needed. All four sounds took less time on her tongue 
and in her mind than the one clumsy dipthong in "room" 6. 
This whole passage qualifies the experience denoted by the words 
"she looked at the room". We subsequently discover that Rydra is 
thinking in Babel-17. It forces her to think in a very precise 
way. The manner in which it is constructed makes certain 
relationships in the observed world unavoidable. Rydra explains 
this principle herself when she is teaching the Butcher the use of 
the word "I". The Ciribians are a friendly, intelligent, 
"galaxy-hopping life form" who because of their reproductive 
processes and body heat changes have three forms of "I". Although 
we find out very little about these beings we are told that, "Their 
whole culture is based on heat and changes in temperature. "97 
Because they have no word for housing or dwelling, 
You have to end up describing " .... an enclosure that 
creates a temperature discrepancy with the outside 
environment of so many digress, capable of keeping 
comfortable a creature with a uniform body temperature of 
ninety-eight-point-six, etc 98 . 
Conversely, they can describe a "huge solar-energy conversion plant" 
such that another Ciribian could build it, in nine words, "Nine very 
small words, too". Alien encounters are few, she explains. "Because 
compatibility factors for communication are incredibly low". 
Babel-17 is a language which programmes whoever learns it to 
sabotage the war effort of the alliance, that programme is part of 
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its grammar. In order to make this person an efficient saboteur, the 
language is an exact analytical language which "almost assures you 
technical mastery of any situation you look at". Thus when Rydra 
thinks in Babel-17, as when she "somethinged at the something", or 
breaks the three stranded web restraining her, or the invaders ' 
"defence" formations, it is the grammar of the language which makes 
immediate "what should be done, must be done. 11 99 
In learning Babel-17 Rydra unwittingly becomes a saboteur (even of 
her own spaceship). She explains that the reason for this is that 
Babel-17 h~lS no "I". 
The lack of an "1" precludes any self-critical process. In 
fact it cuts out any awareness of the symbolic process at 
all - which is the way we distinguish between reality and 
our expression of realitylOO. 
Babel-17 is compared to a computer language. The person who knows 
it is programmed to react in a certain way to certain stimuli. 
Because the person is thinking in Babel-17 and this language has no 
"symbolic process", the word is the thing, "And the lack of an "1" 
blinds you to the fact that though itls a highly useful way to look 
at things it isn't the only way .. IOI. 
Despite the wealth of theory concerning Babel-17, the language 
achieves no more dramatic realization in the book than description 
in such terms as "equally tiny phonemes that blended at different 
musical pitches", or "a three particle vowel differential", or "clot 
of tiny singing sounds on an area of her tongue smaller than a 
coin". In short, it is never written. We are never privy to 
Rydra's notation. 
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Throughout Babel-l? Delany exploits any opportunity to make dramatic 
his concern with language, or more specifically communication. Thus 
at the end of the book Babel-l? is corrected, "missing elements" are 
introduced and "ambiguities" compensated for. This is Babel-IS, the 
linguist's equivalent of a happy ending. The perfect language. 
The imperfect language, Babel-l?, shares at least one characteristic 
with Newspeak, namely that it is designed as Lem notes as an 
instrument of enslavement. It limits behaviour and thought. As I 
noted with Newspeak such a project for a language has practical as 
well theoretical problems. Benjamin Lee Whorf outlines his 
principle of linguistic relativity thus; "all observers are not led 
by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, 
unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way 
be calibrated. 1I Babel-I? is clearly a rather extreme application of 
the Whorfian thesis. 
Hockett in an essay entitled 'Chinese vs English: An exploration of 
the Whorfian Thesis' establishes that English and Chinese differ, 
not in what it is possible to specify in either language but in 
"what it is relatively easy or hard to specify"I03. He further 
observes that IIFrom the time when science became observational and 
experimental II IIspeech-habits were revised to fit observed facts, and 
where everyday language would not serve, special sub-systems 
(mathematics) were devised. lIl04 This struggle against inherited 
linguistic limitations effectively relegates the Whorfian thesis to 
a linguistic backwater. 
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The impact of inherited linguistic patterns on activities 
is, in general, least important in the most practical 
contexts, and most important in such goings-on as 
story-telling; religion, and philosophizing - which consist 
largely or exclusively of talking anyway. Scientific 
discourse can be carried on in any language the speakers of 
which have become participants in the world of science, and 
other languages can become properly modified with little 
trouble; some types of literature, on the other hand, are 
largely impervious to translation. IDS 
Hockett suggests that the language of science cuts across the 
boundaries indicated by Whorf's "linguistic relativity principle," 
and more importantly distinguishes the use of language in a 
practical context from the use of language in literature. The 
vocabulary and grammar of a particular culture may predispose the 
native speaker to a particular world-view; it may predispose that 
speaker to certain philosophies. But it would be unfair to say that 
language imposes these philosophies. What Wittgenstein, Ryle, and 
the 'ordinary language' school found was that language nevertheless 
leads philosophers astray, and make similar distinctions to Hockett 
when teasing out how various uses of language are more likely than 
others to fall victim to what David Pears calls language's 
. . t' .. 106 
"decept1ve p01n 1ng . 
Before I go on to look at how the philosophy in science fiction 
reflects this characteristic, it might be useful to summarise how 
language is used in science fiction. After all, it partakes of 
various modes of discourse, that of science, that of philosophy, of 
various kinds of literature, the novel, the fable, fantasy; in short 
it might include any linguistic form that one could imagine. 
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We have also seen that science fiction writers invent words, which 
are sometimes nonsense, which often refer to nothing tangible or 
intangible, whereas on the other hand a percentage of these coinages 
find their way into everyday speech. 
These neologisms and the artificial languages, which we have looked 
at may be formed on any principle, which mayor may not be central 
to the plot of the story. They may be slang, gobbledygook, 
systematic distortions of grammar or elaborate codes. The 
relationship between new ideas and new concepts is not reciprocal. 
Whereas a new word is frequently coined to describe a new object, 
practice or concept, most neologisms in science fiction are inserted 
to provoke a sense that the world described is strange and exotic. 
The colourful language of science fiction, it would seem, is 
therefore a kind of motley. Its exhibitionism merely linguistic 
sleight of hand. Entrusted with the task of describing the 
impossible and improbable science fiction has retreated into 
mannered prose and offers at best a few scraps from the linguists 
feast. 
The primary problem, that of representing an alien language is not & 
problem of expression, merely of conventions. Apart from the fact 
that, as Hockett has shown 107 , the chances of deciphering an alien 
language are practically zero, even if we could provide a notation, 
in the context of a story, it would be a very tedious thing to have 
to deal with. 
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Clearly if, as with Newspeak, the structure of the language has a 
bearing on the development of the story, such a struggle with the 
new language has its rewards. This is the area which Meyers and 
Barnes have covered in their various studies. They would simply 
have science fiction treat of linguistics as if it were a science 
like any other, and call for similar standards of plausibility to be 
met with language as with any other aspect of science fictional 
extrapolation. Thus, for example, in 'The Future History and 
Development of the English Language' Meyers is chiefly interested 
that future English ought to be developed along sound linguistic 
lines.lOe 
These problems seem quite distinct from the question which Parrinder 
highlights in connection with Lem. No matter how sound the 
linguistics, a writer who wants to present communication with alien 
beings must take into account the inherent anthropocentrism which 
characterises all language. Any confusion which there may be about 
whether the problem of presenting the 'new thing' is stylistic or 
conceptual is likely to arise here. Such confusion is confounded in 
the case of Solaris by the fact that Lem is imagining something 
which is by definition beyond understanding. The view that failur~ 
to achieve these realms of the imagination where nothing can be said 
is explicit or implicit in a great deal of science fiction. I 
believe this to be a mistaken view which misunderstands and 
misrepresents the relation between language and the imagination. 
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Part of the problem lies in a common tendency to think of language 
as referential. The fact that a word might refer to an object or an 
idea, leads to the concomitant tendency to think of language as 
something which represents. or stands for. thought. The picture 
theory of language which Wittgenstein put forward in the Tractatus 
is a version of this tendency. It is as if the word is a kind of 
proxy for the real. This unfortunate misapprehension leads to a 
kind of nagging suspicion that words somehow lack something without 
an object to refer to. even if that something is only an 'object of 
thought'. One doesn't normally worry that prepositions and 
conjunctions have no reference. so it does seem strange that it 
should seem a problem with the nouns and verbs. 
It is difficult to see why anyone should claim special status for 
the language of science fiction unless it was felt that words which 
describe objects or concepts which have no counterpart in the real 
world are somehow different from 1) words used in other kinds of 
fiction. 2) words used in everyday speech. Searle's "axiom of 
existence" and Angenot's "absent paradigms" are thinly disguised 
objects of thought. and as we saw with Newspeak and Babel-17. 
Whorf's hypothesis involves either words preceding thought or vice 
versa. Either way he can't countenance one without the other. It 
is as if we could allocate a scale of values to various classes of 
words. 
'Borogrove' being signifier without signified. is a semantic dead 
end because it lacks a paradigm. a system of signs to confer meaning. 
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'Kemmer' however being a word definable in terms of animal and human 
sexuality has a paradigm but limited signification. 
'Doublethink' gets the accolade being firmly integrated in everyday 
speech patterns and partaking of endless patterns of signification 
thereby. 
Where the misspelling of Riddley Walker and the gratuitous 
phrase-book Russian of Clockwork Orange might fit into this scheme 
is anybody's guess. 
I think this is all backwards. 'Kemmer' and 'doublethink' are 
examples of neologism where a new concept is expressed. This 
concept is perfectly well described in ordinary language, which, it 
seems to me, takes away all the mystery. 'Borogroves', 'wub', 
'gluck' etc., seem to be far more mysterious. Indeed, nonsense 
poems fascinate precisely because they toy with our preconceptions 
about language. Science fiction while partaking in this game of 
sense and nonsense, toys with another preconception about language, 
notably that there are realms of the imagination, dream worlds if 
you will, where words cannot go. It 'pretends' as Searle might say 
that for want of a little more language, a little more imagination 
and a lot of effort we might see into a new world. But, and here is 
where Angenot is right, (but for the wrong reasons), not only does 
the language of most science fiction not bear close examination, the 
Icience and philosophy are often pretty thin as well. Angenot's 
elaborate schema is rather superfluous when you think of it like 
this. The extent to which science fiction is really trying to 
present 'the new thing' is dubious. If, however, a writer strove 
for the imaginary heights, with intellectual integrity and 
scientific plausibility, is it likely that he would bang his head on 
the linguistic ceiling? 
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This view of language I maintain is like the medieval idea that the 
stars were holes in the canopy around the earth. What Wittgenstein 
says much later in his life, is effectively a recasting of his 
famous "Whereof we cannot speak thereof must we remain silent." 
Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the 
end logic cannot be described? you must look at the 
practice of language, then you will see it.109 
Here he is not warning against speaking of new things. He is not 
even saying that there are a class of things with which language 
cannot deal. As we have seen the new thing no more needs new words 
than the new words need the new thing. What he is saying is that the 
grammar of words leads us to imagine that there is a realm beyond 
what can be said. Many of these questions turn out to be about the 
logiC of language itself. 
Metaphysics he says is misleading philosophy in which "we express an 
unclarity about the grammar of words in the form of a scientific 
110 question" Russell's paradox stems from Russell's own attempts 
to formulate philosophical questions in a 'perfectly logical' 
scientific language. However by imagining the class of classes and 
finding that it did not include the class of things which are not a 
class, he began to look for something 1n a logical space which 
according to his own formulation should not exist. Logical 
paradoxes exert a widespread fascination. There is always the 
feeling that such riddles point to some fundamental crack in 
reality. It is as if our handle on reality has been greased. When 
Russell formulated his paradox he was engaged in the task of 
formulating an 'ideal' logical language. A language to describe 
language.Such an approach to language is largely the butt of 
Wittgenstein's later work. 
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In Wittgenstein's view many of the questions of philosophy are 
merely confusions brought about by a misleading analogy embedded in 
the language of the question. Such philosophy is meaningless 
because it is only the failure to use language correctly which 
allows the question to be asked. Science fiction invariably finds 
itself addressing questions of a philosophical or metaphysical 
nature. If Wittgenstein is to be believed it ought to be apparent 
that in doing so science fiction is tying itself in logical and 
linguistic knots. This we shall see in my next chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE TRAPS OF LANGUAGE 
Hockett's statement in his 'Chinese vs English,l essay. that one's 
native language merely makes it more difficult to grasp concepts 
which one's native grammar does not allow for, appears on the face 
of it to leave the door open for communication with 
extra-terrestials and time-travellers, even animals. Such an 
interpretation misconstrues the pedantry which characterises his and 
my arguments. In his 'How to Learn Martian,2 he established 
fairly conclusively that communication with anything other than 
human beings is likely to be impossible. It's not impossible in 
principle, merely in practice. His point in moderating the Whorfian 
hypothesis is to establish that it is wrong to try and locate the 
problem in language itself. Crudely, it is the gap between cultures 
and behaviour that makes it difficult for certain concepts to cross 
the divide. Unlike Chomsky, Hockett believes that there is nothing 
in the theory of language to prevent communication in these cases. 
His distinction between scientific language and other forms of 
discourse, philosophy, literature etc., is justified by referral to 
the empirical basis of science. Thus philosophical and artistic 
concepts are less likely to be cross cultural than scientific or 
purely concrete behavioural speech. The importance of this bit of 
pedantry will become apparent as I proceed. 
By identifying the language problems of science fiction with those 
of philosophy I am 'with Wittgenstein' saying that there are a class 
of so-called problems in philosophy that are in fact pseudo-problems. 
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An examination of the language of the question reveals the problem 
to be non-existent. My subsidiary point is that science fiction, 
belying its name, does not partake of scientific discourse, but 
being literature is more akin to philosophy. 
If science fiction is to be singled out as a special case of the use 
of language, it is because it consciously distances itself from 
ordinary behaviour and has strong attraction for the metaphysical. 
Philip Pecorino says in an essay entitled 'Philosophy and Science 
Fiction' that science fiction, 
fulfils the current ne<ed for a revised interpretation of 
reality. If philosophy is viewed as composed of two 
elements, the speculative and the analytic, science fiction 
is related to the speculative element insofar as it is 
primarily concerned with extrapolated future possibilities 
and it offers up images to aid in the interpretation of the 
nature of reality. It can be said that science fiction is 
one part of the telescope that enables philosophy to look 
beyond the actualities to explore the possibilities for the 
future of the human race. 3 
Pecorino goes on to suggest that science fiction should be judged by 
philosophy and tested in experience. This essay is published among 
a collection of essays under the title The Intersection of Science 
Fiction and Philosophy. In his introduction, the editor, 
Robert Myers remarks, "although science fiction and philosophy are 
not identical, some of their concerns and methodological techniques 
intersect.,,4/ He divides his book up into sections dealing with 
such science fictional and philosophical chestnuts as "Space-Time 
and Time Travel"; "Human Nature and Teleology"; "History and Heroes" 
etc., and not surprisingly I shall cover similar ground. 
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In contrast to Myers and Co., my aim is to show that to a large 
extent science fiction and philosophy fail to act as foils for each 
other because they both fall into the same linguistic traps. 
Science fiction's treatment of time (time-travel), identity, 
artificial intelligence (robots and computers), minds (telepathy), 
the will (teleportation and telekinesis), evolution and God, all 
have their basis in philosophical questions that go back further 
than Plato. Wittgenstein and Ryle say that many of these questions 
only come about through taking a metaphor literally, or being misled 
by an image. The image embodied in the metaphor misleads us into 
asking questions which either have no answer or result in the 
formulation of a paradox. 
It is easy to see how science fiction by giving dramatic form to 
these paradoxes can be an interesting test of Wittgenstein's 
hypothesis. Wittgenstein was an intelligent behaviourist. He did 
not think that just because we cannot see something or its cause 
that it did not exist. However, ascribing qualities to abstracts is 
often to treat them as Objects. Treating time like space for 
example. 
Time Travel: Pictures of Time 
Given the extensive science fictional treatments of the subject to 
date it is not surprising that many people have come to accept the 
idea of time travel as possible. Between Wells' Time Machine and Dr 
Who's Tardis the plethora of, time travel devices might constitute 
the subject of a lengthy study in itself. 
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However I am less interested in the style in which we might travel 
that its possibility to begin with. After all we travel forward in 
time every moment that passes and we can 'cast our mind' back or 
forwards without the aid of a noisy machine. The idea of time 
travel raises many interesting questions. How would we know if we 
had travelled or were travelling in time? And having established 
that we were in the past would we be able to change it? Clearly 
there are one or two logical problems associated with this notion, 
and a whole host of time-travel scholars prepared to tease them 
out. The dominant position amongst these scholars appears to be 
that although time travel is possible, it is not possible to change 
the past. Gilbert Fulmer puts it thus: 
what has happened has happened. Not even God could make it 
true now that I had eggs instead of cereal for breakfast 
this morning. I fully agree that the idea of changing the 
past is logically incoherent, and therefore the act 
logically impossible. But this is no objection to time 
travel, for time travel does not require the possibility of 
changing the pasts. 
Having said this, Fulmer accepts that the possibility of "closed 
causal loops" is a necessary corollary to the acceptance of time 
travel. "Such loops" he says 
are radically counter to ordinary intuitions, of course; 
yet once again we should not rely too complacently on 
intuitions that have been formed in the absence of time 
travel. • 
David Lewis' and Paul Horwich' also present elaborate arguments 
defending time-travel from the many paradoxes which it appears to 
present. 
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Horwich defends the idea of "closed causal chains" as they develop 
from travelling into the past, but in common with Lewis is unable to 
accept that the past could be changed by a time-traveller. The 
distinction is established between affecting the past and changing 
it. Various stories, for example, propose that the tourist industry 
gets into time travel and package tours to the past are arranged. 
In 'Let's Go to Golgotha' time tourists subtly disguised as denizens 
of the time of Christ, are enabled to participate in the crucifixion 
story. In the course of one of these trips the participants 
realised that the whole jeering and booing crowd are time-travellers 
and that it is only their presence in the past that has made the 
crucifixion happen. This is a case of time-travellers affecting the 
past without restructuring it in relation to present day memories. 
If, for example I wanted to go into the past and prevent the 
shooting of Abraham Lincoln or John Lennon, according to Lewis and 
Horwich, some chain of events would prevent me from doing so. We 
can only go back into the past and cause what would have happened 
anyway. Fulmer cites the familiar instance of the man who travels 
back into the past and fathers a child who grows up to become 
himself, i.e. the time traveller. Lem presents a similar scenario 
in his essay 'The Time Travel Story and Related Matters of SF 
Structuring', and dismisses "all structures of the time-loop 
variety" as "internally contradictory in the causal sense".' 
Because such an instance involves creating matter "ex nihilo" Lem 
draws precisely the opposite conclusion to Fulmer and dismisses the 
idea of time-travel as a serious proposition. 
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Nevertheless time-travel is often a convenient means of setting up 
an analogy, moving to a new and exotic environment, speculating 
about the future or merely structuring a plot. The appeal to 
science, however, has its own particular problems, and often 
confuses the philosophical position. The Paradox Men by Charles 
Harness 10 provides excellent examples of time loops, defying 
logic, denying causality and using science to make it all seem 
plausible. Written in 1952 it is a classic example of plot 
manipulation through time travel. The novel is set in Imperial 
America after the third great war. It is a land ruled by an 
oppressive slave owning elite. The hero, Alar, is a member of the 
society of Thieves, an organisation dedicated to the overthrow of 
this regime. Kennicot Muir, public hero, astronaut and scientist, 
foreseeing the annihilation of civilisation through a devastating 
nuclear war, conceives of a plan to alter the path of humanity which 
involves precipitating the evolution of homo superior. To this end 
he masterminds the building of the T-Twenty-Two, a spaceship capable 
of travelling at trans1ight speeds. Muir's plan is to board this 
ship on its launch on July 21st 2177 and through the "micro- and 
macropatho10gica1 geotropic transformations" effected on his body 
through a few million G's acting upon it, transform himself into 
this new being. Thus on July 21st 2172, five years earlier than its 
launch, the T-Twenty-Two crash lands on Earth, and after a five year 
journey backwards in time Muir emerges from the ship as Alar the 
thief. Which is the beginning of the story, if you follow. The 
characters central to the plot all operate from the centre of 
intrigue which is the Imperial Palace. 
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With all these courtly trappings, the Byzantine intrigue, the 
swordplay, slaves and sedan chairs, it is no wonder Brian Aldiss 
characterises this kind of science fiction as "Widescreen Baroque". 
He says of this category in his introduction to The Paradox Men, 
Their plots are elaborate and generally preposterous, their 
inhabitants have short names and short lives. They traffic 
as readily in the impossible as the possible. They obey 
the dictionary definition of Baroque; which is to say that 
they have a bold and exuberant rather than a fine style, 
they are eccentric and sometimes degenerate into 
extravagance. They like a wide screen, with space, and 
possibly time travel as props, and at least the whole solar 
h . . 11 system as t e1r sett1ng. 
The mood, he says "is somewhat Jacobe than, even down to the 
profusion of adjectives", and in .common with the work of Elizabethan 
and Jacobean dramatists the "feeling for life" this sensible warm 
motion' (is) most sharp when set against torture and death". 
Harness's characters engage in the most "absorbingly unlikely" 
conversations. "They discuss science and history and Aristotelian 
logic and Toynbean civilizations and philosophy and the effects of 
relativity". 12 Moreover they engage in such absurd conversation 
precisely when any sensible person would be making a break for the 
nearest fall-out shelter or contemplating suicide. The action, 
between philosophizing, involves Kieris (the romantic interest) and 
Alar getting themselves in and out of sticky situations whilst on 
the appropriately Elizabethan quest of trying to discover Alar's 
true identity. This quest ends on the sun itself, where in the act 
of dying, (or achieving godhead), Alar remembers all. 
Alar/Muir transforms himself into Homo Superior by crossing the 
universe in a space ship reaching speeds of two billion light years 
per year, which by my calculations means that it would take one 
second to get from Earth to Sirius. 
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However, ignoring the theoretically limiting factor of Einsteinian 
mass, the ship has travelled backward in time. Thus on July 21st 
2172 a space ship crashes on Earth, and a mass, which turns out to 
be that same space ship, is seen to leave the Earth at "unbelievable 
velocity". This object travels across the universe and appears back 
on Earth at the same time and place as the T-Twenty-Two is launched 
on July 21st 2177. The T-Twenty-Two has crash landed 5 years before 
it took off, and the object which has been observed moving across 
the heavens in the intervening period was in fact that same ship 
moving backward in time. The plot derives its complexity from 
juggling with time. It is the paradox of the ship arriving before 
it leaves, together with its passengers, that produces the riddle 
over the identify of Alar/Muir/Microfilm Mind, and the number and 
origin of the spacecraft. This is so because it is a fairly obvious 
implication of time travel that one may go backwards or forward to a 
time and meet oneself. The ingenuity with which Harness exploits 
the notion of a causal time loop, and the manner in which he 
apparently resolves the various paradoxes thrown up by his premise, 
provides us with an intellectual game, which incidentally has 
nothing to do with the supposed subject of the story. He attempts 
to give substance to this intellectual game by doing some very 
dubious things to the Einsteinian equation for the equivalence of 
masS and energy. Alar declares that 
when v is greater than c it would seem that Einsteinian mass M 
must be meaningless, involving as it does the square root of a 
negative number. But such a conclusion is inconsistent with 
the observed effect of the ship on galactic matter during the 
whole of its flight. 
Now the alternative to meaningless M is negative v, which 
would make v-square pos~tive, and the equation then follows 
the usual pattern for the determination of M. Distance is a 
positive scalar quantity, but time can be either positive or 
negative, depending on whether it stretches into the future or 
13 the past. 
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This is, in essence a fairly stock rationalisation of time travel 
using Einstein. However. to be pedantic, it is quite conveniently 
forgotten, not only by science fiction writers but by exponents of 
teach yourself Einstein books, that Einstein's Special Theory of 
Relativity refers only to bodies moving at a uniform velocity. Thus 
relatavistic effects such as appear to be suggested by the equations 
of this first paper. such as negative value for t, spacemen getting 
younger or time going backwards, are negated by the necessity of any 
body so described having to accelerate and decelerate. Thus, 
although the special theory seems to allow limited travel forward in 
time, that is, spacemen arriving at places younger than they would 
normally be, it does not deal with the beginning and end of the 
journey, the acceleration towards the speed of light and the 
deceleration on return to earth or planetfall. Such matters are 
covered by the General Theory of Relativity. Fascinating as these 
matters of time and relativity are, Einstein, contrary to common 
opinion, does not open the way to the possibility of time travel, in 
fact his theory expressly forbids it. Only an incomplete 
understanding of his work and an undue extrapolation from various 
examples used to illustrate his ideas ~ to make time travel 
possible. 
Thus. despite the obvious fascination of time paradoxes, and the 
manifest use to which they can be put in structuring a novel, undue 
analysis of such riddles inevitably results in conceptual confusion 
and intellectual stultification. in short a dead-end. Indeed the 
implications of time structured novels are far greater for 
literature than for philosophy or science, because time and various 
narrative ploys with time constitute a very large part of what is 
rather grandly called 'structural innovation' in the novel. 
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The reason these philosophical chestnuts concerning time continue to 
hold sway is related to our use of words when talking about time. 
Because time is an abstract concept we speak about time through the 
use of metaphors. Lee Werth in an essay entitled 'Siddhartha and 
Slaughterhouse Five (A New Paradigm of Time)' comments, 
Certain metaphors for time appear again and again in the 
works of diverse cultures, and in unpacking these 
metaphors, in understanding their similarity we can come to 
understand why they are appropriate. 14 
to which I might add we may also come to understand why they are 
inappropriate. Some of the metaphors he cites are the revolving 
wheel and sphere; variations on the river metaphor, where it is the 
flow of the river which is important; light fragmented or reflected; 
and less versatile metaphors such as grains of sand, chinese boxes, 
phonograph records and various Phoenix myths. 
Werth outlines two necessary conditions symbolized by time metaphors, 
(i) a serial continuum of coexisting elements that 
constitute a permanent and unchanging order 
(ii) a relationship of this series to ourselves, or to 
something, a relationship that changes at each instant, 
thus giving rise to the transiency; .. and flux of human 
experience (or the world).ls 
The conditions which he outlines fit very conveniently the metaphor 
of time which Werth prefers, namely the filmstrip. Every frame 
co-exists with every other frame on the reel, and in projection as 
. 
each frame moves past the gate it is "brought to life" giving the 
overall appearance of action. 
He remarks 
If we consider a static series of elements (condition one) 
and introduce no other consideration, we cannot speak 
intelligibly of temporal relations. 
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A serial order can be understood as a temporal order only 
after we introduce a state change of some sort. Hence 
condition two must be met before time concepts can be 
rendered intelligible. When the filmstrip is projected, we 
can use the terms 'earlier' and 'later' meaningfully.16 
However we use the terms 'earlier' and 'later' in connection with a 
multitude of serial orders which need no temporal ordering. Thus we 
speak of earlier and later numbers in a series of integers; an 
earlier page in a book; or we might speak of a station being earlier 
on the Victoria line. All these circumstances are susceptible to 
being construed temporally, that is, we can read a number series, 
and a book and go on a train journey in a way which makes such 
descriptions not metaphorical at.all, but literal. Equally our 
temporal experience of these series might be reversed or in some 
other way changed about. The possibility of re-editing the life 
represented by the filmstrip appeals to Werth. He attempts to 
correlate this view of time with Einstein-Minkowskian space-time 
theory, by regarding "ordinary consciousness as sequentially 
intersecting the four-dimensional, static human body along its 
world-line in order to bring to life (bring to the "screen of 
consciousness") different three-dimensional states.,,17 
This is the view which the Tralfamadorians have of time in 
Slaughterhouse-Five "Our time becomes a spatial dimension to them; 
our long life appears to them as our long body."la This metaphor, 
despite its apparent sophistication in accounting for current 
scientific theory regarding time, shares with many of the other 
metaphors the need for individual perception of events as the 
essential "activating" feature. 
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Thus for the metaphor to work the river must flow by as we stand on 
the bank, for example, the sphere must revolve in relation to a 
fixed point, and the filmstrip pass in front of the lamp. 
Werth again 
If for some reason, the river metaphor omits bank and 
bottom, as does Bergson's and Newton's, the second 
condition is violated. to the extent that the metaphor 
remains intelligible, we are implicitly adding ourselves as 
the fixed point by which the river flows. 19 
All of these various metaphors stress one or other aspect of time 
which the author of the metaphor wishes to stress. Werth finds it 
impossible to use the river metaphor without introducing the factor 
of individual perception. Whichever metaphor you choose to use it 
will have its drawbacks. Representing time as another axis on the 
usual 3-dimensional graph (Minkowski) treats of time as if it were 
another spatial dimension. Minkowski's visualization of Einstein's 
formulae gives rise to this notion of the time/life line which can 
be intersected anywhere along its length to describe the now. 
Western metaphors have treated time like space for hundreds of 
years, by taking such a metaphor literally we get into a muddle. 
What we call time is a means of structuring our perception of the 
world. 
The essential characteristic of our construct of time is that we can 
measure it. However, the fact that we can measure length and 
measure time, does not imply any similarity between the idea of 
length and the idea of time. These are two entirely different uses 
of the word 'measure'. It is ~nly when we come to ask ourselves 
what exactly we are measuring if its not spatial, that the language 
we are using starts to become inadequate. 
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It is only when we ask ourselves questions like "Where does the 
present go when it becomes the past?" and "Where is the past?" that 
the analogy we use starts to become problematic. Wittgenstein 
describes it thus 
It is clear that this question most easily arises if we are 
pre-occupied with cases in which there are things flowing 
by us - as logs of wood float down a river. In such a case 
we can say that the logs which have passed us are all down 
towards the left and the logs which will pass us are up 
towards the right. We then use this situation as a simile 
for all happening in time and even embody the simile in our 
language. as when we say that "the present event passes by" 
(a log passes by). "the future event is to corne" (a log is 
to come). We talk about the flow of events; but also about 
the flow of time - the river on which the logs travel. 20 
Such an analogy for time gives rise to the device used in 
Slaughterhouse Five, where past, present, and future all exist at 
once and any intersection into that sequence is what we choose to 
call the present. That Billy Pilgrim has no choice as to where he 
is in this continuum is precisely how he is "unstuck in time". In 
The Paradox Men Alar finds himself contemplating his 
four-dimensional body, thus he moves outside his normal continuum 
and inserts himself back into it earlier than he left it. 
He was suspended in space near a silent, winding column. 
Gravity was banished here. There was no up, no down, no 
frame of reference for direction, so the column was neither 
necessarily vertical nor horizontal ••••• His eyes 
brightened as he realized that a cross-section of this 
column would resemble very closely the vertical 
cross-section of a human being. Looking about, he 
discovered that the column appeared to go on indefinitely 
•••• He returned slowly, pensively, and studied the column 
at approximately the point where he had found himself when 
he recovered consciousness •••• He stuck in his right leg 
•••• Tentatively he eased the rest of his body into the 
column. Z 1 
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Having achieved this he uses his knowledge of the events which are 
about to happen to him again, to alter them. This is where the 
paradox arises because if he is precipitated into time travel by 
pain, and by travelling back ten minutes he is enabled to avoid that 
pain, is it not true that he could never have travelled into the 
past if he avoided the cause of his travelling there? etc., etc. 
This is where Harness throws himself into conflict, not only with 
Lem, but with all the other believers in time travel. He has 
proposed an event without a cause, probably the greatest sin you can 
commit in philosophical circles. The Paradox Men breaks the causal 
loop and allows for the past to be reconstructured. It transpires 
that Alar has been manouvered into his various crises by the 
Microfilm mind in an attempt to precipitate in Alar awareness of his 
various abilities. 
Thus when Alar is subjected to his final test of pain on the Sun, he 
once more finds himself contemplating the "time axis of his 
four-dimensional body" and is able to change time such that 
"Operation Finis", America Imperial's plan to wipe out the Eastern 
Federation, cannot happen and trigger the nuclear holocaust which 
will end the world. Thus at that final moment Juana-Maria muses 
She wondered what Muir-Alar could do that would avoid 
Operation Finis. Perhaps he would go back in time and 
cause Haze-Gaunt to be still-born. But then another 
dictator, even more ruthless, might arise and destroy 
civilization •••• Perhaps the Michelson-Morley experiment 
which proved the contraction of matter in its line of 
motion and started Einstein off on his theory of the 
equivalence of matter and energy could be doctored so that 
Michelson would actually get the interference image he 
sought. But then there would be Rutherfords work on the 
suspiciously heavy electrons and an infinity of allied 
research. And human ~ature being what it was, it would 
again be just a question of time. zz 
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But the change that Alar effects is in the "colloidal webs" of the 
frontal lobes of Neanderthal man, replacing the killer instinct with 
a spirit of brotherhood. Thus Neanderthal man, 
had no way of knowing that even as he spared the 
animal-like Eoanthropus, so would he, Neanderthal, be 
spared by ero-Magnon. Nor had he any way of knowing that 
by offering the open palm instead of the hurled spear he 
had changed the destiny of all mankind to come. Or that he 
had dissolved, by preventing the sequence of events that 
led to its formation, the very intelligence that had 
wrought this marvellous change in the dawn-mind. 23 
End of story, as they say. Everything that has been narrated is 
wiped out by Alar's final act, and we come into another area of 
time-travel theory, the notion of parallel times and branches in 
time. As if like lightning time travels several false paths before 
it finds earth. Once again we fall victim to an analogy. The 
Paradox Men is a beautiful example of how one can play tricks with 
time travel. The various paradoxes which Harness generates exert a 
fascination which I would be the last to deny. Indeed there are 
hundreds if not thousands of other stories which rely on similar 
conceits. But to read them one must suspend one's belief. And as 
soon as you start to ask question like "What is time?, "What is 
now?" etc., the metaphors which such stories entail begin to exert 
their sway. 
Time is measurement. Time that you can't measure isn't time. Just 
as space that you can't measure isn't space. The idea of time 
travel involves a passage of time which can't be measured. Einstein 
allows for the idea that people might measure time differently, that 
is it may be perceived differently for different observers, but he 
f ' d" ' 24 does not allow or one to e ~t t~me • 
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One can speed the film up or slow it down, but not look at it all at 
once or take a bit out and put it somewhere else. One of the other 
pieces of pseudo-science which governs time travel ideas is the idea 
that if we could see far enough we could see the past, i.e. the 
light coming from Sirius set off from Sirius 4 years ago. If Sirius 
exploded three years ago we would still see it as it was four years 
ago. It is also true that if we could see far enough we could see 
America, and we do via satellite. But seeing isn't being there. 
Even if we caught up with a light beam from the big bang we still 
wouldn't be there. 
The metaphors we use when talking about time are useful and 
unproblematic in the context of every day situations, they only 
become misleading when we talk about time itself. Wittgenstein 
comments 
No sharp boundary can be drawn round the cases in which we 
should say that a man was mislead by an analogy. The use 
of expressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses 
analogies between cases often far apart. And by doing this 
they may be extremely useful. It is, in most cases, 
impossible to show an exact point where an analogy begins 
to mislead us. Every particular notation stresses some 
. 1 . t f . 25 part1cu ar p01n 0 V1ew • 
Wittgenstein locates the problem in a lack of awareness of the 
different uses of words, and a simultaneous tendency to mistake the 
role of other words. Thus he says of these two sentences: -
"The sun sets at six o'clock". 
"The sun is setting now". 
We are inclined to say that both "now" and "six o'clock" 
'refer to points of time'. This use of words produces a 
puzzlement which one might express in the question "What is 
the 'now'? - for it is a moment of time and yet it can't be 
said to be either the 'moment at which I speak' or 'the 
moment at which the clock strikes', etc., etc.," - Our 
answer is: the function of the word "now" is entirely 
different from that of a specification of time 26 • 
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If you are not satisfied with that answer, and fall to speculating 
about what 'the present' is or what the 'past' is, or even what 
'time' is, then it is likely that you will end up imagining 
situations not unlike those presented in science fiction stories. 
Charles Hockett in his essay 'Information, Entropy, and the 
Epistemology of History' encounters a problem when attempting to 
ascertain how one might test the validity of certain propositions of 
a historical nature. He resolves this by first making a statement 
defining past and future "as observed from any single neighbourhood, 
the past is determinate and the future indeterminate", and secondly 
by adopting a non-European view of time and events. Thus he says 
Neither our everyday language nor the special mathematical 
jargon of modern physics is really well adapted for talking 
about the world in this way. The time of the physicist is 
the time of "earlier" and "later" and of quantified 
durations, ••• the physicist's traditional frame of 
reference needs supplementation, not replacement. 27 
The advantage that Hockett's supplementary frame of reference has is 
that it does not use a spatial metaphor. Hockett's "Hopi-Whorf 
time" is not subject to such metaphorical vagaries. Hopi verbs have 
three formal tenses which he calls the nomic, the reportive and the 
expective. The nomic is used in assertions of something unchanging; 
the height of a mountain, or the colour of the sky. Thus the 
reportive defines the province of history, it refers to events about 
which we have information. The expective is appropriate to the 
realm of the indeterminate, the anticipated or planned for. 
Having dispensed with metaphor, and defining our perception of time 
only by the degree of determinism, Hockett finds himself in conflict 
with Laplacian Mechanics and proposing a new view of the laws of 
Thermodynamics. 
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Thus, when considering the relation of information and entropy, 
Hockett suggests that instead of the irreversibilities in the 
behaviour of heat systems (second law of thermodynamics) being in 
contravention of the reversible behaviour of mechanical systems, 
statistical mechanics must be read in the opposite 
direction, so that reversible systems appear as special 
limiting - and perhaps asymptotic or even non-existent -
cases of irreversible ones, and so that incompleteness of 
information comes to be the result of such matters as 
temperature and entropy, rather than their cause l8 • 
If you imagine that time stands still for everybody and everything 
in the world but you, how would you define the situation? How would 
it feel? Nothing could move, not even an elementary particle, 
therefore no heat. But matter only exists due to the movement of 
elementary particles and their various interactions with other 
particles, thus matter would not exist. More correctly such a 
system at Absolute Zero could not be observed. Thus a system 
without entropy is incapable of eliciting information. So although 
we may define information as the inverse of entropy, "as that which 
decreases when entropy increases and vice versa,,29 the notion of 
complete information is meaningless, for the observability of a 
system implies, indeed requires, a degree of entropy. 
The idea that there can be a frozen moment in time, that we can 
completely define that state, that we can possess all the 
information about it, is a stated aim of scientific procedure, and 
especially the misguided belief of those working on a unified field 
theory. 
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Knowledge is, as Wittgenstein says, only possible where the~e is 
doubt 30 • 
All testing. all confirmation and disconfirmation of a 
hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this 
system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point 
of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the 
essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so 
much the point of departure. as the element in which 
arguments have their 1ife3l • 
In considering, in the last years of his life, the foundation of 
"language-games", Wittgenstein emphasizes more and more the 
"unlearned" nature of certain apparently empirical propositions. 
Certain aspects of the "world-picture" are part of our inherited 
background against which we distinguish between true and false. Of 
these special cases of propositions it makes no sense to say that we 
have knowledge or doubt. 
It is quite sure that motor cars don't grow out of the 
earth. We feel that if someone could believe the contrary 
he could believe everything we say is untrue, and question 
everything that we hold to be sure. 
But how does this one belief hang together with all the 
rest? We should like to say that someone who could believe 
that does not accept our whole system of verification. 
This system is something that a human being acquires by 
means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do 
32 
not say "learns" • 
Thus doubting that the chair I am sitting on exists, or that the 
Earth has existed for many years, or that I am the same person that 
I was yesterday, throws into disarray our whole system of thought. 
Wittgenstein's example is a science-fictional rather than a 
philosophical case of a fantastic proposition undermining the basis 
of language and therefore exhibiting a profound pointlessness. 
Given the situation predicated we do not know what constitutes a 
consistent extrapolation from the premise. 
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There is no logical basis on which to proceed, if we accept that 
cars grow out of the Earth, because the premise de-bases logic. On 
examination, much of science-fiction is based either overtly or 
unwittingly on such premises. However, when Wittgenstein says that 
the fact that there is no test which will verify whether someone has 
been to the moon, makes it an objective truth about which I cannot 
be mistaken, he has not given a bad example, merely established that 
the line that demarcates the madman from the philosopher, is defined 
more by social awareness than by physics. 
The example also indicates one reason why there is no point at which 
we can clearly state that "Here is where the analogy becomes 
misleading." In fact when we consider problems of identity and 
artificial intelligence as treated in science fiction, the paradoxes 
of time seem quite trivial. Clearly, talking about time without 
using metaphors is difficult. In the sense that it is difficult to 
ascertain to what extent individual science fiction writers put a 
scientific/philosophical face on fantastic premises; the application 
of philosophical rigour to science fiction is likely to be a good 
test of seriousness. 
Time is probably the clearest and commonest example of 
science-fiction embodying a particular form of philosophical 
nonsense. Not all of the premises of science fiction are 
fantastic. Some are more attractive than others because the 
extrapolations which they suggest embody an almost mythical 
element. We have a picture of time which makes us ask what time is. 
88 
We ought to ask ourselves where we got the picture. The pictures as 
Kenny remarks, are often "not really pictures at all, but misleading 
illustrations of grammatical turns of speech,,33. Jung has 
documented the power of such images and 'turns of phrase', in his 
analysis of dreams. Whereas Jung accepts the power of such symbols, 
Wittgenstein contends that we should fight them. Kenny sees this as 
one of the essential elements in the continuity of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy. 
The right method of philosophy, in both the Tractatus and 
the Investigations, consists of putting a stop to 
metaphysics; in both of the works this is done by showing 
that the metaphysician has given no meaning to one of his 
expressions - in the earlier work because he has not 
correlated it with an element of reality, in the latter 
because he has not fitted it into a language game 34 
To this extent science fiction and to a large extent philosophy 
partake of the metaphysical. In this chapter I will look at several 
other examples of science fiction "failing to give a meaning" to one 
of its terms. In each case we are asked to make a mental leap into 
the unknown. To suspend disbelief on one crucial aspect of the 
projected world. As the writer chases down the ramifications of 
this suspension or extrapolation we are invited to have no less than 
complete faith in his driving. Usually he invokes some scientific 
principle to back up this request. 
Colin Greenland commenting on the work of J.G. Ballard remarks on 
the tendency of the Surrealists, Breton, Appolinaire etc., to use 
science to justify their activity, and on their peculiar tendency to 
cast their manifestoes in pseudo-scientific terms 35 • 
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Despite the appositeness of this observation to the work of Ballard, 
there are crucial differences between science fiction and Surrealism 
which are connected with the willingness of the author to 
extrapolate from his 'fantastic' premise. I will illustrate this 
point with another example drawn from science fiction where a 
picture or an analogy becomes misleading and leads us into 
philosophical puzzles and metaphysical speculation. 
Identity Problems: Minds Vs Bodies 
When Gregor Samsa awoke one morning to find himself transformed into 
a giant' insect, he retained his sense of his own identity. Apart 
from certain obvious physical differences from the Gregor of the day 
before, Gregor remains the same person. He has the same memories, 
emotional attachments and values which sustained him in the 
occupation of commercial traveller. He worries about what his 
employer will think of his being late for work, and is keen to 
impress upon the chief clerk his willingness to resume his rightful 
place in the firm. Such considerations dominate Gregor's thinking 
even as this dramatic change overtakes him. Physical considerations 
such as the number of legs he has, what he would like to eat and how 
something might be done to remedy his position, hardly impinge upon 
his consciousness. 
The distinction between surrealism and science fiction is not just 
the lack of explanation for oQt-of-the-ordinary events, but the 
concommitant lack of concern shown by the protagonists. 
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Thus what at first might seem an excess of apathy, a lack of 
curiosity, is in fact a characteristic indifference to what 
Wittgenstein calls the "forms of life" which characterise the 
fictional world. We are struck by Gregor's lack of concern about 
his coleopterous condition, but the world which Gregor inhabits is 
subtly different from ours, for his family accept it with similar 
grace. We do not have enough information to extrapolate a world 
based on the psyches of the characters in Metamorphosis 36 , but if 
we did, and it we tried to make it cohere, we would be writing 
science fiction. 
Science Fiction is characterised therefore, by an attempt to help 
the reader feel comfortable wit~, or equipped to deal with, the new 
environment. Only when such matters arise in the text do questions 
like "What is identity?" and "What is memory?" lead the author into 
deep philosophical waters. The problems of identity which we had in 
The Paradox Men, "Who is Alar?" and "Can he be the same person as 
Muir?", do not arise in Metamorphosis because the author does not 
try to show the passage from Gregor the man to Gregor the beetle. 
One of the problems with 'new wave' and satirical science fiction is 
that to the unschooled reader what is an unexplained and fantastic 
situation may in fact merely be a parody of a science fiction 
cliche. Lack of knowledge of the genre results in a failure to 
adjust to the tone. 
Writers have been playing fast and loose with the notion of identity 
since the first set of twins was born, if not before. Sisters have 
inadvertently married brothers, impostors have become kings, and the 
wrong man executed. 
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But for all that, the stool-pigeon with the new face, the man who 
becomes a woman, and the spy who comes in from the cold, retain 
their identity in all but a public sense, that is they retain their 
memories. 
To get into serious conflict with the logic of identity a writer 
needs an amnesiac, re-incarnation, disembodiment, or schizophrenia, 
or any combination thereof. The amnesiac killer turned hero is a 
fairly mundane example of an identity problem. ("Is he culpable for 
crimes which he doesn't remember?"), without fantastic premises. 
A.E. Van Vogt's The World of Null-A adds some novel twists to the 
old mind-body duality problem. 
In the year 2560 A.D. Earth's affairs are managed by the games 
machine. A giant structure which for 300 years had "sorted 
according to their semantic training" the people of Earth, and made 
decisions about who was to rule, and who was worthy of the Null-A 
paradise of Venus. 
Self-renewing, conscious of its life and of its purpose, it 
remained greater than any individual, immune to bribery and 
corruption and theoretically capable of preventing its own 
destruction37 . 
Gosseyn finds himself entangled in a plot to overthrow the machine. 
He also discovers, as the games begin in the Machine city, that he 
is not who he thinks he is. That his memories are, at least 
partially, false. Once again we have the Byzantine intrigue; the 
hero on whom the fate of the world revolves; the mysterious 
manipulator pushing the protagonists around like pawns on a cosmic 
. 
chess board, and a great deal of pseudo-science. 
92 
As with The Paradox Men the hero's search for identity is the chief 
means whereby the action progresses, and his amnesia is used to make 
explanations necessary and to keep the reader guessing. 
Gosseyn could be said to have a mind-body problem, his memories have 
been tampered with by hypno drugs, yet after he is killed he appears 
again in a similar body with all the previous body's memories. 
Fantastic, impossible, but why? Van Vogt pushes to the fore various 
questions about the mind-body problem, using a dramatic technique 
that will become familiar as we examine other science fiction 
texts. He recasts the familiar story of the amnesiac, the famous 
man re-incarnate, the ghost and the madman, in a form which takes 
the metaphors we use to describe mental states, and the phenomenon 
of consciousness, literally. 
Given that the question of Gosseyn's identity, and the continuance 
of his mind in more than one body, is so central to the plot of The 
World of Null-A, I would like to examine the question of why the 
identity paradoxes he generates, exert such a fascination on writers 
and philosophers. In The Concept of Mind Gilbert Ryle outlines what 
he calls "the official doctrine", the "dogma of the Ghost in the 
Machine", 
It maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that 
there occur physical processes and mental processes; that 
there are mechanical causes of corporeal movements and 
mental causes of corporeal movements]'. 
The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously 
ensconced in a machine derives from this argument. 
Because, as is true, a person's thinking, feeling and 
purposive doing cannot be described solely in the idioms of 
physics, chemistry and physiolo§y, therefore they must be 
described in counterpart idioms 9. 
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Because of the apparent .disjunction between mental events and 
physical processes, because although the two are related there is no 
"causal" relation, because the mind is not observable in the same 
sense as the body, the connection has become mysterious. This need 
to make the mind something "mysterious" can be seen as a symptom of 
two related phenomena, 1) inadequacies in describing the workings of 
minds, 2) a belief that these inadequacies signal that the mind is 
of superior stuff to the body and somehow independent of its 
workings. 
Thus with Gregor and Gosseyn although the body changes, the mind, 
being made of different stuff, remains the same. This seems 
logically possible if not physically so. It assumes that memory 
alone is enough to establish identity. (Indeed Van Vogt claims that 
such is the meaning of his book.) The obvious objection to this 
being that although I don't remember my childhood I still consider 
myself the same person that I was when I was younger. Indeed in 
Harness's story Muir becomes Alar, his body and mind transformed, 
his memory gone. In what sense can Muir and Alar be said to be the 
same person if not through physical continuity? We have no reason 
to believe that Alar has been substituted for Muir, just as Gregor's 
family do not assume that someone has replaced Gregor with a beetle. 
It is only the illusion of direct access to other people's minds 
which the novel form gives us which makes these problems seem so 
insurmountable. Essentially this is so because in the novel we are 
privilege to the kind of introspection and mental eavesdropping, to 
knowledge of other people's thoughts which is denied us in normal 
life. 
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The convention of the third person 'He thought' narrative form is 
founded on a double fallacy, 1) that we "know" our own minds, 2) 
that we can know other minds like we know our own. The first is 
wrong because there is no reason for us to assume that we know our 
own mind in any privileged way. We can be wrong about our motives 
and our memories can fail. It is the inalienability of our 
sensations which leads us to ascribe a privileged status to our own 
thoughts. The subjectivity of mental states Searle writes, 
is marked by such facts as that I can feel my pains, and 
you can't. I see the world from my point of view; you see 
it from your point of view. I am aware of myself and my 
internal mental states, as quite distinct from the selves 
and mental states of other people. 40 
The third person narrative form ignores at will this characteristic 
and "Eosters the illusion that we can know a character's mind as 
perfectly, with the same apparent degree of certainty, that we 
imagine we know our own. Without the omniscient narrator, Gregor 
would be a beetle, albeit a big one, Gosseyn II a remarkable twin, 
and the Alar-Muir relation a matter of conjecture. 
The narrative form in The World of Nu1l-A in common with most modern 
novels contravenes one of the chief features characteristic of the 
mind-body relation. It ",reinforces~ the identity paradox where a 
first person narrative would lead us to think that Gosseyn was 
merely a paranoid schizophrenic. 
By making the mind something that can transfer from one body to 
another, despite all the scientific mumbo-jumbo, Van Vogt is 
restating the Ghost in the Maohine doctrine. 
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Prescott explains to Gosseyn II a law of nature which the Distorter 
utilizes, 
"If two energies can be attuned on a twenty-decimal 
approximation of similarity, the greater will bridge the 
gap of space between them just as if there were no gap, 
although the juncture is accomplished at finite speeds." 
"That" said Gosseyn, "sounds like pure Greek." 
Prescott laughed, louder this time. "Think of it this way, 
then." he said. "How do you explain the fact that you have 
in your mind the details of what Gosseyn I did and 
thought? You must have been attuned, you and he; in fact 
its the only theoretically sure method of thought 
transmission - his thoughts, being alive, would have 
flashed to you wherever you were within the limits of 
reachable space. 41 
Simple really! By positing the existence of clones who are similar 
to such a fine degree Van Vogt suggests an affinity for the 
materialist view of the philosophy of mind, but balks it by giving 
thoughts super-physical identity. His telepathy with the cosmic 
chess player at the end of the book is made possible by the fact 
that he is a clone of the chess player. As with Alar, the nearest 
Gosseyn gets to discovering his identity is in finding the identity 
of a former self, a kind of father figure. 
Gosseyn's body hopping ability reminds me of a comic-book hero I am 
very fond of called Noman. He had no human body, just a series of 
android bodies, all identical, and when he was killed, which he was 
in every episode, his mind transferred to the next one. Noman is 
the ultimate in transplant and prosthetic surgery. The pure 
embodiment of the "ghost in the machine" philosophy. 
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In his discussion of the idea of consciousness and identi ty4Z 
Wittgenstein suggests that it is the lack of purpose or situation 
which often characterises such introspection which gives rise to a 
picture which misleads. 
The subtlety and depth of Wittgenstein's argument here has left him 
open to the charge that it is psychology and not philosophy which he 
is engaged in. He imagines a situation where one is reflecting on 
how remarkable is one's consciousness, "It is when I, for example 
turn my attention in a particular way to my own consciousness, and, 
astonished, say to myself: THIS is supposed to be "produced by a 
process of the brain!"4l. Astonishment at how intelligence, 
consciousness, emotions etc., can emerge from mere biological 
processes. He continues 
Now bear in mind that the proposition which I uttered as a 
paradox (THIS is produced by a brain process!) has nothing 
paradoxical about it. I could have said it in the course 
of an experiment whose purpose was to show that an effect 
of light which I see is produced by stimulation of a 
particular part of the brain. 44 -
The utterance of the apparently paradoxical observation in an 
appropriate situation removes its mystery. Wittgenstein relates 
these two instances of consideration of aspects of consciousness to 
instances where a picture forces itself on us, and one where we 
choose the picture to support an application. 
In numberless cases we exert ourselves to find a picture 
and once it is found the application as it were comes about 
of itself. In this case we already have a picture which 
forces itself on us at every turn, - but does not help us 
out of the difficulty, which only begins here. 45 
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The picture, therefore, of consciousness, can without a distinct 
application become misleading. Wittgenstein posits another 
situation. 
But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, 
lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way 
as usual? - If I imagine it now - alone in my room - I see 
the people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about 
their business - the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. But 
just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your 
ordinary intercourse with others, in the street say! Say 
to yourself, for example: "The children over there are 
mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automism." And 
you will either find the words becoming quite meaningless; 
or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny 
feeling, or something of the sort. 46 
Producing "in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling" is precisely 
what the writers and readers of science fiction seek to do with 
their paradoxes. Automata are a good example. 
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Robots: Machines with Minds 
Wittgenstein's example is by no means original. It is an old 
philosophical riddle which states that since we cannot have direct 
access to the thoughts of another person there remains the 
possibility that that person is an automaton merely posing as a 
person. Ryle states the fallacy thus: 
I am conscious of all my own feelings, volitions, emotions, 
and thinkings, and I introspectively scrutinize some of 
them. But I cannot introspectively observe, or be 
conscious of, the workings of your mind. I can satisfy 
myself that you have a mind at all only by complex and 
frail inferences from what your body does. 47 
We assume that the androids in Ira Levins's The Stepford Wives48 
do not have minds, even though they behave exactly like people. 
Only at the end of Asimov's story 'Let's Get Together' do we 
discover that the character Breckenridge is a humanoid robot sent to 
infiltrate washington's security. It was assumed that Breckenridge 
had a mind till Lynn shot his head off and high-grade machine oil 
49 
spilled out 
vindicated. 
Doubt about whether someone has a mind is 
Such examples seem to confirm that we have privileged access to the 
doings of our own mind and that self-knowledge is therefore superior 
in quality to other kinds of knowledge. Ryle disagrees, 
The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are 
the same as the sorts of thing that I can find out about 
other people, and ~he methods of finding them out are much 
the same. 50 
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We might say "I cannot feel your pain, so how do I know you are 
feeling pain?", and argue that because I feel my pain and infer 
yours, the "methods of finding things out" are very different. But 
the answer is not as simple as that. The kind of thing we are 
trying to find out is very different. Firstly, knowing someone is 
in pain is not the same as feeling someone's pain. If you could 
feel it, it would be your own pain. If I see someone fallout of a 
window and drop 20ft to the ground I know that they feel pain when 
they hit, (unless they are dead, anaesthetized, or a robot) I do not 
feel the pain. The fact that we feel our own pain is part of our 
sense of identity. This applies to our emotions, enthusiasm, and 
feelings of all kinds. There is always doubt as to whether someone 
is happy or sad etc., he could be acting, if there wasn't the 
possibility of doubt it would make no sense to talk of the 
possibility of knowledge of these feelings. To be certain that the 
girl I was talking to was not an android I would have to define my 
criteria of certainty. If the android looks and behaves like a 
human being what would count as difference. If she has skin and 
internal organs just like a real person, plastic but 
indistinguishable from the real thing, just because she has been 
manufactured, does that mean she is inferior to human beings? If 
she died would we bury her? Because she was only an android, a 
programmed thing, she never lived. This is the crux of the 
mind-body problem. An inability to accept that something 
mechanical, analysable, theoretically constructable, can be a 
conscious entity like ourselves. The fear of computers and robots 
which many science fiction stories betray is often symptomatic of an 
. 
unconscious analogy between man and machine. 
100 
We posit the existence of ·the ethereal mind and convince ourselves 
that it is superior to any machine. 
The various examples of stories purporting to examine the notion of 
identity, intelligence and artificial intelligence, do little more 
than reinforce the superstition that the human mind is superior to 
any mechanism, citing anything from the limitations of pure logic to 
a machine's lack of a concept of God to support this misleading 
notion. John Searle in his recent series of Reith Lectures examines 
the nature of the connection between mind and body, and attempts to 
refute entirely the notion that "a digital computer" can think. He 
begins by asserting that the essential features of consciousness, 
intentionality, subjectivity and mental-causation, which must be 
taken into account when discussing mind-body relations, are entirely 
compatible with the view that mental phenomena are features of the 
brain. He answers the question "How can the unconscious physical 
particles which make up the brain have consciousness?" by the 
pointing out that just as we would not expect to be able to reach 
into a glass of water and pullout a molecule and say "This one's 
wet.", so it would be equally daft to say of the neurons in the 
brain, "this neuron is in pain, or this neuron is experiencing 
thirst".sl Characteristics of the brain, like the characteristics 
of matter, have a micro and macro level, "two causally real levels 
of description". 
In his second lecture Searle attacks the whole program of artificial 
intelligence. 
Now, the reason that no computer program can ever be a mind is 
simply that a computer program is only syntactical, and minds are 
more than syntactical. Minds are semantical, in the sense that 
they have more than a formal structure, they have a content. 52 
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He illustrates this point. with an ingenious example of a program 
enabling a computer to "simulate the understanding of Chinese". He 
imagines a person locked in a room with a series of Chinese symbols 
in various baskets, and a rule book, written in English, explaining 
how to manipulate these symbols. When Chinese symbols are passed 
into the room the rule book indicates which ones are to be passed 
out. Suppose, he says, that the person does not know that the 
symbols passed in are questions, and the symbols passed out answers. 
Suppose, furthermore that the programmers are so good at 
designing the program, and that you are so good at 
manipulating the symbols, that very soon your answers are 
indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese 
speaker. 53 
The point of this whole story is simply this: by virtue of 
implementing a formal computer program, you behave exactly 
as if you understand Chinese# but all the same you don't 
understand a word of Chinese. 54 
Searle further asks us to imagine that we are in the "Chinese room", 
and the Chinese room is inside the head of a robot which moves 
around "causally" interacting with the world. 
Suppose the robot picks up a hamburger and this triggers 
the symbol for hamburger to come into the room. Well, as 
long as all I have is the symbol, with no knowledge of its 
causes or how it got there, I have no way of knowing what 
it means. The causal interactions between the robot and 
the rest of the world are irrelevant unless those causal 
interactions are represented in some mind or other. But 
there's no way they can be if all that the so-called mind 
consists of is a set of purely formal, syntactical 
operations. 55 
When Searle says that there is "no way that the system can get from 
the syntax to the semantics", he is making the error which he warns 
against in his first lecture. He is likening the formal element of 
language to the inert properties of matter, and declaring that 
nothing so wonderful as unde'rstanding could be imputed to the 
robot. 
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Imagining himself as the -robot's brain he says 
I, as the central processing unit, have no way of figuring 
out what any of these symbols means, but then neither has 
the whole system. 56 
Such an observation is superfluous. If I walk up to the robot and 
ask it directions to the nearest library, and the robot responds, I 
should say that the robot understood my question and that I 
understood the answer. I would not stand there and object that 
because it was a robot its answer was "irrelevant", I wouldn't care 
whether it had a mind or not as long as it gave me the right 
directions. Wittgenstein gives this example in Philosophical 
Investigations, 
If I give anyone an order I feel it quite enough to give 
him signs. And I should never say: this is only words, and 
I have got to get behind the words. Equally, when I have 
asked someone something and he gives me an answer (i.e. a 
sign) I am content - that was what I expected - and I don't 
raise the objection: but that's a mere answer. 
But if you say: "How am I to know what he means, when I see 
nothing but the signs he gives?" then I say "How is he to 
know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs 
either?,,57 
Understanding is not something somehow separate from the words which 
the robot speaks, and neither is meaning. I can no more understand 
better the robot's directions by imputing in him mental states, than 
the robot improve them by "meaning" them. Further, there are 
different uses of the word "understanding". I can say I understand 
the sentence "It's just round the corner." in the sense that I know 
English, but in the context of being out in the street I understand 
what it means in another way. If a computer beats us at chess, it 
is idle to say "It's only a machine, it doesn't understand chess 
, 
anyway." For it has replied to our moves, it has 'known' how to 
because of the particular program which was running. 
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If you were playing chess by post, and subsequently discovered that 
your opponent was using a computer to tell him which move to make, 
your first reaction might well be "That's not faid" Although the 
moves are made in accordance with the rules, there are no rules 
governing how you decide to make the moves. There is however the 
tacit agreement that chess is a kind of "battle of minds". Pitting 
yourself against a computer "Isn't the same." In this sense Searle 
is right about the conversation with the robot, it isn't the same as 
a conversation with a human being. 
If I adopt the view of the Chinese-room, that the whole system of 
rule-book, baskets of symbols etc. 'understands' Chinese, I am still 
talking to a machine. However the extent to which the machine 
'understands' Chinese, the level at which it knows how to operate 
the language, and similarly the skill with which the computer plays 
chess, are all defined by the program. The programmer decides which 
words the robot will 'know', just as he decides which tactics the 
chess program can adopt. So are we not really talking to the 
programmer, and playing chess with the programmer? The answer is 
no. It is possible for an average chess-player to write a program 
which can beat him. We would not then say that he had beaten 
himself • 
The knowledge that we are talking to a machine, or playing a 
machine, does not change the validity of the directions, or the way 
the moves are made, it does however change our attitude. It is like 
seeing a beautiful girl, and then finding out that it is a man in 
drag. 
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We suddenly find ourselves in a different game. When philosophers 
exercise themselves with the problem of our knowledge of other 
minds, and ask "How do I know I am not talking to an automation, 
which merely behaves like a human being?", the answer is a question, 
"What difference would it make?". Searle says it makes a difference 
because the robot has not got a mind, but I submit that what he 
means is that because the functions of the robots reasoning are 
reducible in a way that the functions of the brain are not, the 
robot is inferior. 
Searle claims that because what he calls "mental states" are caused 
by brain processes, by biological processes, that these mental 
states are incapable of duplication by digital computers. He 
imagines a computer designed to simulate human behaviour 
If it's really a computer, its operations have to be 
defined syntactically, whereas consciousness, thoughts, 
feelings, emotions and all the rest of it involve more than 
syntax. Those features, by definition, the computer is 
unable to duplicate. 58 
Searle is guilty here of mixing his terminology in a very confusing 
manner. Ryle says of thinking 
I discover that there are other minds in understanding what 
other people say and do. In making sense of what you say, 
in appreciating your jokes, in unmasking your 
chess-stratagems, in following your arguments and in 
hearing you pick holes in my arguments, I am not inferring 
to the workings of your mind, I am following them. Indeed 
we do not merely discover that there are other minds; we 
discover what specific ~ualities of intellect and character 
particular people have. S 
The concept of mind is a metaphor which enables us to describe how 
we manipulate these symbols which Searle designates as mere syntax. 
He talks about "getting from the syntax to the semantics" as if the 
signs (the words) were dispensable. 
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Like the man who is shown around the colleges of Oxford and then 
asks "But where is the University?", Searle sees all the workings of 
the mind in this robot, it talks, gives answers, tells jokes, 
misunderstands and is sad, he then asks us where its mind is. 
He says that the computer simulation of mental processes are no more 
mental processes, than computer simulations of storms are wet. In 
fact computers do not simulate mental processes, they simulate 
methods of reasoning, means of calculation etc., which were first 
devised in some other medium. It matters not one bit to the 
operation of the computer whether we call these processes thinking. 
If I went to Disneyland to watch the Abraham Lincoln robot deliver 
the Gettysburg address I would not, following my previous line of 
reasoning, assume that it had a mind. Such a thought is 
irrelevant. I might however wonder as to its capacities as a 
robot. Could it play chess? could it kick a football? etc., etc., 
and I might well be disappointed if I was subsequently to find that 
it was not a robot at all. But due to a malfunction of the robot, 
had been replaced by an actor for the day. I might marvel at the 
actors skill in pretending to be a robot. These games are 
interesting because they challenge our categories of animate and 
inanimate. Van Vogt plays with such notions in his short story 'All 
the Loving Androids. 1 60 In this story androids pretend to be 
people and people pretend to be androids. The androids are a kind 
of slave class vying for equality, and adopting guerilla tactics to 
achieve their aims. The story asks the question "Could androids be 
our equals in society?" 
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The answer is that they could (theoretically) be our intellectual 
and physical equal, but would not be accepted socially as equals. 
(The story baulks the questions by giving them inferior powers of 
reasoning). However, a perfectly functioning simulation of a human 
being is a challenge to our whole system of values. It asks the 
question "What do we define as living?" Searle obviously thinks 
that something capable of 'semantics' would quality, he fails 
however to qualify the term, and it functions in his essay as 
'soul', spirit, elan vital etc., might in a more theological 
treatise. 
It is an interesting point that the 'behaviourist' attitude that 
Searle finds inadequate to the mind-body problem, as evinced by a 
study of its most powerful advocates, does not admit of the need for 
a biological model of brain processes. Wittgenstein in Zettel 
insists that there is no necessity that there should be a 
physiological counterpart of thought. 
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is 
no process in the brain correlated with associating or with 
things; so that it would be impossible to read off 
thought-processes from brain-processes •.•• 
If this upsets our concept of causality then it is high 
time it was upset. 61 
and in Lectures on Aesthetics he comments 
Here is the point of behaviourism. It isn't that they deny 
there are feelings. But they say our description of 
behaviour is our description of feelings. 62 
It is difficult to imagine that an android will feel pain in the 
same way as you or I feel pain, or get the same sensation as you or 
I get when we see a beautiful painting. 
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There is a tendency to talk about the 'effect of a work of 
art' - feelings, -images, etc. 
Does that mean if you gave a person the effects and removed 
the picture it would be all right? Surely (the) first 
thing is, you see the picture or say the words of a poem. 
Would a syringe which produces these effects on you do just 
as well as the picture?'3 
Clearly if the android could expound knowledgeably about a painting, 
and give us insights into the work, we can see the issue of whether 
it has feelings is innappropriate. The mental images which Marcus 
Hester says we have when we read poetry, they are not the reason we 
read poetry. We do not argue with people to generate neural 
responses in their brains either. How the brain works is not 
relevant, except to brain surgeons. Searle conflates 
brain-processes with thought-processes. He makes the same mistake 
as Chomsky, in thinking that if you can locate the part of the brain 
which is responsible for our predisposition to 'universal grammar' 
we might then be able to answer such questions as "How does meaning 
arise from metaphor?" or other such semantic questions. In fact 
only analysis of the way we talk and behave, tells us about our 
thinking. 
If someone wanted to check whether someone understands something, 
they might list factors which make it unlikely e.g., he can't read, 
he is innumerate, he had his brain removed yesterday. If the person 
nevertheless demonstrates his understanding such factors are 
irrelevant. That is they are irrelevant to the question "Does he 
understand?". They may however be of interest to neurosurgeons 
etc. Of similarly peripheral interest would be the fact that he 
turned out to be a robot. 
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The treatment of robots and computers in science fiction is the 
embodiment of the 'Heath Robinson' picture people have of the mind 
and understanding. Searle presents the apparently sophisticated 
version by assuming that we could have an android or robot that is 
indistinguishable from a human being. He asks what difference it 
would make, and gives the answer which science fiction writers have 
been giving for years. A robot has got no soul, he calls it 
semantics, but for all his protestations he fails to qualify the 
term. This is a kind of metaphysical solution, to a metaphysical 
problem. The impossibility of Searle's Chinese room example amuses 
AI specialists,· because it is an odd kind of idea of what a mind is 
which generates it. Proposing an extra quality to minds and 
understanding that is outside the activity of social interaction, I 
have tried to show here is irrelevant to understanding understanding. 
Similarly what we call consciousness is made up of these various 
characteristics; emotion, understanding, thinking, feeling. 
Another very common way of thinking about the mind-body problem is 
to imagine that we could have direct access to people's minds. This 
popular concept has currency outside science fiction circles, and as 
we shall see is the picture which people have of being certain not 
only that someone has a mind, but is thinking and feeling what they 
say they are. 
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Telepathy: Thoughts without Words 
Telepathy is a kind of picture of perfect communication. It 
imagines how it would be if we could look into peoples minds. 
Assuming the powers of our omniscient narrator, what kind of things 
we would expect to find? We often hear people say "I'd like to see 
what's going on in his head now." Science fiction stories often use 
the device of telepathy or extra-sensory perception to avoid 
language problems with aliens or as a useful gimmick in a tight 
situation. 
The general theory is that as brain waves can be detected by a 
machine, and that machine might be able to translate those bOrain 
waves into something resembling that person's thought. Similarly if 
we could receive other peoples' brain waves we would be able to know 
what they were thinking. Alfred Bester in his novel The Demolished 
Man posits a society where an elite group of people have telepathic 
abilities, and extrapolates on "wide-screen Baroque" lines, the 
social consequences of such an eventuality. Ben Reich head of the 
vast Monarch corporation decides to murder his business rival 
Craye D'Courtney. The chief obstacle to this enterprise is the 
existence of the Esper Guild, the organisation of mind-readers, 
because of whom "there hasn't been a successful premeditated murder 
in seventy-nine years." 
Espers make it impossible to conceal intent before murder. 
Or if Espers have been evaded before the murder, they make 
it impossible to conceal the guilt afterwards. 64 
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Espers are graded thus 
An Esper 3 can peep the conscious level of a mind - can 
discover what a subject is thinking at the moment of 
thought. 
2nd class Espers can penetrate beneath the conscious level 
of the mind to the preconscious. 
The lsts are capable of deep peeping, through the conscious 
and preconscious layers down to the unconscious •••• the 
lowest levels of the mind. Primordial basic desires and so 
forth. 55 
There are about 100,000 3rds, 10,000 2nds, and less than 1,000 lsts 
in the Guild. The Guild runs an Espers professional life. It 
trains them, grades them and sets ethical standards. They have an 
equivalent of the Hippocratic oath called the Esper Pledge. The 
punishment for breaking the pled~e is ostracisation by the rest of 
the Guild, leaving the transgressor to live his life with normal 
people. This. Monarch's head of espionage likens to asking a normal 
person to live out his life in the company of deaf-mutes. 
Reich bribes a 1st class Esper, Gus Tate, to help him in his plot. 
Tate runs "interference" for him against other peepers, provides 
intelligence and mind-blocks. Reich develops a temporary mind-block 
of his own by establishing in his mind a banal advertising jingle, 
capable of confusing any 3rd class peeper. The murder is duly 
committed, but D'Courtney's daughter. Barbara, witnesses the act and 
escapes. There follows layer upon layer of devilish intrigue, in 
which Reich and peeper Prefect Powell of the Psychotic Division, pit 
their wits and considerable resources in a race to find the girl. 
The essential point is that "peeped" evidence is not admissable in 
court, Reich must be trapped by hard evidence. The two antagonists, 
(the resources of the Guild and the resources of Monarch), set traps 
for each other. lay false leads, set up decoys, red herrings, feign 
defeat and generally chase each other round the solar system. 
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When the girl is found she is catatonic, of no use as a witness, we 
are privy to Powell's attempts at entering her psyche in an attempt 
to find more about her experience, and coax her back to 
consciousness. 
He went down the black passages again towards the 
deep-seated furnace that was ~ithin the girl ••• that is 
within every man ••• the timeless reservoir of psychic 
energy, reasonless, remorseless, seething with the 
never-ending search for satisfaction. 66 
Powell becomes lost in the chaos of the girl's psyche. He is 
attempting to do what is normally done in psychoanalysis, to find 
the source of her anguish, he finds that she has transferred her 
affections to him, she has fallen in love with him 
abruptly the image of Powell-Powerful-Protective-Paternal 
rushed at him, torrentially destructive. He stayed with 
it, grappling. The back of the head was D'Courtney's 
face. He followed the Janus image down to a blazing 
channel of doubles, pair, linkages and duplications to 
Reich? Imposs - Yes, Ben Reich and the caricature of 
Barbara, linked side to side like Siamese twins,S7 
Bester uses imagery and terminology from various psychoanalytic 
schools to portray the working of the ide What is revealed through 
this process is that Ben Reich is Barbara's brother. It is Reich's 
refusal to accept that he killed his father (D'Courtney) for 
anything other than financial reasons that causes his nightmare of 
the Man with No Face. The Demolished Man uses the Oedipus myth to 
establish the motive for the murder, "He wanted to destroy the 
hateful father who had rejected him". 
The Espers in this novel do not just read minds, in the sense of 
requiring a language as a medium. They can receive emanations of 
anxiety, blood lust in a pure form, even from animals! 
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While in the jungle of the nature reserve on space land Powell 
reached out on the TP Band, sensing, touching, feeling. 
There was nothing but blind fear, blind rage, blind 
instinct around him. The hippos, sodden and viscid .•• the 
crocodiles, deaf, angry, hungry ••• swampbats, as furious 
as rhinoceri whose size they doubled •••• A quarter of a 
mile off were the faint broadcasts of elephant, wapiti, 
. t t 68 g1an ca s 
I wonder what Powell would have found if he had tried to look into 
an elephants psyche? 
Feelings and thoughts, structured by myths are not the only way that 
Bester attempts to describe Extra-Sensory-Perception. In the 'Esper 
party' sequence he attempts to show how the TP chatter might form 
patterns analogous to the rhythmic and metrical patterns in poetry. 
He does this typographically'9 and later in the scene at the Guild 
Institute 
In the lecture hall, a class of 3rds was earnestly weaving 
simple basket patterns while they discussed current 
events. There was one little overdue 2nd, a 
twelve-year-old, who was adding zig-zag ad libs to the dull 
discussion and peaking every zig with a spoken word. The 
words rhymed and were barbed comments on the speakers. 7o 
The skill with which Bester weaves together descriptions of the 
various levels of mind-reading, leaves us with the impression of a 
comprehensive view of what it might be like to possess an 
"extra-sensory Node" in the brain. He does not fall into the trap 
of attempting to describe the workings of the mind in the way that 
those concerned with the mind-body problem or the apparently 
intractable questions of artificial intelligence do. 
The problem is insoluble because investigators are looking for the 
'mechanics' of 'mental processes'. 
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The philosophers on the one hand deny that minds, like bodies, are 
subject to Laplacean determinism, while on the other hand are unable 
to formulate rules about how the mind works without resorting to 
some kind of determinism. 
This confusion and a slavish adherence to determinism in physical 
systems leads Searle into his fruitless discussion of the status of 
free will in behavioural sciences. Searle attempts to get out of 
the usual "epistemological flaw of circularity" in his argument of 
what causes minds by postulating it as an emergent quality of the 
brain. Koestler makes a similar assertion in his The Ghost in the 
Machine when he postulates a hierarchical mental structure where 
descriptive methods at one level are not applicable at others71 • 
Bester manages to avoid the quicksand of "describing mental states" 
by taking on board a fairly unashamed Freudian vocabulary. What we 
discover about characters at the "conscious" and "preconscious" 
level of thinking, are of the nature of things they could tell us 
but would rather not. This foregrounds the "invasion of privacy" 
aspect of mind-reading. The degree of deception required in the 
everyday conduct of our affairs is emphasised by the examples of job 
interviews being conducted by peepers, and police officers being 
able to "peep" all those little things we would rather them not 
know. The essential point of Bester's book is that all a 
mind-reader is likely to find beyond that, is a never ending 
complexity of wishes, desires and motives, likely to confuse rather 
than clarify procedures. 
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This brings us back to Ryle's point that it is a mistake to think 
that we can know our own minds better than someone else's. The 
kinds of things that we can find out about other people's minds are 
very much the same as the kinds of things we can find out about our 
own, and in the case of mind-reading, if the methods of finding out 
these things are much the same, we are likely to experience a loss 
of identity, and the conviction that what are peeping is right and 
true is subject to much the same criteria as Freudian criteria, 
namely an appeal to what seems right and natural and the power of 
mythology. 
There are no causal laws which we can calIon in the operation of 
feelings, we can not set up experiments, and say "Yes" or "No", 
"this experiment was successful, this one was not." 
Take Freud's view that anxiety is always a repetition in 
some way of the anxiety we felt at birth. He does not 
establish this by reference to evidence - for he could not 
do so. But it is an idea that has a marked attraction. It 
has the attraction that mythological explanations have, 
explanations which say that this is a repetition of 
something that has happened before. 72 
Wittgenstein is not merely saying that Freudian techniques lack 
criteria, that sometimes the analysis may satisfy the patient but 
not the doctor, what he is saying is that often such "memories" as 
analysis evokes could easily be due to the analyst. The patient may 
be reassured, things might seem clearer to the patient, but the 
vocabulary and structure of the Freudian view provides descriptive 
powers which necessarily entail the myth. 
Bester's treatment of telepathy is unusual in that it does not 
suggest that mind-reading would establish with any certainty what a 
person's feelings were. 
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If someone were in pain, -I imagine that Bester's peepers would be able 
to establish such fairly quickly, but the various levels of 
consciousness need deeper probing. However, if a person were 
pretending to be in pain, or pretending sorrow, the mind reader would 
easily see the through the deceit. In this sense mind-reading appears 
to establish some kind of certainty. Interestingly it is only the 
things about which we have no doubt when we refer to ourselves, which 
can be established with certainty by the peepers. It makes no sense to 
say "I don't know if I'm in pain" but I can say "I don't know what I 
think" • 
Imagine you are in love. Are you in love all the time? Just for an 
hour a day? or ten minutes out of every hour? If someone were to read 
your mind at the wrong time he might never realize that you were in 
love. The Freudian mind-model which Bester subscribes to suggests that 
there are levels of the psyche which separate out a little like crude 
oil separates out into spirit and lubricant. The mind reader would 
have to probe into the lower levels to find out if you were in love. 
This image of the mind, effectively codified by Freud, is essentially 
misleading and gives rise to the notion that one might establish with 
some certainty a series of causes and mental events, which would allow 
one to talk about 'mental states' as if they were tangible things like 
the state of the weather. Wittgenstein finds Freud's theories full of 
"fishy thinking,,?3, and whilst recognising what he calls his 
"scientific achievement" he says of Freud in a letter to Norman Malcolm, 
••• he never says what an enormous charm that the idea (of 
psycho-analysis) has for people, just as it has for Freud 
himself. There may be strong prejudices against uncovering 
something nasty, but ~ometimes it is infinitely more attractive 
than repulsive. Unless you think ~clearly psycho-analysis is 
a dangerous & foul practice, & it's done no end of harm, & 
comparatively, very little good.?4 
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One of Wittgenstein's chief objections to Freud's methods was that 
taking physics as the ideal science, his approach allows us to 
imagine that laws of psychology are being formulated. It ignores 
the crucial point that the essence of mental phenomena is that there 
aren't any laws governing them. In a conversation with Rush-Rees, 
Wittgenstein asks of the interpretation of dreams how with free 
association we know where to stop, "where is the right solution?". 
Also if it is true that there is a dream language shouldn't it also 
be possible to reverse things and translate everyday life into a 
dream? As an example of how imprecise the whole idea of 
interpretation is in psycho-analysis, Wittgenstein asks us to 
imagine a cartoon featuring a caricature of Churchill and another 
character with a hammer and sickle emblazoned on him. Given that 
the caption is missing we would not say that there was only one 
possible caption. 
The question is whether you would always be justified in 
assuming that there was some one joke or some one point 
which is the point the cartoon is making. Perhaps even the 
picture has no "right interpretation" at all. You might 
say:"There are indications - such as the two figures 
mentioned - which suggest that it has." And I might answer 
that perhaps those indications are all that there is. 75 
Certain things in the picture might be open to interpretation, other 
things not. Wittgenstein suggests that the same might also be true 
of dreams, and he believes that to same extent Freud confuses 
interpretations with causes. 
Freud asks "Are you asking me to believe that there is 
nothing which happens without a cause?" But this means 
nothing. If under 'cause' you include things like 
physiological causes, then we know nothing about these, and 
in any case they are not relevant to the question of 
interpretation. 76 
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This idea that philosophy is independent of empirical propositions 
is essential to Wittgenstein's approach even in the Tractatus. In 
his introduction to the 1913 'Notes on Logic' he says, 
Philosophy gives no picture of reality, and can neither 
confirm nor confute scientific investigations. 77 
and in the Philosophical Investigations he says 
The problems are solved, not by g1v1ng new information, but 
by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a 
battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
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of language. 
We are mislead by the inordinate importance which we attach to an 
image of how language works and are inclined to regard literal 
language as providing the model for the whole of language. We think 
of it as descriptive. Thus when we describe something the 
proposition appears to have the form "This is how things are"., 
Wittgenstein comments 
That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself 
countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the 
outline of a thing's nature over and over again, and one is 
merely tracing round the frame through which we look at 
it. The picture has held us captive. 79 
The image which activates the idea of 'literal' language is that of 
words picturing reality, as if one could map language onto reality. 
Literal language thereby becomes a kind of extended metaphor in 
itself • 
All of the 'philosophical nonsense' which I have noted in my various 
examples may be traced back to being misled by a picture. This 
picture is often embedded deep in the form'of language. 
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Because the grammar of Freud's descriptions of mental phenomena is 
similar to the grammar of the description of things in the world, of 
objects and events, we formulate an image of a descriptive process 
similar to that of scientific procedures. This image entails the 
ascription of causes to mental events, just as we ascribe causes to 
physical events. 
This misleading notion is the product of being captivated by a 
picture and of an inordinate fondness for causes, and a particular 
partiality for singular causes. ~~en philosophers talk about 'the 
will' as a kind of 'prime mover' of intelligent activity, the fuel 
as it were driving all our actions, and they notice that they have 
not given a 'cause' for 'the will', as if it somehow appears from 
nowhere~ it begins to worry them. They have, as Wittgenstein says, 
failed to give a meaning to one of their terms. The focus of 
Bester's second novel Tiger!Tiger!lo (published in the U.S.A. as 
The Stars my Destination) is the will. The blind wilfulness of 
Gully Foyle in his thirst for revenge is set against the more 
prosaic, scientific, exercise of the will required in Jaunting and 
in exploding PyrE. In what is undoubtedly a tour-de-force in 
"Widescreen Baroque", Bester combines all the myths and cliches of 
science fiction in a classic space-opera. It is worth assembling 
these elements in order to form some idea of how all the 
philosophical formulas which I have identified can be made to cohere 
in the service of an ideal which is principally romantic; the 
supremacy of the imagination. 
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-Will and Idea: Thinking the Impossible 
The world of 2336 A.D. is a "golden age, a time of high adventure"; 
where all the "habitable worlds of the solar system were occupied"; 
where the Outer Satellites are at war with the Inner Planets; where 
the vast commercial clans form dynasties, liveried and encastled. 
Bester peoples it with fantastic figures; Olivia Presteign the 
albino "princess" blind to all but the "7,500 Angstroms to one 
millimeter wavelengths"; Saul Dagenham, whom a fission blast had 
turned radioactive, "transformed him into a twenty-fourth century 
'Typhoid Mary'; Robin Wednesbury, a one-way telepath, who could 
"broadcast her thoughts to the world but could receive nothing."; 
and amidst all these improbable misfits is Gulliver Foyle, Mechanics 
Mate 3rd Class, "the stereotype common man". 
Gully Foyle is turned uncommon, "kicked awake" by forces beyond his 
understanding. His lust for revenge for being left stranded in 
space, transforms him into a "walking cancer", "a liar, lecher, 
ghoul", his obsession with vengeance makes Foyle a deadly killer, a 
tiger amongst men. 
Unbeknown to Foyle, the ship on which he was stranded, the Nomad, 
carried 20 pounds of PyrE, the most deadly explosive known to man. 
Thus as Foyle wreaks havoc in his relentless quest for revenge, he 
is pursued across the solar system by agents of the mighty Presteign 
and Inner Planets Intelligence, desperate to extract from him the 
location of the wrecked ship. 
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From here the plot proceeds in a manner not unlike The Count of 
Monte Christo, exchanging the trappings of seventeenth century 
French society for those of the twenty-fourth. The most remarkable 
development of this new age is "jaunting", "the transportation of 
oneself through space by an effort of the mind alone." We usually 
call it teleportation. The effect is named after a researcher named 
Jaunte whose colleagues, suspecting his ability, sealed him in an 
unbreakable crystal tank, filled it with water and smashed the valve 
handle. 
Jaunte began to drown. Then he was outside the tank 
dripping and coughing explosively. He'd teleported 
• aT 
aga1n. 
Once the principles of teleportation were established it no longer 
took the threat of death to make a person jaunte, 
Any person was capable of jaunting provided he developed 
two faculties, visualization and concentration. He had to 
visualize completely and precisely, the spot to which he 
desired to teleport himself; and he had to concentrate the 
latent energy of his mind into a single thrust to get him 
there. Above all he had to have faith ••• He had to believe 
he would jaunte. az 
Note that one just has to imagine where one wants to go and then 
will oneself there. Peoples' ability to jaunte varied from person 
to person, "but no jump could exceed a thousand miles." 
Stylistically speaking teleportation is the spatial equivalent of 
the omniscient narrator. The ability to jump from one place to 
another is something we take for granted in a novel or a film, we 
expect our omniscient narrator also to be Ubiquitous in space and 
time. And just as mind-reading provides the illusion of depth, 
teleportation provides the illusion of speed. 
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With "jaunte stages" set up all around the world, the characters 
move about the globe with dizzying speed. Bester visualises vividly 
the social consequences of this commonplace fantasy. "More 
spectacular than the change-over from horse and buggy to the 
gasoline age four centuries before," universal jaunting brought with 
it crashes, panics, famines and plagues. Crime waves swept the 
planets and satellites, 
There came a hideous return to the worst prudery of 
Victorianism as society fought the sexual and moral dangers 
of jaunting with protocol and taboo. S3 
Labyrinths and masking devices had to be set up to prevent unlawful 
jaunting, and a man's social position was displayed by his refusal 
to jaunte. Bester playfully depicts this cult of outmoded transport 
as he describes the guests arriving at one of Presteign's parties. 
The sightseers buzzed and exclaimed as the famous and 
near-famous of clan and sept arrived by car, by coach, by 
litter, by every form of luxurious transportation. 
The Colas arrived by band wagon. The Esso family (six 
sons, three daughters) was magnificent in a glass topped 
Greyhound bus. But Greyhound arrived (in an Edison 
Electric Runabout) hard on their ~eels •••• 84 
Foyle arrives in his new identity of wealthy upstart Fourmyle of 
Ceres, his thirst for revenge keener after his long imprisonment in 
the jaunte-proof Gouffre Martel, and outdoes them all by arriving in 
a steam locomotive preceded by track-layers and a man on a white 
horse holding a large red flag. His entry into society assured 
Foyle falls in love with the "white princess", who turns out to be 
the person who gave the order to leave him stranded on the Nomad, 
and the object of his quest for vengeance. Thus emasculated, the 
tiger, its teeth drawn, and claws clipped, is at the mercy of 
Presteign and his cohorts, more determined that ever to get hold of 
PyrE, knowing that Foyle has it hidden. 
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P~~ it turns out is a pyrophoric alloy "releasing thermo-nuclear 
-/ 
energy on the order of stellar Phoenix action", and brought to 
critical mass "Through Will and Idea", as the original energy was 
generated in the beginning of time,,85 Presteign explains. 
When Foyle is thrust into a position of having to decide who to give 
this deadly substance to he bau1ks the question and distributes it 
around the globe in a mad spreed, crying to Dagenham and Yeovi1 
I've handed life and death back to the people who do the 
living and dying, The common man's been whipped and led 
long enough by driven men like us •••• Compulsive men ••• 
Tiger men who can't help lashing the world before them • 
•••• Who the hell are we to make decisions for the world 
just because we're compUlsive? Let the world make its own 
choice between life and death. Why should we be saddled 
with the responsibility?86 
Foyle's attempt to provoke the masses to greatness, is founded on 
the belief that the Common man can be kicked awake like he was, and 
his abnegation of responsibility is set against the knowledge that 
Foyle, far from being the stereotype common man is the "new man" 
almost a God in the universe. His newly found ability to 
space-jaunte, gives him an even more awesome responsibility than 
PyrE. 
Am I to teach the world how to space-jaunte and let us 
spread our freak show from galaxy to galaxy through all the 
universe?87 
he asks. Here Bester pushes the jaunting idea to its extreme by 
suggesting the possibility of teleportation through time. The 
figure of the burning man which has haunted Foyle throughout the 
book, turns out to be himself, time-jaunting in a desperate effort 
to escape from the inferno of Sth Pat's Cathedral. 
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He went hurtling along the geodesica1 space-lines of the 
curving universe-at the speed of thought which far exceeds 
that of light. His spatial velocity was so frightful that 
his time axis was twisted from the vertical line drawn from 
the past through Now to the Future. aa 
His space jaunting takes him to the very edge of the universe, where 
thousands of light years from earth 
He hung in space for a blinding moment, as helpless, as 
amazed and yet as inevitable as the first gil led creature 
to come out of the sea and hang gulping on a primeval beach 
in the dawn-history of life on earth. 89 
In a remarkable feat of integration Bester has rounded up 
time-travel, te1eportation, mind reading, identity crises, 
evolution, extra senses, god, religion, and the apocalypse and all 
the philosophical nonsense which this entails, with a style and 
panache which is precisely the reverse of what Amis remarks as 
typical science fiction. He says 
nothing is more typical of science fiction than it presents 
what are at any rate interesting ideas, and sometimes even 
original ones, in terms of electrifying bana1ity.90 
It is probably impertinent of me to remark on the banality of the 
message of Tiger!Tiger!, because its thrust is principally 
romantic. Indeed Patrick McCarthy seeks in it a revisionary 
perspective on Blake's 'The Tyger', and calls it 
a visionary novel built upon Romantic assumptions about the 
relationship between the imagination and the external 
world. Unlike Arthur C.Clarke's Childhood's End - or even 
his 2001: A Space Odyssey, whose conclusion in some ways 
resembles that of Bester's novel - The Stars My Destination 
does not depend on forces outside man to bring about its 
apocalyptic breakthrough. 91 
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This appears to be a fair- assessment to the extent that Bester's 
novel conforms to the definition of romanticism which T.E. Hulme 
offers in 'Romanticism and Classicism' 
that man, the individual, is an infinite reservoir of 
possibilities; and if you can so arrange society by the 
destruction of oppressive order then these possibilities 
will have a chance and you will get Progress. 92 
Hulme's capitalisation of the word "Progress" seems to set his 
tongue firmly in his cheek, and gently suggests that romanticism has 
begun to parody itself. In consequence I find it difficult to take 
McCarthy's view seriously, and find Tiger!Tiger! a virtual 
caricature, not just of the romantic myth but of the archetypal 
science fiction novel. 
In the book's refusal to resolve the paradoxes: Foyle's role as a 
figure of redemption through "viciousness" and selfishness; his 
offering to humanity the keys to hell (PyrE) as well as the keys to 
heaven (space-jaunting); McCarthy sees a "dynamic tension" essential 
to the Romantic myth. He concludes 
if we find it difficult to evaluate Gully Foyle at the end 
of the novel, it is because Bester's concept of irony here 
is so thoroughly Romantic that we can arrive only at a 
paradox. 93 
At the end of the book we are left with a vision of Foyle, huddled 
foetus like in the locker of the space-ship Nomad, watched over by 
the two "scientific people" Joseph and Moira. This Christ-in-the 
manger scene presages the "awakening" of Foyle and mankind to the 
"new frontier of the mind" that would "transform man and make him 
master of the universe". 
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This would as McCarthy suggests, indeed seem to parallel the 
position of Stephen Dedalus at the end of A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man, and strengthen the case for considering the 
development of Foyle as an echo of the development of the 
artist/anti-hero which Joyce has established as the archetypal 
post-romantic figure of the 20th century. 
The development of "jaunting" in Tiger!Tiger! is a symbol of man 
throwing off the shackles of technology, and outgrowing the 
scientific, mechanistic approach. That the transcendence of 
imagination is only possible through conflict, "the marriage of 
pinnacle freaks", is represented ,by Foyle's hedonistic and vengeful 
quest. In the central scene of the book Foyle is attempting to 
interrogate the captain of the Vorga in the Sklotsky colony,. 
Sklotskys are people who, believing that sensation is the root of 
al1 evil, have "submitted joyously to an operation that severed the 
sensory nervous system, and lived out their days without sight, 
sound, speech, smell, taste or touch."s4 Against the background 
of these corpse like creatures, writhing to the broadcasts of the 
telepath which Foyle has pressganged into helping him, the Burning 
Man appears. 
The Burning Man is Foyle, the Tiger of the title tattooed, time 
travelling and experiencing synaesthesia. 
that rare condition in which perception receives messages 
from the objective world and relays these messages to the 
brain, but there in the brain the sensory perceptions are 
confused with one another. So, in Foyle, sound registered 
at sight, motion registered as sound, colours became pain 
sensations, touch became taste and smell became touch. 95 
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It is the Burning Man who reads the movements of the Sklotsky, 
Lindsey Joyce, and translates them into the name Olivia Presteign. 
From this moment, when Foyle realises that the object of his hatred 
is also the object of his love he becomes a thinking man rather than 
a driven thing. Bester's depiction of synaesthesia is clearly 
derived from Rimbaud's 'Sonnet of the Vowels' and other such 
Symbolist poems. The notion that movements could "speak" is a 
curious reversal of the Symbolist belief that poems, in stimulating 
the other senses through rhythmic and metaphoric means, gave a kind 
of transcendent meaning to language. Foyle's entrapment in the 
"kaleidoscope of his own cross-senses" is the eventual trigger to 
his space-jaunting. Overall, Bester's use of synaesthesia is 
ambiguous. On the one hand it is Foyles' own synaesthesia which 
reveals to him that which he has quested, which emasculates him, and 
simultaneously raises him to become a member of society again. It 
is against the background of the "senseless" Sklotskys, refugees 
from experience, that Foyle finally realises that he must face 
himself, the Burning Man, and society. The appearance of the 
Burning Man is an epiphany, the manifestation of a God to Gentiles. 
Bester in a stroke of brilliance, casts the clearest message of the 
book in the mouth of a robot disrupted by Dagenham's radiation. 
When Foyle asks the "haywire" machine what he should do with PyrE 
and his knowledge of space-jaunting, it answers that he should "go 
along with society", "You must teach society" it says. Foyle asks, 
'To space-jaunte?' Why? Why reach out to the stars and 
galaxies? 
What for? 
'Because you're alive, sir.' 
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it answers, and when Foyle asks why a freak like himself should have 
to lead society it replies, 
'You're all freaks, sir. But you have always been freaks. 
Life is a freak. That's its hope and glory.' 
'Thank you very much.' 
'My pleasure, sir.' 
'You've saved the day.' 
'Always a lovely day somewhere, sir,' the robot beamed. 
Then it fizzed jangled and co11apsed. 96 
The bartender robot, conditioned to respond "Always a lovely day 
somewhere, sir." to any sentence with "day" in it, is remarked by 
Foyle earlier in the scene, 
'That's me,' he said. motioning to the robot. 'That's all 
of us. We prattle about free will, but we're nothing but 
response •••• mechanical reaction in prescribed 
grooves.,,97 
The robot has expressed the view that life and human beings are an 
accidental product of a "clockwork" universe, and that intelligent 
beings (or minds) are as much a freak as the apparent sense which 
the malfunctioning robot spouts in response to Foyle's questions. 
This prevalent view, relegating the mind to the status of a 
by-product of forces beyond our control, is at the bottom of a 
number of philosophies including mentalism, and the "argument from 
illusion," all of which ascribe superior status to the mind. Once 
the Earth has been relegated to the status of a planet circling the 
sun, the sun to the status of a minor star on the outer arm of a 
spiral galaxy nowhere near the centre of the universe,it's not 
surprising that philosophers and science fiction writers would like 
to mark out some special status for mental states and events. The 
image of man looking out from his frail body onto the universe, 
inevitably leads to the consideration that this power we have over 
our bodies, (to move our arms by our own free will) might be 
extended to the universe. 
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It is the ability of man to imagine himself elsewhere and elsewhen 
(as Bester puts it) which fuels this romantic view. Te1eportation, 
telepathy, the belittling of machines, computers and artificial 
intelligence, crackpot theology and the suggestion that we are 
evolving into gods, all are present in the books I have discussed, 
and all would suggest that the mind somehow transcends the body, and 
is not subject to the laws of physics. 
In a historical formal sense, since science fiction grew out of 
fantasy, it is not surprising that it should find itself so at odds 
with the philosophy of science. From this vantage the almost 
anti-romantic stance of writers like Clarke and Asimov appears 
rather muddled, their scientific "expertise" as Delany calls it, 
merely the run up to some spectacular philosophical own goals. 
Bester's conclusion is philosophically similar to Searle's, that 
intelligence is biological, with the essential difference that 
Searle wouldn't have listened to the robot. In science fiction, 
scientific knowledge is no use in predicting the future. In science 
fiction, philosophical and logical sophistication is of use in 
creating controlled breaks of everyday rules. 
The apparent disjunction which both writers attempt to resolve 
involves the observation that the mind has free will, 
(intentionality as Searle terms it), and must therefore be 
indeterminate, and that the body made up as it is of particles and 
charges, must obey the rules of physics and be determinate. Charles 
Hockett sees it from the other. end of the telescope, for him 
determinate systems are exceptions to the rules. 
129 
Hockett maintains that as there are no completely reversible systems 
a system without entropy would not be a physical system. Moreover 
Every observable physical system must, by definition, 
contain ~ information. For if there be some material 
system in which entropy has actually reached a steady 
maximum - not the stone lodged part way down the hill, but 
the stone that has rolled to the very bottom - so that it 
contains no information at all, then we have no way of 
knowing of its existence. For all intents and purposes such 
a system would form a universe of its own, separate from 
91 ours. 
Hockett rather magnanimously allows that although the laws of 
thermodynamics are idealizations, their power is not diminished. 
His minor point is that determinism and statistical mechanics rest 
on the assumption of zero change. in entropy, his major point is that 
any system without entropy is incapable of being known, and if there 
were no entropy, no decrease in information, we would have no means 
of organising information and therefore no history because 
"everything" would be known. 
His argument interestingly does not depend on quantum mechanical 
theories, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, or disproofs of Bell 
inequality, it depends on a definition of history which qualifies 
the term "determinate". Because information is always about the 
past he maintains that classical mechanics' "instantaneous 
observation" is impossible, and that this view of reality is only 
made possible by a concept of past, future, present, which sees the 
present as a kind of snapshot, and the 'flow' of time as a kind of 
film. A film which can be stopped, frozen at any moment. 
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To some extent I have come back to the point I started at at the 
beginning of this chapter. The way in which the language of "time 
words" leads us astray. I have suggested here that the notion of 
determinacy is related to this concept of time, and that it is the 
idea of determinacy in physical systems, counterpoised with what we 
call "free will" which causes many of the puzzles of the mind-body 
duality problem. However it makes no sense to speak of free will 
unless there is something determinate for that will to act on. To 
some extent things are only determinate because we want them to be 
so, we want to observe patterns and correspondence. Determinacy 
thus becomes a function of our concept of reality, which in turn is 
dependent upon our observation of reality, the idea of the world 
existing independently of human consciousness is abolished. 9 ! 
In The Sirens of Titan Kurt Vonnegut neatly satirises the idea of 
free will in Rumfoord's heated argument with the mechanical 
messenger, Salo from Tralfamadore. 
"Nobody likes to think he's being used" said Rumfoord. 
"He'll put off admitting it to himself until the last 
possible instant." He smiled crookedly. "It may surprise 
you to learn that I take a certain pride, no matter how 
foolishly mistaken that pride may be, in making my own 
decisions for my own reasons." 
"I'm not surprised," said Salo. 
"Oh?, said Rumfoord unpleasantly. "I should have thought 
it was too subtle an attitude for a machine to grasp." 
This, surely was the low point in their relationship. Salo 
~ a machine, since he had been designed and 
manufactured. He didn't conceal the fact. But Rumfoord 
had never used the fact as an insult before. loo 
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To set the scene in perspective, Rumfoord has here discovered, not 
merely that he has been used, but the "sickening" fact that 
everybody on earth has been used 
"Everything that every Earthling has ever done has been 
warped by creatures on a planet one-hundred-and-fifty 
thousand light Oears away. The name of the planet is 
Tralfamadore."l 1 
To the end of supplying a replacement part to a Tralfamadorian 
spaceship grounded on Titan, the beings of Tralfamadore had 
influenced just about every major event in earth's history. The 
beings of Tralfamadore it transpires are machines just like Salol 
vonnegut further satirises the science fictional/philosophical idea 
of "the will" by having Salo's ship powered by a quantity of "the 
most powerful conceivable source of energy, UWB, or the Universal 
Will to Become." Thus treating this almost sacred capacity of human 
beings as if it were gasoline. It might be seen on reflection that 
that is exactly how "the will" is treated, in the way we use the 
word, and the way science fiction writers use it. 
In both The Demolished Man and Tiger!Tiger! as well as in The 
Paradox Men, what is discovered accidentally through panic, 
("jaunting", time-travelling etc.,) are found to be functions of 
human will and therefore controllable. "Will-power" is the 
watchword, Foyle's ability to control his emotions, symbolised by 
his tiger face, is an effort of will. We constantly talk about will 
as if it were something we have reserves of. 
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We imagine that "willing" PryE to explode, or ourselves to teleport, 
would be a bit like a child "trying" to go to the toilet; we would 
screw our faces up and think. And that failing to achieve the 
required end is a bit like failing to hit the bell on the "Test your 
strength" stall at the fair. However if I will my arm to raise, and 
it doesn't, I would not say that this was due to a lack of 
will-power, I would suspect that my body is failing to obey me in 
some way. As Wittgenstein says 
One can say "I will, but my body does not obey me" - but 
not: "My will does not obey me." (Augustine) 
But in the sense in which I cannot fail to will, I cannot 
'11 'th 102 try to W1 e1 ere 
It makes no sense to speak of "willing willing". Either I will 
something or I do~'t. and it doesn't take more will to lift a heavy 
object than a light one, it takes more strength. By thinking of 
willing as a "non-causal bringing-about", the driving force behind 
an idea or a wish,we are subject to the misleading analogy of the 
mind as a kind of machine driven by this "ethereal" substance will. 
Vonnegut in The Sirens of Titan takes all the elements of the 
stereotypical science fiction novel and weaves them together into a 
seamless whole, and laughs like a drain at the whole thing. 
James Mel1ard in an essay whose title is too long to mention here, 
remarks, 
Vonnegut transcends the form by instilling life into its 
most transparent cliches, by reducing its formulas to 
absolute archetypes and by elevating its trite metaphysical 
theme to the status of a believable eschatology.lo3 
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He finds that Sirens conforms with Northrop Frye's definition of 
"Naive" literature, namely that it is plainly written in a popular 
form. However I think that the naive appearance of Vonnegut's 
language is deceptive, and his use of the "formulas" of science 
fiction is structurally so coherent that by comparison any of the 
novels, in the tradition of which he is supposedly following, are 
about as structured as alphabet soup. To appreciate the full extent 
of Vonnegut's travesty in Sirens it would be useful to epitomise the 
archetypical science fiction novel. The mode I shall stereotype is 
the space-opera as that is the form which Sirens pastiches. 
The story involves an apparently ordinary man whose search for 
identity brings him into conflict with the proto-fascist dynasty 
which rules the world/solar system. The elite of this corrupt 
power, in a plot to achieve domination of whatever territories 
remain, threaten to destroy the world with their machinations. 
Further they seek to usurp the power of the machine/computer which 
makes all the decisions, for their own purposes. Meanwhile the 
hero, who unbeknown to himself is at the nexus of the fate of the 
universe, and being controlled by some Machievellian character 
behind the scenes, falls in love with the current ruler's beautiful 
daughter. The ruler's plans for domination by the acquisition of 
some new and deadly weapon turn out to be a paltry thing compared to 
the transcendent secret which our hero contains within himn. 
A chase across the universe is obligatory, Mars and Venus should be 
used as local colour. 
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It is customary that in the midst of a nuclear holocaust our 
mind-reading/teleporting/time-travelling hero should discover his 
mission and that the mysterious manipulator of his fate is none 
other than himself, time-warped, mutated or in some other way 
re-incarnated, or, at the very least his surrogate father. 
At this point the giant computer, so far the source of much worry 
due to its apparently limitless powers, turns out to be almost human 
after all. but destroys itself in its attempts to prove this. The 
hero, amidst much Christ imagery, becomes the saviour of the 
universe, and the question of whether he gets the girl is left open. 
Statutory are: marvellous space-ships, made of wonderful new metals 
and capable of enormous speeds; endless plot twists to keep the 
reader guessing; beautiful girls brutalised; secret societies, 
crackpot sects and wonderful new religions. There should be no 
language problems. 
The whole is a kind of philosophical detective story whereby we 
discover how civilisation began and how it is likely to end if we 
don't allow the development of homo-superior. 
The motto of such science fiction might be a kind of reversal of 
Wittgenstein's dictum, and read something like, 
Whereof we cannot speak, thereof must we speak. 
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The modus operandi extends what Samuel Delany calls "expertise", 
into something more (and less) than a narrative technique. In his 
essay 'Critical Methods: Speculative Fiction' Delany looks at "one 
of the narrative techniques that practically alone support science 
fiction:" 
expertise - that method whereby an author, deploying a 
handful of esoteric facts, creates the impression that he, 
or more often a character in his story, is an expert in 
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He attributes the genesis of the technique to Huysmans and Poe. In 
fact what Delany is calling a narrative technique is the ancient and 
much venerated art of bullshitting. But, baffling the reader with 
science is a little different from baffling the reader with 
philosophy, because explaining the meaning of life is not like 
forensic science or deduction. Science-fiction however treats "the 
meaning of life" as if it can be discovered hidden in the 
grandfather clock or tucked under the carpet. Vonnegut lampoons 
this tendency throughout Sirens, beginning with Ransom K.Fern's 
request in connection with the sealed letter Malachi Constant's 
father had left in case of the collapse of his financial empire, 
"And I will now, as an humble and loyal corporate servant, 
ask you for one small favour," said Fern, "If the letter 
seems to cast the vaguest light on what life may be about, 
I would appreciate your telephoning me at home.,,105 
Ransom K.Fern is cast as the most rational person in the book. That 
civilisation was set in motion to provide a spare part for a 
stranded Tralfamadorian space-ship, has a logic which might appeal 
to a rational man. 
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In the context of our archetypical space-opera Malachi Constant is 
our ordinary hero, his search for identity begins when he is 
brainwashed by the Martian army and he becomes Unk. The capitalist 
proto-fascist dynasty are the Rumfoords, prime representatives of 
the "one true American class", characterised by the title of a 
fictional book as The American Philosopher Kings". In the absence 
of a beautiful daughter our hero eventually falls in love with the 
next best thing, Winston Niles Rumfoord's dignified and virginal 
wife Beatrice. The nearest thing to a transcendent secret within 
our hero, is his eventual love for Beatrice and their child Chrono, 
whom he fathered in loveless rape on the trip to Mars. 
Rumfoord himself appears on the face of it, to be the mysterious 
manipulator. Rumfoord and'his dog Kazak are scattered through space 
and time by a phenomenon known as a chrono-synclastic infundibulum,. 
They exist as wave phenomena "apparently pulsing in a distorted 
spiral with its origin in the Sun and its terminal in Betelgeuse." 
(pronounced beetle-juice). 
Whenever a heavenly body intercepted their spirals, 
Rumfoord and his dog materialized on that body. 
For reasons as yet mysterious, the s~irals of Rumfoord, 
Kazak and Titan coincided exactly. 10 
Rumfoord and his dog materialize on earth every fifty-nine days for 
the matter of a few hours, and as a side effect of this phenomena 
Rumfoord can not only read minds, but exists timelessly, i.e. he can 
see everything that ha's happened and everything that will happen. 
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Rumfoord masterminds the war with Mars, the effective suicide of 
150,000 Martians (formerly earthlings), in order that the "world 
might unite as the Brotherhood of Man." 
As he says in his Pocket History of Mars: "Any man who 
would change the world in a significant way must have 
showmanship, a genial willingness to shed other people's 
blood, and a plausible new religion to introduce during the 
brief period of repentance and horror that usually follows 
the bloodshed."IO? 
Rumfoord has all these qualities and he select Malachi Constant, 
alias Unk,to epitomise all that is corrupt about mankind and 
enshrines him as a "central symbol of wrong-headedness" in his new 
religion. Malachi Constant achieves his role as redeemer by being 
exiled to Titan in front of an enormous crowd "so that the Church of 
God the Utterly Indifferrent can have a drama of dignified 
self-sacrifice to remember and ponder through all time."IOS All 
the various threads of plot resolve themselves into a single dot in 
the climax of the story on Titan. There Malachi meets Salo, the 
mechanical messenger from Tralfamadore. Salo, out of love for his 
first and only friend Winston Niles Rumfoord overcomes his 
mechanical nature and contravenes his most fundamental order, he 
opens the message he has carried for half a million years. The 
message is a single dot, which in Tralfamadorian means "Greetings". 
On revealing this to be the "main point of the solar system", Salo, 
out of mechanical despair dismantles himself. 
The theme of the "dot", the "point", and the idea of "being 
punctual" is overtured through the book. The gulf that separates 
Winston Niles Rumfoord from Malachi Constant is emphasised by 
Malachi's playful reaction to Beatrice's invitation asking him to be 
punctual. 
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Constant smiled at that - the warning to be punctual. To 
be punctual means to exist as a point, meant that as well 
as to arrive somewhere on time. Constant existed as a 
point - could not imagine what it would be like to exist in 
any other way. 109 
Punctual means to "be at the right place at the right time." which 
is a euphemism for being lucky, and we are led to believe that 
Constant is the luckiest person in the world, or is up until he 
meets Rumfoord. Rumfoord we find, despite being chrono-synclastic 
infundibulated and a wave phenomenon rather than a punctual 
phenomenon, despite being able to see that "Everything that ever was 
always will be, and everything that ever will be always was.", still 
asks questions l ike1 
"I should still like to know just what the main point of 
this Solar System episode has been."no 
Salo knows that if Rumfoord were to find out that Stonehenge, the 
Great Wall of China and other great earth monuments were 
Tralfamodorian messages meaning "Replacement part being rushed with 
all possible spped.", he would show himself to be a "surprisingly 
parochial Earthling at heart." When Rumfoord is blasted off Titan 
by a sun-spot, Malachi Constant (whose name means "faithful 
messenger") and his mate Beatrice and their son Chrono are left 
alone to survive as best they can. 
Here vonnegut breaks with the space-opera formula. Having 
successfully re-invented it he adds an epilogue which earns him the 
reputation of sentimental. After the death of Beatrice, Constant 
reveals'to the rebuilt Salo that he finally fell in love with 
Beatrice, 
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"Only an Earthling year ago," said Constant. "It took us 
that long to realize that a purpose of human life, no 
matter who is controlling it, is to love whoever is around 
to be loved. "Ill 
The final scene sees Salo continuing on his 18 million year "fool's 
errand", and "Unk" being taken to paradise by his "best and only 
friend", Stony Stevenson. This final sentimental vision is the 
product of a hypnotic suggestion induced in Constant by Salo, and 
the final piece of Tralfamadorian meddling in earthling affairs 
before leaving them to their own "free will". The Tralfamadorians 
have no concept of free will we find in Slaughterhouse Five, 
"If I hadn't spent so much time studying Earthlings," said 
the Tralfamadorian "I wouldn't have any idea what was meant 
by 'free will'. I've visited thirty-one inhabited planets 
in the universe, and I have studied reports on one hundred 
more. Only on Earth is there talk of free will.112 
The Tralfamadorians of Slaughterhouse-Five are slightly different in 
character from the Tralfamadorians of Sirens. The former share to 
some extent Rumfoords view of time, "seeing all time as you might 
see a stretch of Rocky Mountains". What is an affliction however to 
Rumfoord, is to the Tralfamadorians a way of life; a philosophy. 
When Billy retails to the Tralfamadorians the horrors he has seen 
perpetrated by Earthlings, and his fear that Earthlings might become 
the terrors of the Universe if not somehow stopped, Tralfamadorians 
rather than being impressed by his high ideals find the whole idea 
stupid. They know how the Universe ends, they say, 
"We blow it up, experimenting with new fuels for our flying 
saucers. A Tralfamadorian test pilot presses a starter 
button, and the whole Universe disappears." So it goes. 
"If you know this," said Billy, 'isn't there some way you 
can prevent it? Can't you keep the pilot from pressing the 
button?" 
"He has always pressed it, and he always will. We always 
let him and we always will let him. The moment is 
structured that way."lrr-
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This is an important moment for Billy. Stupid as Billy is this fits 
in with his perception of things. The narrator characterises Billy 
and all his characters as "the listless playthings of enormous 
forces." The effect of war and the horrors of Dresden on Billy only 
confirm for him that he is, as the Tralfamadorian says, trapped like 
a bug in the amber of time. 
Tralfamadorians, of course, say that every creature and 
plant in the Universe is a machine. It amuses them that so 
many Earthlings are offended by the idea of being 
machines. l14 
Billy is not offended by this notion of absolute determinism, and is 
enabled to make this great philosophical leap by an accident of 
fate. Billy has a partially Tralfamadorian view of things by virtue 
of being "unstuck in time". Billy is a temporal spastic. He has no 
control over where in his own particular space-time continuum he may 
emerge at any given moment. He experiences his whole life in a 
kaleidoscopic manner, moving backwards and forwards in a manner 
which effectively precludes any notion of "free will" at all. Thus 
we find that Slaughterhouse-Five, as it follows Billy's experiences, 
is structured in the "somewhat telegraphic schizophrenic manner of 
tales of the planet Tralfamadore". The novel is far from dead on 
Tralfamadore. We find that they all write like Alain Robbe-Grillet. 
Their books are composed of "clumps of symbols", each of which is a 
brief, urgent message, something like a telegram, describing a 
situation or scene. They are read all at once, not one after the 
other. 
There isn't any particular relationship between all the 
messages, except that the author has chosen them carefully, 
so that, when seen all at once, they produce an image of 
life that is beatiful and surprising and deep. There is no 
beginning, no middle, no end, no suspense, no moral, no 
causes, no effects. IIS 
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John Somer, in an essay whose title is too silly to quote, spends 
much time developing a parallel between the narrative styles of 
Robbe-Grillet and the Vonnegut of Slaughterhouse-Five l16 • He 
appears not to notice that stylistically the two bear no comparison 
at all. Vonnegut does not pretend to be a formal innovator. 
However, his eclecticism allows him to borrow forms from any number 
of sources (e.g. film, science fiction, poems and limericks, 
encyclopedias, articles of propaganda etc.), and synthesise them 
into a cohesive whole. The "flashback" technique of 
Slaughterhouse-Five is justified by Billy's unfortunate affliction, 
and integrated into the texture of the book by its relation to the 
main theme of the piece. It does not serve as a device to obfuscate 
an otherwise banal plot, as in any number of Nick Roeg films, and it 
is not a means of maintaining suspense, as in any number of 
detective novels. Vonnegut has taken the hackneyed old 
science-fictional fascination with time, and rather than invite us 
to be awed at the paradoxes he can generate, he has used it to 
provide a perspective on something genuinely awe-inspiring; the 
massacre of the greatest number of human beings in the shortest time 
at Dresden. In Slaughterhouse Five Vonnegut is demonstrating that 
our experience of the world is entirely at odds with the doctrine of 
free will, which would seem to imply, in the words of Howard 
w.Campbell, Jr., that the poor "have no one to blame for their 
1 ,,117 d h' . misery but themse ves. an t at 1f you f1nd yourself at the 
bottom of the heap you probably deserve to be there. 
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What Billy finds is that whether you live or die, whether you suffer 
or not, whether you become rich or lose everything, whether you end 
up on a strange planet caged in a zoo with a movie star, or get shot 
for looting at the scene of the greatest carnage in human history, 
is a matter of complete indifference to a putative God, and entirely 
outside your power to control. 
Further the kind of perspective which the chrono-synclastic 
infundibulated Rumfoord attains, "where all the different kinds of 
118 f' truths fit together" ,and the Tral amador1an view of things, 
don't make wars any less horrible, and they still remain as Vonnegut 
declares at the beginning of the book "as easy to stop as glaciers." 
The only way to remain sane in an insane'world it seems, is to keep 
telling yourself little lies, and the occasional whopper as well. 
This is advocated in Cat's Cradle where the religon of Bokonism is 
invented. The book proceeds with a warning, 
Anyone unable to understand how a useful religion can be 
founded on lies will not understand this book either. IIS 
The religious answer to impending apocalypse is a familiar one. In 
Cat's Cradle the apocalypse comes anyway. Billy Pilgrim on the 
other hand has already seen the apocalypse. He and Eliot Rosewater 
"found life meaningless, partly because of what they had seen in 
war." 
So they were trying to re-invent themselves and their 
universe. Science fiction was a big help.120 
Rosewater is heard to say to one of the psychiatrists in the 
veterans hospital, 
"I think you guys are going to have to come up with a lot 
of wonderful new lies, or people just aren't going to want 
l ' '--II 121 to go on 1v1ng. 
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The old lies it seems aren't enough any more. This is demonstrated 
through the example of one of Kilgore Trout's novels called The 
Gospel from Outer Space. This fictional piece of science fiction is 
a re-telling of the new testament story where Jesus is not really 
the "Son of the Most Powerful Being in the Universe", but emphasises 
the fact that Jesus was a nobody, a complete burn who just happened 
to say a lot of "lovely and puzzling things." He gets nailed to a 
cross anyway, but at the last minute there is thunder and lightning 
and the voice of God declares that he is adopting the bum as his son 
with complete· "Son of the Creator of the Universe" powers and 
privileges. 
God said this From this moment on, He will punish horribly 
anybody who torments a bum who has no connections. lti 
This moral, our narrator declares, is quite different from the moral 
which the Gospels actually teach because whereas they appear to 
teach us to be merciful "even to the lowest of the low", what they 
actually teach is this, 
Before you kill somebody, make absolutely sure he isn't 
well connected. lil 
Kilgore Trout's other stories similarly update old lies. Even the 
Tralfamadorians, we have seen, have a flourishing fiction market and 
just as they ignore all the unpleasant moments in time, "simply 
don't look at them", they are only interested in "marvellous 
moments" in their books. Slaughterhouse-Five is, unlike the 
Tralfamadorian novel, a very moral book. 
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With the notable exception of his assertion that people in the 20th 
century still need some kind of God, Vonnegut is entirely playful in 
the way he evokes the philosophical problems which have proven such 
deep and serious matters for the writers which precede him. In a 
recent interview Vonnegut admits that the science fictional passages 
in Slaughterhouse-Five were largely provided for "light relief" and 
to provide another perspective on the central concern of the book, 
the bombing of Dresden. His conclusion, seemingly foregone, is that 
coming to terms with the mysteries of time and the universe is a 
small thing compared to finding a place in the scheme of things for 
something as "large" as the senseless massacre of so many human 
beings. Humour becomes the only safe means of dealing with it. 
The writers whom I have dealt with in this chapter, with the obvious 
exception of both Vonnegut and Bester, have displayed an absence of 
humour which would be remarkable if it was not absolutely typical of 
the genre. It is clear that much of Vonnegut's humour is at the 
expense of these writers. Vonnegut establishes thereby an 
unequivocal stance with regard to the generic ghetto which I have 
attempted to characterise in this chapter. His humour generates a 
gap between his and other science fictional work. Philip K.Dick on 
the hand has a more integrated science fictional approach. His 
parody of the conventions of science fiction establishes him as a 
writer determined to expand the limits of the genre, and transform 
the ghetto. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Epistemological Excursions of Philip K. Dick 
Speculation on the foundations of knowledge seems an appropriate 
activity for science fiction. Even if science itself remains shy of 
epistemological debate, the limits of thought, knowledge and 
understanding remain for philosophers a never-ending source of 
dispute. Given the correspondences which I have noted between the 
interests of philosophers and science fiction writers, and given 
that science fiction is expected to "boldly go where no man has gone 
before", these areas form the thematic basis for many a science 
fiction story. Not surprisingly these epistemological excursions 
suffer from the same linguistic ills as many of the other 
philosophical issues which science fiction writers address. 
Further, because of the 'essential' nature of the questions asked, 
epistemology tends to involve more tail-chasing and regression than 
any other area of philosophy. 
The chief reason for this is that in asking questions about the 
foundations of knowledge, philosophers also appear to cast doubt 
upon the reliability of their tools. Language and logic itself are 
called into question. In science fiction these doubts may be 
established, in a first contact story for example, by suggesting the 
alienness of the intelligence being established. In Solaris 1 , Lem 
establishes the futility of the various disciplines which comprise 
the science of solaristics, and as such seems to be indicating where 
the limits of knowledge and understanding lie. 
146 
At first blush this appears a rather dismal conclusion to arrive at 
given the infinite variety of intelligences mankind is likely to 
engage in its quest of discovery among the stars. 
Lem's dramatisation of this quest, whatever his conclusion, does not 
merely imagine an alien intelligence, and then dismiss it as 
unintelligible, that would be an exercise in tautology. Lem 
imagines what it would be like to confront such an intelligence, in 
terms of what such an event might be able to tell us about the 
foundations and limits of knowledge. Even if science fiction cannot 
answer the questions of epistemologists, it remains an essential 
part of its character that it tries to. 
In the last chapter I showed how science fiction which takes time or 
identity as its subject will invariably find itself formulating 
paradoxes or playing intellectual games. Here I would like to 
consider whether there is a qualitative difference between science 
fiction of the paradox and non-paradox kind. Clearly it ought to be 
possible to distinguish the two using the various approaches 
outlined by linguistic philosophers. The task would seem to involve 
identifying a series of philosophical positions in various science 
fiction texts which have their basis in linguistic tangles, and then 
establishing the role of such ideas in the development of the tale. 
It is an essential part of science fiction that it extrapolates 
premises of scientific development, social change or cosmology. 
Such extrapolations will invariably involve one or all of 
space-travel, time-travel, genetic engineering, robots and new 
intelligences. 
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Clearly one of the main obstacles to being considered seriously is 
the comic-book associations which such characteristics of the genre 
continue to have, even after a quarter of a century of space flight. 
Thus one may be forgiven for a certain confusion as to the 
seriousness of a piece of science fiction, even prior to addressing 
the various issues of linguistic philosophy to it. For these 
observations on the philosophical content of science fiction to have 
any value, a method of applying them will need to be established. 
It ought then to be possible to distinguish serious science fiction 
from the frivolous kind. But, as Wittgenstein points out, it is not 
always easy or possible to say exactly where we can say that we are 
misled by language z• Wittgenstein's approach furthermore, does 
not include a formula for establishing such criteria. There is not 
the equivalent of a litmus test which we can conduct. What he does 
provide are series of methods and procedures, a discipline, which 
focuses on language and specific words with a view to clarifying the 
nature and sense of the 'philosophical' question. 
From this perspective, it is possible to see how Wittgenstein and 
Ryle's emphasis on 'ordinary language' may be seen as an answer to 
Moore in that it seeks to qualify the underpinnings of 
'common-sense'. This emphasis does not attempt to establish an 
ideal language, as is commonly thought. Neither does it prefer a 
view that only words which refer to concrete objects, events and 
experiences have meaning. Quite the contrary, such a view of 
language is misleading in itself. The reason 'abstract' thought 
tends to lead to confusion and paradox is often because the purpose 
of such thinking is ill defined. It is often, as Wittgenstein terms 
it "language without work to do".] 
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Thus, one might describe science fiction as an experiment, a thought 
experiment if you will, which because the experimenter is unclear 
about what he is trying to demonstrate, cannot be pronounced 
successful or unsuccessful. The authors of my second chapter fell 
variously into the traps of being misled by metaphors and by models 
of the mind and of language. The object of their quest often turns 
out to be a mirage. Often, it is evident, they are happy merely to 
have quested. Thus with the question of seriousness, the authors 
views cannot be considered reliable. 
Van Vogt, for example, in his introduction to The World of 
Null-A,4 clearly considered that his meditations on problems of 
identity and memory, are a contribution to the philosophy of mind. 
Similarly, Aldiss's 'Man in his Time's expounds a psychological 
view of time which attempts to offer an alternative model to that of 
science. To this extent, both these authors have taken on the 
declared task of science fiction and are attempting to provide a 
conceptual framework for the extrapolation of novel scientific, 
philosophical and cosmological speculations. My observation that 
they have been led astray, bewitched by language, provides a level 
of description which, despite their intent, shows that their 
speculations are in some respects frivolous. 
Additionally, the approach which I am suggesting is complicated by 
the use of 'frivolous' devices such as time-travel, as a means of 
establishing a more prosaic point. Wells'Time Machine is a good 
early example of such a tale. Later writers, such as Harness and 
Aldiss are torn between treating time-travel as a serious 
possibility and using it as a narrative device. 
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Science fiction without time-travel, mind-reading, androids and all 
the other nonsense barely earns the name. These narrative props 
almost define the genre. They, like pantomime dames, gothic 
mansions and nazi gold, are conventions. We do not normally expect 
that the pantomime, gothic novel or adventure yarn, will enlighten 
us about transvestism, architecture or metallurgy. Science fiction 
does. 
In a way which would be quite inappropriate in pantomime, farce or 
western, science fiction sets out to examine the scientific and 
philosophical credentials of its accidents of structure. In this 
respect, science fiction has a lot in common with the historical 
novel, which whilst entertaining us with a costume drama seeks to 
elucidate and enlighten us on political, economic and social 
history. Inevitably the crystallization of a genre's traits gives 
rise to parody and pastiche, and eventually to complete self-parody 
in the mature form of the genre. Thus is retains the apparently 
frivolous aspects of it forebears whilst developing new intellectual 
and literary criteria. When one uses the pantomime form to debate 
sexual roles, the detective novel form to comment on social evils, 
or as with The Sirens of Titan, the space-opera form to scrutinise 
technological evils, the frivolity becomes decadence, the decadence 
becomes ironic, and irony becomes satire. If, as I suggested in the 
last chapter, the author appears to be satirizing the genre he is 
ostensibly writing within, the question of tone becomes 
simultaneously difficult and crucial. 
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Lem coounents, 
Sometimes the dissociating agency consists in chemical 
substances (of the hallucinogenic type - thus in The Three 
Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch); sometimes in "cold-sleep 
technique" (as precisely in Ubik); sometimes (as in Now 
Wait for Last Year) in a combination of narcotics an~ 
"parallel worlds". The end effect is always the same: 
distinguishing between waking reality and visions proves to 
be impossible. The technical aspect of this phenomenon is 
fairly inessential - ••• The essential point is that a 
world equipped with the means of splitting perceived 
reality into indistinguishable likenesses of itself creates 
practical dilemmas that are known only to the theoretical 
speculations of philosophy. This is a world in which, so 
to speak, this philosophy goes out into the street and 
becomes for every ordinary mortal no less of burning 
question than is for us the threatened destruction of the 
biosphere. 8 
These "dilemmas that are known only to the theoretical speculations 
of philosophy" are loosely identifiable with those that I outlined 
as the declared province of just about every other science-fiction 
writer. Time is reversed, identities are blurred, and God manifests 
himself. 
Dick's treatment of these themes is essentially parodic, but it is 
not the same attitude which Vonnegut brings to bear. Vonnegut, as 
we have seen, derides these great philosophical issues by manifestly 
making them the servants of a ridiculous plot. His concern is not 
philosophy, or even science fiction, it is corruption, madness and 
inhumanity. Dick on the other hand allows his often pathetic 
characters to limply speculate on such philosophies through being 
thrown into situations where it appears their speculations might 
have a practical application. 
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This evidently has interesting implications for the thesis, that it 
is as it were the 'idleness', the 'lack of application' of 
philosophical thought which leads it astray. 
When philosophy as Lem terms it 'goes out into the street' it ceases 
to be philosophy. Philosophical statements, according to 
Wittgenstein cannot be empirical statements. Empirical statements 
are about things in the world, and such statements are verifiable 
only by observation and experiment. Philosophy treats of the form 
of these statements or propositions, it describes rather than 
explains. The essential aspect of what he calls 'philosophical 
grammar' is that it imparts no information about the world. Clearly 
if philosophical statements are not empirical statements, that is, 
are verifiable without reference to the world and without 
observation and experiment; if the various situations which 
philosophers imagine, such that I cannot be sure that a person is 
not a robot, or which direction time runs, etc; if these imagined 
props for philosophical points become reality; if the sceptical 
doubts are confirmed, what happens to the 'philosophical' question, 
and more importantly, what happens to my thesis that it is the 
characteristic lack of 'use' of philosophical language which leads 
philosophers and science fiction writers into fruitless areas of 
investigation? Dick's explorations of 'concrete epistemology' 
challenge the application of these linguistic criteria and are an 
extreme test of my hypothesis. 
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It is difficult when using linguistic philosophy to do anything 
other than describe the misuses of language and errors of thinking 
which characterise science fiction and philosophy. That is, it is 
difficult to find virtue using the techniques of Wittgenstein and 
Ry1e. My stance, therefore appears more hostile to science fiction 
as a whole than it is. Finding in Dick, a writer who largely avoids 
the linguistic traps, leaves me without a test to apply because the 
test merely finds fault. 
consequently, I must make comparisons with authors who in one 
way or another fail, such that I can show where Dick succeeds. This 
task is complicated by the fact that Dick is often parodying the 
authors with whom I am comparing him. This is certainly true of 
Van Vogt and Poh1. Dick's deployment of time travel, identity 
problems, artificial intelligence, etc., invariably partake in a 
degree of humour at the expense of science fiction's pulp pedigree. 
The reader is quite justified in suspecting that Dick is merely 
disguising well worn cliches in a cloak of narrative confusion. 
With Harness, we found that although The Paradox Men was a reworking 
of some fairly old themes, a certain finesse distinguished the 
piece, a facility with the time travel device and some ingenious 
scenarios. 
Bester similarly takes a rag-bag of literary and science fictional 
myths and weaves them into a kind of detective/adventure story. 
Vonnegut, we have seen parodies the space opera in Sirens, yet still 
maintains a serious intent. Clearly all of the foregoing are some 
combination of parody, pastiche, satire or plagiarism. 
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Without a reasonably intimate knowledge of the genre, it is not 
always easy to discern what the mix is. That is, without the 
background knowledge of 'sci-fi' it is not always easy to judge the 
tone. The emphasis on style and form in literary analysis which has 
been the legacy of modernism, ought to leave us particularly well 
equipped to deal with Dick's tonal complexity on a purely formal 
basis. Indeed the structuralist school of science fiction criticism 
whose organ is the journal Science-Fiction Studies, and whose 
various methods I attacked in my first chapter, would hold that 
"structuralism and semiology are not only important but actually the 
obligatory modes for criticising SF".9 I share Greenland's view 
that such a programme is extreme and tends to render science fiction 
as a sub-genre of structuralism. I have examined the 
'structuralist' claims for a special status for the language of 
science fiction and found them wanting. Clearly there are 
linguistic issues to be addressed, as I showed in my last chapter, 
and as I have suggested, the later form of the genre presents us 
with stylistic problems which can only be settled through some 
criteria of aesthetic appreciation. In my last chapter, my emphasis 
on the philosophical content and subject matter suggested the 
grounds for intellectual criteria. I would like now to indicate 
formal criteria on the basis of an approach through linguistic 
philosophy. 
155 
Before I look at texts in detail, I would like to suggest an 
analogy, drawn from philosophy, which will clarify my procedure. In 
On Certainty, Wittgenstein dissects various uses of the words "know" 
and "knowledge" and shows that the theory of knowledge by turns 
falls victim to and exploits their various shades of meaning. In 
answer to Moore's 'Proof of an External World' and 'A Defence of 
Common Sense',lO Wittgenstein dissects a few of Moore's 
propositions "everyone of which he claims to know with certainty to 
be true". These 'Moore-type' propositions are of the following kind 
and purport to provide a general. description of the universe based 
on the common sense view. They are that there exists, 
and has for some time existed, a human body which is his 
body; that during the time that it has existed, this body 
has been 'in contact with or not far from the surface of 
the earth', that there have existed many other things, 
'also having shape and size in three dimensions', ••••• that 
the earth has existed for many years before he was born, 
and that during many of those years a large number of human 
bodies had at every moment been alive on it, and had, in 
very many cases, ceased to exist before he was born. ll 
He further asserts that he has had experiences, perceived his own 
body in relation to other things in his environment, has imagined 
things and had dreams without believing their reality, and that 
there are many other human beings who would concur with him with 
regard to the propositions listed. All these statements have the 
form of empirical statements about the world, and are directed 
against various shades of idealist philosophy. 
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Wittgenstein's answer to Moore is conducted, as Kenny points out, in 
the form of a "three cornered argument with Moore and the Cartesian 
sceptic". He remarks, 
Wittgenstein thought that Moore was right against Descartes 
in claiming that some propositions about the external world 
(e.g. 'This is a chair') could have the same 
epistemological status as mathematical propositions and 
propositions about sense-data. But he thought that Moore 
was wrong in thinking that these propositions provided a 
proof of the external world, and indeed wrong in thinking 
that he knew the propositions at all: not because the 
propositions were false, but because the claim to knowledge 
of them was senseless. Both Moore and the sceptic, he 
claimed, misunderstood the nature of doubt, knowledge and 
. t' 1 12 certa1n y 1n severa ways. 
Wittgenstein, by showing the meaninglessness of the sceptic's 
procedure simultaneously casts doubt on the propositions which Moore 
uses to refute the sceptic. He begins with an example, 
"I know that I am a human being". In order to see how 
unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its 
negation. At most it might be taken to mean "I know I have 
the organs of a human". (E.g. a brain which, after all, no 
one has ever yet seen). But what about such a proposition 
as "I know I have a brain"? Can I doubt it? Grounds for 
doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, 
nothing against it. Nevertheless, it is imaginable that my 
skull should turn out empty when it was operated on. 13 
Because grounds for doubt are lacking, Wittgenstein believes that 
Moore type propositions are a misuse of the expression "I know". In 
the last entry in On Certainty, he asks if it is possible to doubt 
whether oneself has flown from America to England within the last 
few days, 
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"But even in such cases if I can't be mistaken, isn't it 
possible that I'm drugged?" If I am and if the drug has 
taken away my consciousness, then I am not now really 
talking and thinking. I cannot seriously suppose that I am 
at this moment dreaming. Someone who, dreaming, says "I am 
dreaming", even if he speaks audibly in doing so, is no 
more right than if he said in his dreams "it is raining", 
while it was in fact raining. Even if his dream were 
actually connected with the noise of the rain. 14 
This last example shows just how mistaken the dogmatic behaviourist 
view of Wittgenstein is. Doubt which springs from the suggestion 
that one may be drugged, or dreaming, is by definition unverifiable 
and thereby an inadmissable doubt, i.e. it precludes knowledge. 
Wittgenstein's approach, in his later work, to these seemingly 
intractable problems of epistemology is characteristically 
difficult, yet simultaneously straightforward. His argument hinges 
on the assertion that where doubt is possible knowledge must also be 
possible. Things which we cannot doubt we therefore cannot say we 
have knowledge of. He attacks Moore's common-sense propositions for 
a number of reasons, notably because they lack an appropriate 
context. Other propositions about which we would say we cannot be 
mistaken he puts into another category. 
If I say "We assume that the earth has existed for many 
years past" or something similar, then of course it sounds 
strange that we should assume such a thing. But in the 
entire system of our language-games it belongs to the 
foundations. The assumption, one might say forms the basis 
of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought. iS 
Wittgenstein is saying that when it comes to answering the sceptic's 
questions, instead of declaring him a madman, we are to some extent 
playing the madman's game. 
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The ways that we talk a "sane" person out of a crazy idea, and the 
ways we talk a crazy person out of a crazy idea, are very 
different. Thus although one can easily find a context for 
statements like "I know that I have always been near the surface of 
the earth." or "I know that I am a human being", Wittgenstein 
believes that in imagining such a context the statement loses 
"everything about it that is philosophically astonishing." I think 
perhaps Wittgenstein might have said "loses everything about it that 
is epistemologically astonishing". 
These Moore-type statements which appear to be inductive in fact 
playa purely formal role in the language, because they are beyond 
epistemological doubt. Agreement on these is what makes 
epistemological doubt possible. 
When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really 
enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm 
without special testing; propositions, that is, which have 
a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical 
'ti 16 propos1 ons. 
Wittgenstein goes on to say that the assurance that Moore knows 
these things is uninteresting in itself, but that the examples are 
interesting because they have "a similar role in the system of our 
empirical judgements".17 This "system" is not something that is 
"learned" it is "something that a human being acquires by means of 
observation and instruction". It is important however that such 
inherited background assumptions are subject to change, however slow 
that change might be. 
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I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts 
he knows, but it stands fast for him, and also for me: 
regarding it as absolutely solid is part of the method of 
doubt and enquiry. 
I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast 
for me, I can discover them subsequently like the axis is 
not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the 
movement around it determines its immobility.ls 
Wittgenstein is constantly asking what it would be like if something 
unusual happened; if houses turned to steam l9 or cars grew out of 
the ground. 20 If such a thing was observed once, one might 
conclude that it was an hallucination or some such thing, if it 
constantly recurred, tha"t is if houses always turned to steam, and 
cars always grew out of the ground, our foundations or judgement 
might indeed be shifted. The axis would have shifted. The analogy 
which I wish to press here asks you to consider that the various 
axiomatically science fictional situations of time-travel, etc., 
which appear to be propositions of an empirical nature, are in fact 
Moore-type propositions. That is, that in science fiction which 
addresses epistemological issues, such issues which appear to work 
at the level of content, in fact playa purely formal role. 
In consideration of the sylistic similarity of Molly's interior 
monologue in Ulysses, and Goethe's early-morning monologue in Lotte 
in Weimar, Lukacs makes a similar point. He observes that despite 
the stylistic similarity "it is not easy to think of any two novels 
more basically disimilar",21 and concludes that an "exclusive 
emphasis on formal matters can lead to serious misunderstanding of 
the character of the artist's work". 22 
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He suggests a compromise which qualifies the distinction between 
'form' and 'content'. 
The distinctions that concern us are not those between 
stylistic 'techniques' in the formalistic sense. It is the 
view of the world. the ideology or weltanschauung 
underlying a writer's work, that counts. And it is the 
writer's attempt to reproduce this view of the world which 
constitutes his 'intention' and is the formative principle 
underlying the style of a given piece of writing. Looked 
at in this way, style ceases to be a formalistic category. 
Rather, it is rooted in content; it is the specific form of 
°fo t t Z3 a speC1 ~c con en • 
Lukacs goes on to argue that the ontology on which the image of man 
in modernist literature is based, that of man as a solitary being, 
"incapable of meaningful relationships", is the content of the 
formal techniques of modernist. The chaos and shifting perspectives 
serving to emphasise a fundamental disassociation from reality. The 
individuality that in traditional realism is presented as a feature 
of the characters' interaction with society; the solitariness that 
is a specific "social fate", is in modernist literature a "universal 
condition hwnaine". He cites the "mood of total impotence, of 
paralysis in the face of the unintelligible power of circwnstances" 
which informs the work of Kafka, as the extreme of this tendency. 
If one were to press the analogy with science fiction, modernism 
might seem a very parochial movement after all. The "ideology of 
modernism" extended to science fiction, presents this solitary human 
condition as species specific. 
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One is encouraged to regard the whole of the human race as a social 
individual, ranged against the incomprehensible vastness of the 
universe. The collective solipsism which is the world view of a 
specific science fiction text will invariably emphasise man's 
isolation in the universe. I will return to this point when 
discussing the influence of the 'new wave' writers in my next 
chapter. 
The emphasis on the formal role of language which characterizes 
modern criticism focuses on the rule governed nature of reading. 
The formal rules simultaneously make possible invention, and as 
Empson suggests 24 , impose limits on it. Thus it is not the fact 
of breaking the rules that is important, it is how they are broken. 
The literary critic without an intimate understanding of the 
conventions and forms which characterise a genre will find himself 
applying an ill-fitting set of aesthetic criteria. When 
structuralists write about the ways in which poetry undermines the 
functions of ordinary language, a lack of clarity about how the 
rules of language are applied leads them to advocate the breaking of 
unspecific rules. It is as if, having done something which one 
thinks ought to be wrong, one retrospectively invents the rule or 
statute defining the offence. One really ought to know what the 
rule is before one breaks it. Clearly, Moore's statements that he 
knew he had a hand, that he knew he was a human being, etc., seemed, 
and still seem to some, to break several of the rules of 
epistemological enquiry. By refuting so directly the sceptical 
doubts which give rise to philosophical and epistemological inquiry, 
Moore appears to be making an ,important move in the game. 
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It is as Ayer points out, important to remember that, unlike 
Wittgenstein, Moore believed that philosophical problems were 
genuine and as such were capable of being solved. 25 
Wittgenstein's demonstration that many of Moore's statements 
purportedly refuting the Cartesian sceptic, are merely part of the 
formal framework that make doubt, including epistemological doubt, 
possible, reduces these propositions to the status of interesting 
truisms. 
Descartes in his Meditations doubts the existence of material 
things, his own body, and even the truth of logic and mathematics. 
Kenny points out that this 'radical' Cartesian doubt is argued for 
in three stages. 
first, the senses have often deceived him in the past; 
second, he cannot know that he is not dreaming; third, it 
may be that he is the plaything of a powerful and 
malevolent spirit who is deceiving him. 2 & 
Invariably, in Dick's stories, one or all of the protagonists have 
their doubts confirmed on one or all of these stages. In The Three 
Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch the characters are increasingly in dmubt 
as to whether they are under the influence of the hallucinogenic 
drug, Chew-Z, they are therefore unable to trust their perceptions 
and are, it eventually transpires, the 'playthings' of the god-like 
Palmer Eldritch. Thus, typically, Dick's characters find themselves 
in the position of involuntary sceptics. They formulate the 
questions of classical epistemology, not through an inordinate 
fondness for metaphysics, but because of some cataclysm or 
misfortune which materially affects their lives. 
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They ask questions like "How do I know I am not dreaming all this?" 
because they find themselves suddenly in a world which is not 
consistent with what they normally experience as reality. In Ubik, 
Joe Chip begins to suspect that he is dead. The characters in Time 
Out of Joint prove to be quite justified in not trusting their 
memories, and the question "How do I know I exist?" assumes quite 
different aspects when asked by Rachel Rosen, Joe Chip and 
Barney Mayerson. Rarely has epistemology seemed so urgent, rarely 
outside the insane asylum. I would like now to examine how, mired 
as they are in the epistemological swamp, Dick's characters manage 
to avoid insanity and despair. If you can't trust your senses or 
your memory, if you have no idea whether what you face is real or an 
illusion, what basis is there for action? How do you make a 
decision? 
The Three Stigmata of Cartesian Doubt: Dreams, Demons and Deceit 
The characters in The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch are 
originally in dispute about the status of their experience when 
under the influence of the translation drug Can-D. The argument 
takes the form of the old catholic debate about transubstantiation. 
Does the bread and wine really turn into the flesh and blood of 
Christ during the mass? The colonists on Mars ask "Do we really go 
to Earth when we take Can-D?" 
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However, they are aware that they are participating in an illusion, 
but the case with the hovellists on Mars is that the illusion is far 
better than reality. Can-D is mostly used by colonists drafted to 
the barren wastes of Mars to live in dreary hovels. Can-D is a 
translation drug. Whilst under the influence of the drug, users can 
take on another identity in another time or place, and if they wish 
fuse with other people also taking the drug. The effect is 
reminiscent of that which the Mercerites experience in Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? The use of the drug, although it is 
illegal, is quite ritualised, and instead of taking the drug in a 
vacuum as it were, the hovellists use artificial aids to define the 
environment into which they would like to translate themselves. 
Perky Pat Layouts are the dominant aid used with Can-D. They are 
elaborate dolls-houses (clearly based on the Barbie Doll) full of 
the miniaturised trappings of the Californian lifestyle prevalent 
before soaring temperatures made life on Earth so unpleasant. Under 
the influence of the drug Can-D, users take on either the role of 
Perky Pat or her boyfriend Walt, and live briefly within the layout 
so painstakingly and expensively maintained. 
Thus when Sam Regan takes the drug he becomes Walt. But 
identification is not complete. When Walt goes to the shaving 
mirror he sees a note written in his own hand. 
THIS IS AN ILLUSION. YOU ARE SAM REGAN, A COLONIST ON 
MARS. MAKE USE OF YOUR TIME OF TRANSLATION, BUDDY BOY. 
CALL UP PAT PRONTO. 27 
165 
What Sam Regan is reminding himself (Walt) is that he is undergoing 
translation with Fran (who will now be Perky Pat) and that if he 
hurries he might achieve his aim of having sex with her before the 
drug wears off. This mating with Fran, his neighbour's wife, will 
all take place in the identities and environment of Pat and Walt. 
The narrator glosses Sam's reflections thus, 
Her husband - or his wife or both of them or everyone in 
the entire hovel - could show up while he and Fran were in 
the state of translation. And their two bodies would be 
seated at proper distance one from the other; no 
wrong-doing could be observed, however prurient the 
observers were. Legally this had been ruled on; no 
cohabitation could be proved, and legal experts among the 
ruling UN authorities on Mars and other colonies had tried 
- and failed. While translated one could commit incest, 
murder anything, and it remained from a juridicial 
standpoint a mere fantasy, an impotent wish on1y.21 
Sam sees translation as an opportunity to do things either difficult 
or impossible in reality. His control over the situation slips, 
however, when he is caught in the act by the other hove11ists, 
including Fran's husband, as they fuse with him. 
Sam Regan's wheeze of leaving a hand written note for himself in the 
alternative, Can-D reality, is typical of how Dick might qualify the 
operation of the laws which apply in his 'dream' realities. Sam's 
identification with Walt is imperfect and therefore amenable to 
'conscious' manipulation. It is as if he is allowed a certain 
amount of control over his dream. When Wittgenstein addresses the 
sceptic's argument concerning dreaming, he does so in the following 
terms, 
The argument "I may be dreaming" is senseless for this 
reason: if I am dreaming, this remark is being dreamed as 
well - and indeed it is also being dreamed that these words 
• 29 have any mean1ng. 
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True, Wittgenstein is addressing the radical doubt of the Cartesian 
sceptic, but it is important to note that even at his most sceptical 
Descartes' 'evil genius' neither doubts his consciousness of his own 
mental states nor his knowledge of the language he uses to express 
his scepticism. Many of the sceptic's doubts, Wittgenstein 
suggests, are as senseless as doubting the meaning of one's own 
words. Thus the 'radical' doubt transpires to be selective after 
all. There seems to be something significant in the fact that we 
can doubt other people's words but not our own. But this too turns 
out to be misleading. Imagine, as Dick does, what it would be like 
if we always doubted other people's words. This is the situation 
which Leo Bulero finds himself in in Chew-Z land. Everything in 
this world appears to be a manifestation of Palmer Eldritch. 
Bulero '·s problem when confronted with these various embodiments of 
Palmer Eldritch, the little girl Monica, the Dr. Smile suitcase, the 
gluck, etc., is to sort out, not what is real from what is illusory, 
but what is true and what is false in the information he is being 
given about his situation. What he can act on. Even when he 
appears to have escaped back to the real life world, to his own 
office, Eldritch eventually manifests the gluck animal beneath his 
desk, just to show Bolero that he is still in Eldritch's realm. He 
therefore realises that he is not talking to Roni Fugate at all but 
to an hallucination. 
Leo said, "Well, that's that. I'm sorry, Miss Fugate, but 
you might as well return to your office; there's no point 
in discussing that actions to take toward the imminent 
appearance of Chew-Z on the market because I'm not talking 
to anyone; I'm sitting here blabbing away to myself." He 
felt depressed. Eldritch had him and also the validity, or 
at least the seeming validity, of the Chew-Z experience had 
been demonstrated; he·, himself had confused it with the 
real. Only the malign bug created by Palmer Eldritch -
deliberately - had given it away.3D 
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Even in the ensuing conversation with Roni Fugate, it is not clear 
whether he is talking to himself, his version of Roni plucked from 
his mind, or whether she is "possessed" by Eldritch. This question 
becomes the major question asked by the characters as the book 
progresses. They begin to realise that "Once you've taken Chew-Z, 
you're delivered over".31 Even after the main effect of the drug 
has worn off, you are subject to "phantasms" and "manifestations", 
particularly of Eldritch, until the drug finally disappears from the 
system. This makes matters very difficult for both character and 
reader. Because eventually nobody knows what is true and what is 
false. For example, when Barney Mayerson takes the drug he is 
fanatically possessed with a desi.re to be re-united with his 
ex-wife, Emily. During his first "trip" on Chew-Z, Barney tries to 
relive his life with Emily, just as it was, full of argument and 
recrimination. However, Eldritch convinces him that if he moved 
forward along the time line, to what I suppose we might call his 
present, he could change the course of their relationship. He 
tries, and even though Palmer Eldritch is there, manifested in the 
form of Richard Hnatt, he fails. The drug wears off, he awakes at 
Chicken Pox Prospects, his hovel on Mars. This is where it gets 
tricky. Mayerson is like the dreamer who awakes without "finishing" 
his dream, he wants to get back to sleep and see it through to the 
end. Freud called it wish fulfilment. That's what Barney Mayerson 
is doing. After being woken from this first Chew-Z experience he 
explains to Anne Hawthorne, 
"It's an illusory world inwhich Eldritch holds the key 
positions as God; he gives you a chance to do what you 
can't really ever do - reconstruct the past as it oUfht to 
have been. But even for him it's hard. Takes time. 2 
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This is only one of many theories voiced by various characters, on 
the status of Eldritch and the Chew-Z experience, but for Mayerson 
it is enough to make him take another dose. When he tries to take 
Anne Hawthorne's bindle of the drug from her, she has the appearance 
of Eldritch, the stigmata. We begin to suspect that he hasn't woken 
at all. Upon chewing for a second time, Mayerson finds himself at 
Perky Pat Layouts, in Leo Bulero's office. It is however, two years 
in the future. Chew-Z has been banned. Eldritch is dead. 
Phantasms of choosers are commonplace, Barney Mayerson appears to 
Leo Bulero as just such a "phantasm". Barney is confused. He 
complains, 
"this isn't real; this is a drug-induced fantasy. 
Translation." "The Hell it isn't real." Leo glared at 
him. "What does that make me then? Listen." He pointed 
his finger angrily at Barney. "There's nothing unreal 
about me; you're the one who's a goddam phantasm, like you 
said, out of the past. I mean, you've got the situation 
completely backward. Your hear this?" He banged on the 
surface of his desk with all the strength in his hands. 
"The sound reality makes".33 
Here we have the classic confrontation between Moore and the 
sceptic. Moore banging the desk to prove that he, and everything 
around him is real. Unfortunately for us, the readers, this is two 
years in the future, and this future could be an illusion conjured 
up by Eldritch to convince Mayerson that it is all hopeless. 
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In the previous example, where he is talking to Roni Fugate, 
Leo Bulero has good reason to believe that everything around him is 
a hallucination. Although he can see and converse with Roni, he is 
fairly sure that she is not real. The illusion is so convincing 
that Palmer Eldritch has to manifest little animals to keep Bulero 
off balance. In the second example, Bulero is responding to the 
accusation of Barney Mayerson that they are both partaking in a drug 
induced fantasy. Once again, Bulero does not doubt his own 
consciousness or judgement, he doubts the existence of Mayerson, and 
Mayerson's (presumably also illusory) interpretation of events. 
Mayerson, on the other hand, knows that he himself is a phantasm. 
Unfortunately, the reader isn't in a position to confirm either 
hypothesis. 
The tale as a whole reads as an extended meditation on 
epistemology. It is as if Moore, instead of refuting the sceptic's 
doubts, had confirmed them. Confirmed that there was no way of 
establishing that his memory was reliable; that external objects 
existed; that other people existed or that he had two hands. At 
certain points in the story, both Leo and Barney know that they are 
living in an illusory universe. What Wittgenstein says is that the 
sceptic would be equally unhappy about such a validation of his 
'doubts' about reality, because if you know you ~ in a dream, you 
must be able to know when you are not. If you deny the possibility 
of knowing that you are in either of these states you cannot really 
say that you know anything. Doubt of this kind is nonsensical and 
stems from misunderstanding about the nature of knowledge, doubt and 
certainty. 
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If at various times, Dick's characters have reasonable grounds for 
doubting reality, at other times they can discern, only with extreme 
difficulty, the difference between their dream reality and ordinary 
reality. As the story progresses they are more likely to be 
mistaken, and eventually even the reader cannot tell which is 
which. At this stage we do not know what constitutes "reasonable 
grounds for doubt". All those grounds have been stripped away. 
Everything that Wittgenstein asserts as the basis of language as 
been uprooted. Clearly however, what apply as the ground rules in 
Dick's science fictional universe are not the same as what apply in 
our own. The axis of Moore type propositions has shifted. Those 
assumptions which it makes no sense to doubt or to confirm, which 
playa purely formal role in the language, are at the foundations of 
thought and understanding, are crucially different. When Dick took 
on the theatrical props of science fiction, as Lem terms them; 
"telepaths, cosmic wars, parallel worlds, and time travel", he 
inherited the equivalent of the background assumptions which 
Wittgenstein asserts are the basis of judging. To merely imagine 
these things to be so, would be to adopt the Moore-like position of 
confirming what are after all purely a series of truisms about the 
structure of language and thought. In this case it would be to 
confirm that in science fiction one ought to assume that travel in 
time, and material ising in other dimensions are part of the world 
that one doesn't normally question. Just as we do not normally 
question that the earth is round, or goes round the sun, or that men 
have been to the moon. What counts as an empirical proposition, and 
what functions as the basis for other empirical propositions changes 
with time. 
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Wittgenstein likens this feature of language to a river, 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as 
channels for such empirical propositions as were not 
hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with 
time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones 
became fluid. 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the 
river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between 
the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift 
of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of 
one from the other. 34 
Those formal characteristics of science fiction which, since the war 
might rightly be considered to be part of the mythology of science 
fiction, may by turns appear as empirical propositions, that is, as 
the subject of a given piece of science fiction. More commonly 
however, especially in science fiction which engages in various 
forms of parody and pastiche, the emphasis lies elsewhere. Clearly 
if one wishes to innovate upon these old forms and shift the 
bedrock, one must break the rules in a manner which is not trivial. 
Just as uttering "I know I have a hand" or "I know I am a human 
being" or "I know I have always been near the surface of the earth", 
become philosophically and epistemologically uninteresting in the 
context of a science fiction scenario (although I am sure that 
non-science fiction scenarios are just as plausible), it is equally 
difficult to make statements like "I know I am a robot", "I know 
I've never been to earth" or "I know I am in the wrong time" 
philosophically interesting in post-war science fiction. 
Intellectual and aesthetic criteria have changed, and to some extent 
hinge on the distinction between thinking that something is so, and 
thinking what it might be like if it was. 
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Thus one might imagine that one sees differently, or has an extra 
sense, like Ballard's character Powers in 'The voices of Time'. 
Ballard describes how Powers sees time simply by invoking the old 
• t h 3S r1ver me ap or. The reader is left high and dry with a dusted 
off metaphor and poetic rhetoric. Apart from Powers' feeling of 
terminal lethargy there is little qualification of the nature of the 
experience. It is not a move in the science fiction language-game 
simply to state that time behaves, or is perceived differently from 
the way that we normally expect, and I'm not sure that it ever was. 
It is because the characters in Dick's world behave as if what 
happens in their illusory worlds or hallucinations materially 
affects their lives, and because these events affect us as readers, 
that we are drawn to reflect on these epistemological issues. 
Unlike the characters, the reader is not faced with a life or death 
decision, but the disruption of common-sense categories of 
'life/death, dream/reality is so complete, that normal reading 
patterns are also disrupted and one is forced to reflect on the 
epistemological basis of the matter in question. In short, the 
reader has no idea what counts as an empirical statement. 
The radical doubting of reality which characterizes the world of 
Palmer Eldritch, and the consequent disruption of reading, poses the 
question of how far it is possible or sensible to really doubt the 
existence of things. When we doubt the existence of everything, we 
leave ourselves open to the objection that because we do not concede 
that anything exists, if by some chance something actually did 
exist, we wouldn't be able to identify it as existing because 
existence is a quality we have. never observed. 
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The doubt has merely undermined our use of the word. Wittgenstein 
remarks, 
When one says "Perhaps this planet doesn't exist and the 
light phenomenon arises in some other way", then after all 
one needs an example of an object which does exist. This 
doesn't exist - as for example does •••••••• 36 
A doubt about existence can only work in what Wittgenstein calls a 
language-game. What we are concerned with here is the kind of 
language game that Dick is playing. By giving his characters 
grounds for doubt he simultaneously gives them grounds for belief. 
That we have difficulty discerning where reality ends and the dream 
begins is due to an ambiguity in the behaviour of the characters, 
reflecting an equally ambiguous view of reality. Wittgenstein 
maintains that there is a fundamental difference between asserting a 
doubt (especially of existence) in word and in deed. Asserting 
radical doubts in deed often leads to a person being classified as 
mad. Logically one might think that if the 'madman' can produce 
evidence to justify his doubt or strange belief, he, like Galileo 
and Einstein before him might be given some credence. That however 
is not how things operate. Doubts about knowledge do not admit of 
empirical evidence. If we doubt our senses we cannot base a theory 
of knowledge on any kind of observation about things in the world. 
In his essay 'Philosophy as Grammar and the Reality of Universals', 
W. E. Kennick attempts to clarify in what sense Wittgenstein says 
that "philosophical statements are in one way or another 
. 1" grammat1ca • 
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He begins by defining what Wittgenstein means by an empirical 
proposition. 
By an 'empirical proposition' Wittgenstein seems to mean a 
proposition (1) that is about phenomena, about the world, 
which means that it is not directly or indirectly about the 
use or meaning of words (single words, phrases, and 
sentences or 'propositions'), and (2) that is confirmable 
or disconfirmab1e by observation and experiment. A 
grammatical proposition on the other hand is one that is 
explicitly or implicitly verbal in import; it is directly 
or indirectly about the use or meaning of words. 37 
By characterising philosophical statements as grammatical 
Wittgenstein is establishing that they cannot be affected by 
empirical observations. 
By extension, because statements of epistemology cannot be verified 
by reference to things and events in the world, they ought to be 
immune from validation or invalidation due to radical developments 
such as relativity, quantum mechanics, or even Palmer Eldritch. 
Clearly however, the altered physics of Dick's novels affects the 
reader's ability to make sense of the narrative. This Dickian 
physics is a kind of assemblage from a century of science fiction. 
As Lem says, 
Dick has as a rule taken over a rubble of building 
materials from the run-of-the-mill American professionals 
of SF, frequently adding a true gleam of originality to 
already worn-out concepts, and what is surely more 
important, erecting with such materials constructions truly 
his own. The world gone mad with a spasmodic flow of time 
and a network of causes and effects which wriggles as if 
nauseated, the world of frenzied physics, is unquestionably 
his invention, being an inversion of our familiar standard 
according to which only we, but never our environment, may 
fall victim to psychosis. 31 
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Lem goes on to point our that "Componential analysis, designed to 
separate what is "factual" from what forms the "message"" is 
impracticable with Dick's work. 
The reader of such work does not know whether what he is 
shown is supposed to exist like a stone or a chair, or 
whether it is supposed also to signify something beyond 
itself. 39 
Further, he suggests that Dick is so "caught up in his vision" that 
to ask him to separate the literal from the metaphorical would be 
like asking a man to explain the "real meaning" of his own dreams. 
This is not to say that there is no element of design in Dick's 
work, several consistent themes may be discerned in his stories. 
One such theme which Lem notes is that of the worlds disintegrating 
into the chaos through no discern~ble agency, and for no particular 
reason. He see a major break with science fiction tradition in the 
fact that the causes of the cataclysm are not identified, and 
solutions to the problem are not found. 
The cataclysm, as we have seen, usually takes the form of an 
epistemological crisis, and as I have shown, epistemological 
problems have no solutions, because they are not problems in any 
non-philosophical sense. They are as Wittgenstein says, formal 
questions, and relate to our use of language. What I have suggested 
is that the inability of Dick's characters and readers to make 
fundamental judgements about the nature of Dickian reality, 
indicates that the Dickian language-game attacks its own foundations. 
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His approach is an interesting test of Wittgenstein's assertion that 
the foundations of judgement are the foundations of 1anguage40 ; 
that certain events, such as finding that someone I had known for 
years was not really that person at al1 41 , put one in a position 
where we cannot go on with the old language-game. We are not thrown 
from the saddle because the facts buck, but because we can no longer 
guarantee the regularity of events any more. 4Z 
He writes: 
In that case it would seem as if the language-game must 
"show" the facts that make it possible. (But that's not 
how it is). Then can one say that only a certain 
regularity in occurrences makes induction possible? The 
'possible' would of course have to be 'logically possible'. 
Am I to say: even if an'irregu1arity in natural events did 
suddenly occur, that would have to throw me out of the 
saddle. I might make inferences then just as before, but 
whether one would call that "induction" is another 
• 43 quest1on. 
Wittgenstein makes these remarks in the context of demonstrating 
that not only are there situations where doubt makes no sense (such 
as those posed by the Cartesian sceptic), but situations where it 
makes no sense to say that we know something (as Moore continually 
does). 
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts 
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from 
doubt, and are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific 
investigations that certain things are not in deed 
doubted. 44 
Dick specialises in removing the hinges, the beliefs and assumptions 
which Wittgenstein says form the basis of knowledge, judgement and 
language. 
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He precipitates in his characters crises caused by having all their 
fundamental beliefs and values threatened or denied. A little like 
Pris in Androids cutting off, one by one, the legs of a spider, Dick 
cuts off one by one his characters' beliefs, his ties with reality. 
In Eye in the Sky we saw characters trying to survive in a world 
dictated by someone else's beliefs. In The Simulacra, people's 
belief in Nicole, the perfect puppet politician is destroyed. 
Continually characters discover they are living in false realities, 
continually their faith in their work, their employer, their wife 
and their God is crushed. Ubik pushes this principle to its extreme. 
Ubik: All-Purpose Reality Support on Easy Terms 
Ubik is the story of a mishap which befalls the employees of 
Runciter Associates, an event which you could say changes their 
lives. Runciter Associates is an "anti-psi prudence organisation ", 
an agency which supplies inertials to counteract the talents of 
"teeps, parakineticists, precogs, animators and resurrectors". 
Inertials are people with "anti-talents", they can nullify the field 
of a telepath, a precog, etc. They are often the child of parents 
who have a talent, and have developed the ability to protect 
themselves from having their mind read, or whatever, by generating a 
nullifying effect. 
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Joe Chip, chief tester for Runciter, explains how the anti-precog 
functions, 
The precog sees a variety of futures, laid out side by side 
like the cells in a beehive, For him one has greater 
luminosity, and this he picks. Once he has picked it the 
anti-precog can do nothing; the anti-precog has to be 
present when the precog is in the process of deciding, not 
after. The anti-precog makes all futures seem equally real 
to the precog; he aborts his talent to choose at all. A 
precog is instantly aware when an anti-precog is nearby 
because his entire relation to the future is altered. 45 
Here Dick has taken a classic piece of science fictional mythology, 
precognition and alternate futures, and by proposing the category of 
'inertials' has trivially altered a formal convention. By inventing 
Pat Conley he had totally subverted that convention. 
Pat Conley, Chip's newly discovered inertial, has an anti-piecog 
ability which functions in an entirely different way from other 
iner~~a1s. She can retrospectively alter the course of time. She 
cannot only render the precog's choice wrong, but in doing so 
changes the path of time, changes the present. Thus not only does 
the precog not know that his prediction has been invalidated but 
everyone whom the change affects remains to a large extent unaware 
that they have been shifted onto a new time track. To the extent 
that we are never quite sure how Pat Conley is altering the course 
of things, her capacity poses serious narrative problems in a novel 
that is by no means straightfoward without her. The plot, such as 
it is, runs thus. Runciter and a group of his inertials are lured 
to the moon by Ray Hollis, the, leading employer of psi-talents in 
the Sol system. 
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A self-destruct humanoid bomb in the form of Stanton Mick, 
"reclusive, interplanetarily known speculator and financier" 
explodes and apparently kills Runciter. Hollis supplies psi talents 
for industrial espionage, Runciter runs an agency which, a little 
like pest exterminators, contracts to rid firms or individuals of 
these psi-moles. Runciter is killed, we assume, in an escalation of 
this industrial war. Luckily, however, in the year 1992, if you've 
got the money, you need not die. Remember in Dick's worlds you can 
buy anything, even immortality. The dead can be frozen in cold-pac, 
in a kind of suspended life, called half-life. Communication with 
the half-life is possible by "revving them up" occasionally and 
talking to them through a microphone. Each time the relative 
revives a loved one the duration of the half-life is reduced, till 
after several years, it dims altogether. Runciter is taken to the 
same Moratorium where his wife Ella, is in cold-pac, but although 
the technicians there detect cerebral activity they fail to make 
contact with him. 
To make matters worse, Chip and his fellow employees find that since 
the bombing some kind of premature aging syndrome has come into 
effect. Cigarettes crumble to pieces, newspapers, money and 
telephone directories are found to be out of date. In direct 
parallel to these anomalies, messages from Runciter on matchfolders, 
etc., and coins with his head on, begin to appear. Wendy Wright and 
Al Hammond succumb to the premature aging and crumble away to dry 
bone. 
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Theories about their predicament begin to proliferate. Are Chip's 
inertials participating in an illusion generated by the explosion on 
Luna? How far back in time are forms going to regress? Chip 
wonders, in a classic practical Dickian response to such problems, 
how long, with devolving forms of transport, it is going to take him 
to get to Des Moines. 
As methods of transportation devolve, he thought, From 
rocket propulsion to jet, from jet to piston driven 
aircraft, then surface travel as the coal-fed steam train, 
horse drawn car - but it couldn't regress that far, he said 
to himself. 46 
These atavisms it transpires are the natural way of things for the 
half-lifer. It would appear that the explosion killed all except 
Runciter, and the various manifestations of Runciter are caused by 
his attempts to contact them as they lay frozen in cold-pac. The 
world they are experiencing is a creation of the malevolent 
half-lifer Jory, who preys, vampire-like on the energies of other 
half-lifers. Maintaining the illusion of the vast technological 
environment of 1992, presents such a strain on Jory, that the 
natural atavism of the half-life world begins to regress his 
construction. Essentially he is playing a game, toying with them, 
but the strain put upon him by Chip and the other inertials' 
activities requires him to eat one or two of them in order to keep 
up his strength. 
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Dick's language in Ubik, despite the drastic decay of reality which 
he depicts, remains surprisingly clear. Given that he has removed 
just about every basic assumption which a human being has, notably 
that one is alive, that one is conscious, and that one somehow has a 
control over one's actions, Dick's characters manage to carryon a 
in a remarkably coherent fashion. When faced with the complete 
collapse of reality his characters elicit a practical and concrete 
response. One of the difficulties in reading Ubik is that whenever 
characters get together to discuss the epistemological basis of 
their situation, and the reader begins to think that he understands, 
the characters invariably turn out to be deceiving each other, 
themselves, or are just plain wrong. Joe Chip's theories about what 
is happening to himself and his colleagues are constantly undermined 
by some new discovery or event, thus he spends his'whole time 
wrestling with the practicalities of the altered reality. Even 
before Chip was precipitated into Jory's mad world of frenzied 
physics, he appears to have spent a good deal of his time wrestling 
with the practicalities of life. As is common in many of Dick's 
worlds, in Ubik we find that 'commodities' such as toasters, 
refrigerators, taxi-cabs and even doors, appear to have a life of 
their own. Always they have to be coaxed and cajoled into rendering 
service, they even answer back and offer their philosophy of life. 
Joe Chip'S life appears to be entirely ruled by officious domestic 
appliances. His attempt to get the building's clean-up robots to 
come in and make his apartment look presentable for G. G. Ashwood's 
attractive new find, only results in a rebuke from the buildings 
maintenance circuit. 
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Our department - in fact the whole conapt building - is now 
programmed against an extension of your services and/or 
credit to such pathetic anomalies as yourself, sir. 
Regarding you, everything must hereafter by handled on a 
basic-cash subfloor. In fact, you'll probably be on a 
basic-cash subfloor for the rest of your life. In fact -
He hung up. And abandoned the hope of enticing and/or 
threatenin§7the clean-up robots into entering his muddled 
apartment. 
Chip's financial situation is so bad that he can't even get out of 
his own apartment door. As he tries to exit, the door demands 
5 cents. Chip claims that the payment is a gratuity and not 
mandatory, the door proves otherwise. 
"You discover I'm right," the door said. It sounded smug. 
From the drawer beside the sink, Joe Chip got a stainless 
steel knife; with it he began systematically to unscrew the 
bolt assembly of his apt's money-gulping door. 
"I'll sue you," the door said as the first screw fell 
out. 48 
In real life however, we don't talk to doors or have arguments with 
toasters, do we? What Dick appears to be proposing is a kind of 
Laingian reversal of the notion of madness. It's the world that has 
gone crazy not the patient. Joe Chip's reactions to a world gone 
crazy are very concrete; he unscrews the door-lock and finds himself 
some transport, he takes the stairs instead of the lift, etc. In 
our world the way that Chip thinks and acts would be taken as the 
symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, However, the crucial difference 
between Dick's world and normal reality is that in Dick's world, the 
schizophrenic's view of the universe turns out to be correct. 
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Baving removed so thoroughly, independent grounds for judgement it 
is hardly surprising that Stanislav Lem finds it necessary to say 
that Dick provides no answers. There are no answers to the kinds of 
questions raised in his novels. As soon as one begins to ask 
questions about the nature of reality; is it real, false, an 
illusion, a dream, etc?; as soon as the action is placed within this 
framework of radical doubt, the reader is cast adrift, unable to 
tell whether a lifecraft will float until one of Dick's characters 
tries it out. The altered physics of the Dickian world suspends the 
reader's ability to make common sense judgements about situations. 
Its characters however must continue to act and make practical 
decisions despite the collapse of their reality. Questions about 
the nature of such realities have no answer unless, as with Time Out 
of Joint it transpires that the whole false reality was an illusion 
conjured up by the government. Dick's stories rarely resolve 
themselves as clearly as Time Out of Joint. Only the laconic style 
of its cloak-and daggery make this ludicrous tale readable. Further 
it is an untypical treatment of typical Dickian themes. Dick's 
central theme of paranoia is here a kind of domesticated and 
entirely reasonable suspicion of government conspiracy. In a way, I 
am saying that this novel is untypical of Dick because it avoids the 
metaphysics. The disintegrations of reality which characterize both 
Ragle and Vic's perception of Old Town are not explained and 
therefore quietly forgotten in the denouement. 
Another feature that makes Time different from other Dick novels is 
that the solution to the manifest problem is also the solution to 
each of the various character'a problems. 
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'." 
When what appears to be a problem about individual perceptions of 
reality turns out to have a rational explanation, and the "appeal to 
metaphysics", so important in novels from The Eye in the Sky 
onwards, becomes a dead question, we are left with a story about 
mundane emotional confusions set against a post-holocaust military 
backdrop, The family relationships, emotional ties. affairs and 
feelings of loyalty which are so central to Dick's theme, are in 
Time almost superfluous to the plot. Ragle's affair with 
Junie Black is in this respect a good indication of how Time is a 
botched attempt at building a metaphor about modern day perception 
of reality. In subsequent novels, Dick will make his metaphysical 
point through such relationships. Dick's characters, when they 
entertain uS with their comedy of errors and misunderstandings are 
defining what Aldiss calls 'Dick's Maledictory Web,.49 
This web binds together human relationships and the whole network of 
civilisation which engulfs his characters. When they find that 
their relation with the world is built of lies, deceptions and 
various forms of emotional and intellectual cheating, the answer is 
rarely to escape that world, for what they eventually discover is 
that the whole edifice, defining every perception of reality, is 
bound together by illusion. 
Lem suggests a comparison between how Dick treats these illusory 
realities and how various 'new wave' writers, such as Ballard 
approach the technological transformation of reality. 
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Lem continues to document his love/hate relationship with Dick's 
work calling the author "perfidious", 
in that he does not give unambiguous answers to the 
questions provoked by reading him, in that he strikes no 
balance and explains nothing "scientifically", but rather 
just confounds things, not only in the plot itself but with 
respect to a superordinated category: the literary 
convention within which the story unfolds. 5o 
Whereas one might expect either a utopian or dystopian prognosis, 
Dick provides neither. He does not suggest a return to nature, the 
evolution of homo superior, or, as Ballard, a bland submission to 
the inevitable. Lem sees such an "atomic credo" of inevitable 
catastrophe characteristic of new wave writers as the shirking of 
creative responsibilities. 
Such expedients are foreign to Dick. For him the 
development of civilisation continues, but as it were 
crushed by itself, becoming monstrous at the height of its 
achievement - •••• 
Alarm at the impetus of civilisation finds expression 
nowadays in the slogans of "return to nature" after 
smashing and discarding everything "artificial", i.e. 
science and technology. These pipe dreams turn up also in 
SF. Happily they are absent in Dick. The action of his 
novels takes place in a time where there can no longer be 
any talk of a return to nature or of turning away from the 
"artificial" since the fusion of the "natural" with the 
"artificial" has long since become an accomplished fact. 51 
What is interesting about Dick's various worlds is how the 
supposedly "natural" and the supposedly "artificial" are fused: how 
the false is confused with the genuine, the spiritual with the 
material, the metaphoric with the literal. 
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Although the questions raised in Dick's work are largely 
epistemological, that is they address questions concerning the 
foundations of knowledge, the answers one gets invariably concern 
the basis for actions. This is an important aspect of Dick's 
scenarios. They resolve themselves through the characters taking 
positive action in situations which they do not fully understand. 
Because of Pat Conley, for example, Joe Chip is unsure which time 
track he is on even before the Stanton Mick explosion. He finds 
himself window shopping for rare coins for a collection he is not 
. sure he has, and is not even sure whether Pat Conley is still his 
wife, but the significance of the two underlined crosses remains the 
same. Just as with Sam Regan's message to his hallucinating wife, 
Joe Chip has an apparently independent source of appeal in verifying 
the status of his· reality, a source which paradoxically was 
generated by himself. Of course there is the possibility that the 
crosses mean other than "this girl is dangerous", but they seem to 
Chip to be something that has not been changed, and serve therefore 
as a basis for action. 
Meagre as such indications are, Dick's heroes stoically proceed in 
the full knowledge of their own helplessness. Even central God-like 
figures such as Palmer Eldritch, Hawthorne Abendson and Jones, are 
deluded about the realities which they to a certain extent 
stage-manage. The reader is drawn into this "comedy of mistakes", 
as A1diss terms it, by an ever-changing series of narrative 
perspectives, reflecting the contradictory or simply mistaken views 
of self-interested individuals. 
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Further it is unusual in Dick's later works for the author to 
clarify the situation by favouring a particular view. The 
appearance of the Joe Chip money at the end of Ubik9 Laws being 
bitten by the bug at the end of The Eye in the Sky, Leo Bulero 
retaining the stigmata at the end of The Three Stigmata of 
Palmer Eldritch 9 are prime examples of Dick refusing to 'submit to 
reality' by providing a narrative solution. The bewildering series 
of clues with which the reader is left fail to indicate which 
parallel world, which time-track or which illusion is the 'real' 
one. Peter Fitting 9 confessing a "fascination" with Dick's work, 
attempts to interpret this formal anarchy as "a critique of the 
ideological presuppositions of the SF genre and of the traditional 
novel in general".52 He goes on to describe the "discovery 
scenes", where a character realizes that his reality is somehow an 
illusion, as dramatisations of, 
the epistemological critique of the dominant positivist 
view of empirical reality as an objective "world of facts" 
which can be apprehended directly by the knowing 
b o t 53 su Jec • 
I concur that the notion of 'reality' as a socially constructed 
ideology is central to Dick's work, but question the coherence with 
which he forwards that view. Faced with superficial 
characterisation and confusing plot1ines, the temptation is to put 
it all down to sloppy writing rather than 
a model of a more subversive form of writing which 
undermines rather than confirms the repressive system in 
which it has been produced. 54 
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Neither of these views, however, take account of Dick's place in the 
tradition of science fiction nor the lucidity with which he is 
capable of expressing complex notions. There is nothing sloppy 
about the writing in 'The Golden Man' or 'The Electric Ant' for 
example, yet their elegance belies their beginnings in pulp science 
fiction stories about mutants and robots. I noted in the last 
chapter the extent to which the characteristic obessions of science 
fiction are reflected in narrative techniques and conventions. 
Playing around with time affects narrative flow, and addressing the 
nature of identity suspends certain criteria about how characters 
behave. To what extent can doors, toasters and taxi-cabs, for 
example, be considered characters? These matters seem quite trivial 
when taken in a literary context, but assume the status of 
philosophical meditations when moved into the domain of human 
behaviour. A narrative conservatism leads Harness to use 
time-travel as a device, rather than as an object of study, and 
leads Bester's reflections on mind-reading and the will into trite 
romantic platitudes about the power of the human imagination. 
There seems here a distinction to be made between imagining 
something to be so, time running backwards, finding oneself to be a 
robot, reading somebody else's mind, etc., and imagining what it 
would be like if it was. Thus science fiction tends to concentrate 
on how one might travel in time, in terms of machines and causes, 
rather than what it might actually be like to experience it, and 
what the psychological and philosophical implications might be. 
Certain issues are glossed over like, how we would know we had 
travelled in time, how does one find one's footing in this altered 
reality? 
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One of Wittgenstein's students once remarked "Just imagine, before 
Galileo people thought the sun went round the earth!", to which 
Wittgenstein replied "Just imagine what it would look like if it 
did." Thus Wittgenstein's student has tended to think of people 
before Galileo as in some way deluded, as subject to some species of 
madness. What we call physics and what we call metaphysics are thus 
confused, one applies physical criteria to a metaphysical problem, 
and vice versa. 
When Dick takes on the gaudy admixture of physics, metaphysics, 
social commentary and oddball humour which typifies science fiction, 
one is aware that Dick is taking on these issues so thoroughly that 
he leaves himself without an escape route. Finding himself in the 
nightmare world of physics, metaphysics and religion, and drawing 
the reader after him, he neglects to indicate a way out. Even Lewis 
Carroll allowed Alice to find her way back to reality. 
George Pitcher in his essay 'Wittgenstein, Nonsense, and Lewis 
Carroll' sees a close parallel between Carroll and Wittgenstein's 
treatment of philosophical nonsense. 
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Pitcher provides examples from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, 
Through the Looking Glass, and the Sylvie and Bruno books, which 
demonstrate an affinity in the views of the writers with respect to 
nonsense. Further, each example is chosen to illustrate key aspects 
of Wittgenstein's approach. Alice's conversation with Humpty 
Dumpty, becomes in Pitcher's view an illustration of how nonsensical 
it is to suggest that meaning words is one thing (a kind of mental 
act) and saying words another (a performance). Pitcher concludes 
that although Wittgenstein's ar~uments are supported by Carroll's 
dramatisations, their attitudes to the problem were radically 
different. 
It tortured Wittgenstein and delighted Carroll. Carroll 
turned his back on reality and led us happily into his 
(wonderful) world of myth and fantasy. Wittgenstein, being 
a philosopher, exerted all his efforts to drag us back to 
reality from the (horrible) world of myth and fantasy. But 
the two men cover much the same ground: we may even look on 
Wittgenstein as conceptual ising and applying to philosophy 
many of the points which Carroll had simply intuited. 55 
Pitcher is careful not to attribute a direct influence on 
Wittgenstein through Carroll's writing. I similarly do not impute a 
direct influence on the work of Dick by Wittgenstein, and am 
suspicious as to what extent the sophisticated thought which 
characterizes Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations can be 
intuited. 
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It is important to see that the epistemological problems which Dick 
presents invariably spring from raising the stakes on a classic 
science fiction theme. In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Dick 
presents problems of artificial intelligence and the status of 
robots, by asking questions about the ethics of "retiring" androids 
so life-like that it is almost impossible to distinguish them from 
human beings. 
Does Chomsky Dream of Electric Ants? 
The android had been developed after war had made the earth so 
radioactive that a colonisation program had been instigated. From 
their beginnings as synthetic guerillas, and giveaway incentives for 
reluctant emigrees, androids developed to such a degree that 
eventually a test had to be devised to distinguish runaway androids 
from human beings. The Voigt-Kampff Empathy Test had emerged as the 
state of the art in this field. Rick Deckard reflects 
An android, no matter how gifted as to pure intellectual 
capacity, could make no sense out of the fusion which took 
place routinely among the followers of Mercerism - an 
experience which he, and virtually everyone else, including 
subnormal chickenheads, managed with no difficulty.56 
Dick uses the notion of empathy and the Mercerite religion to 
establish Deckard's criteria for designating androids as inferior, 
as mere machines. Whereas Deckard and his wife, we find, programme 
themselves every morning with their Penfield Mood Organ. 
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At one point Deckard begins to feel that he has more empathy for 
androids than he has for some human beings. 
Most androids I've known have more vitality and desire to 
live than my wife. 57 
His meeting with Luba Luft strengthens this view. 
He had never thought of it before, had never felt any 
empathy on his own part toward the androids he killed. 
Always he had assumed that throughout his psyche he 
experienced the android as a clever machine - as in his 
conscious view. And yet, in contrast to Phil Resch, a 
difference had manifested itself. And he felt 
instinctively that he was right. Empathy toward an 
artificial construct? he asked himself. Something that 
only pretends to be alive? But Luba Luft had seemed 
genuinely alive; it had not worn the aspect of a 
simulation. 5a 
Deckard here, for the first time begins to qualify the notion of 
empathy. It becomes more than a convenient term, it denotes 
distinctions. But not the distinction between android and human, or 
predator and herbivore. Luba had been an opera singer, Deckard 
reflects that the beauty of her voice, the fact that she was 
attractive, and the fact that she had sung The Magic Flute, one of 
his favorite operas, might contribute toward his feeling for the 
android. Conversely, Resch's obvious lack of feeling, his failure 
to understand why he reckoned he had bought Luba the book of Munch 
prints, confirm in Deckard that he would happily have killed Resch 
instead and felt nothing. He reflects 
So much for the distinction between authentic living humans 
and humanoid constructs. In that elevator at the museum, 
he said to himself, I rode down with two creatures, one 
human, the other android ••• and my feelings were the 
reverse of those intended. Of those I'm accustomed to feel 
- I'm required to feel. 59 
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This is a familiar theme for Dick, In an essay entitled 'Man, 
Android and Machine', he defines androids as "things trying to pass 
themselves off an humans." 
I mean a thing somehow generated to deceive us in a cruel 
way, to cause us to think it to be one of ourselves. Made 
in a laboratory - that aspect is not meaningful to me; the 
entire universe is one vast laboratory, and out of it come 
sly and cruel entities which smile as they reach out to 
shake hands. But their handshake is the grip of death, and 
their smile has the coldness of the grave. 
These creatures are among us, although morphologically they 
do not differ from us, we must not posit a difference of 
essence, but a difference of behaviour. so 
He goes on to list instances of characters in his books, who like 
Rachel Rosen lack something, or who are "schizoid" and lack proper 
feeling, and therefore qualify as things rather than people. 
A human being without the proper empathy or feeling is the 
same as an android built so as to lack it, either by design 
or by mistake. 61 
Not only is it important to realize that human beings can lack 
something that makes them human, but it must also be remembered that 
it is possible to be mistaken about the humanity of androids. This 
is shown by Deckard's brief affair with Rachel Rosen. Rachel Rosen 
is never what she appears to be. From the very beginning we are 
misled. Is she human? Is she android? Is she a good android, a 
bad android or someone else's puppet? Dick effectively raises the 
stakes on the question of robots and androids, by posing the 
question as a problem about differentiating between the false and 
the genuine, the illusory and the real. 
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This is shown by Descartes himself. His a priori assumption that 
one cannot doubt one's own consciousness and what one is thinking, 
entails the concomitant assumption that it makes no sense to doubt 
one's knowledge of the language and the meaning of the words one 
uses. Try doubting the meaning of the words one is using. Then try 
and doubt without the words. The kind of radical doubt which 
characterizes the queries of the Cartesian sceptic, questions about 
the foundations of knowledge. characteristically look for an answer 
which is beyond language. Thus we find the approach which 
characterizes Chomsky's attack on the problem of "interpreting the 
world", put forward in Problems of Knowledge and Freedom. 
Chomsky attempts to show that a series of structure-dependent 
operations on various sentences indicate "that there are 
corresponding underlying structures, common to all human beings, 
which pre-dispose us to structure our perceptions of the world in a 
particular way. He writes, 
Thus in an important sense the rules are 'structure 
dependant and only structure dependant,' Technically, they 
are rules that apply to abstract labelled bracketing of 
sentences (abstract, in that it is not physically 
indicated), not to systems of grammatical or semantic 
relations. Again, there is no a priori necessity for this 
to be true. These characteristics, if true, are empirical 
facts. It is reasonable to suppose that they are a priori 
for the organism, in that they define for him, what counts 
as a human language, and determine the general character of 
his acquired knowledge of language. 64 
Chomsky's approach is novel in that he instances the often illogical 
and meaning-independant quality of many of the rules which he 
identifies, as an indication that they are the manifestation of 
something deep-seated rather than culturally imposed. 
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He goes on to retail the notion that in breaking these rules, 
literature exploits what can and cannot be said grammatically. 
Rebecca West, in criticism of the view that art reflects 
nature, wrote that 'A copy of the universe is not what is 
required of art; one of the damned thing is ample.' The 
statement violates the rule of grammar that requires a 
plural noun in such phrases as 'one of the books is here' 
or 'one of the damned things is enough'. But the statement 
is nevertheless exactly to the point. We can often exploit 
the expressive resources of lanfuage most fully by 
departing from its principles.' 
These principles are, he imagines, laid down in our biological 
make-up. 
Perhaps this means that the innate schematism that the 
child brings to bear in language learning is unique to 
language. If so, the neurologist faces the problem of 
discovering the mechanisms that determine this schematism, 
and the biologist the problem of explaining how these 
developed in the course of human evolution. 66 
By imagining that such a 'schematism' might "impose absolute limits 
on what can be known," and that the biological mechanism for our 
pre-disposition might be discovered, Chomsky imagines that he sees 
an end to his task. The end of his quest to find the limits of 
knowledge, like many epistemologists before him, he sees in some 
kind of absolute or universal, in this case a linguistic universal 
based on biological evidence. The man becomes a mechanism. 
The hypothesis that our perceptions of the world are in some way 
programmed is the subject of Dick's 'The Electric Ant'. Instead of 
waking up, as Gregor Samsa did, transformed into a giant beetle, 
Garson Poole wakes up and is informed, 
You're a successful man, Mr. Poole. But, Mr. Poole, you're 
not a man. You're an electric ant. S7 
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An electric ant, it transpires, is a humanoid organic robot, 
programmed with the delusion that he is human. The realisation of 
his mechanical nature sparks off the usual speculations about the 
nature of free will. 
Shall I go to the office? he asked himself. If so, why? 
If not, why? Choose one. Christ, he thought, it 
undermines you, knowing this. I'm a freak, he realised. 
An inanimate object mimicking an animate one. But he felt 
alive. yet •••• he felt differently, now. About himself. 
Hence about everyone, especially Danceman and Sarah, 
everyone at Tri-Plan. s8 
Always with Dick it is important that the discovery of illusion, is 
focused through the character's attitude to his work, his employer, 
and his mistress (usually in that order). Garson Poole immediately 
sets about a series of experiments designed to discover how he knows 
things. Like Chomsky, he is interested in the mechanism whereby he 
perceives reality. Unlike Chomsky he finds it in a "punched tape 
roll" above his heart mechanism. This is his "reality-supply 
construct". The computer explains 
"All sense stimuli received by your central neurological 
system enamate from that unit and tampering with it would 
be risky if not terminal." It added, "You appear to have 
no progranuning circuit." 69 
The idea that he is being controlled by a "reality tape" is so 
repugnant to Poole that the first question he asks is, 
Do I want to interfere with the reality tape? And if so, 
why? Because, he thought, if I control that, I control 
reality. At least so far as I'm concerned. My subjective 
reality •• but that's all there is. Objective reality is a 
synthetic construct, dealing with a hypothetical 
universalization of a multitude of subjective realities. 70 
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The resemblance between this last, and Chomsky's justification for 
his quest for "principles of mental organisation" is remarkable. 
The principles of mind provide the scope as well as the 
limits of human creativity. Without such principles, 
scientific understanding and creative acts would not be 
possible. If all hypothesis are initially on a par, then 
no scientific understanding can possibly be achieved, since 
there will be no way to select among the vast array of 
theories compatible with our limited evidence and, by 
hypothesis, equally accessible to the mind.'1 
This view that the mind is a kind of valve which controls the influx 
of an anarchic reality, provides a picture which leads us to doubt 
the veracity of our senses and leads to questions about the real 
nature of reality. The picture is misleading because it pretends 
that it might be possible to apprehend reality directly, i.e. 
without these censoring devices. This is exactly what Garson Poole 
attempts to do. By punching holes in his reality tape, by inserting 
blank bits, and finally by cutting it all together, he makes various 
aspects of his reality appear and disappear until he experiences 
"absolute and ultimate reality", and "dies". This experience of 
'ultimate' reality, this wnediated sensation of touch, smell, 
taste, sound and vision, is presented in the usual 
impressionalistic, surreal manner which is customary when presenting 
altered perceptions. This juxtaposition of various synaesthetic 
sensations, and disparate ideas and perceptions, appears on the face 
of it to support the picture that there is a more immediate reality 
beyond that structured by knowledge, language and human behaviour, a 
reality which we can vicariously gain access to through 
hallucinagenic drugs, and through the 'creative' breaking of 
semantic rules. 
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Dick however, snatches this comfortable picture away in his 
postscript. The narrative viewpoint shifts to Sarah Benton watching 
Poole • die' • 
It thought I was a stimulus-factor on its reality tape, she 
said to herself. So it thought I would die when it 
"dies". How strange, she thought. Why did it imagine 
that? It had never been plugged into the real world; it 
had "lived" in an electronic world of its own. How 
bizarre. 72 
Sarah and her world then begin to fade away, she and the world of 
matter disintegrate and the story ends. 
In my last chapter, I noted how various errors of thinking were 
caused by presenting metaphoricai statements as empirical 
statements. The apparent 'depth' of such propositions stems from a 
"disquietude" with its roots in the form of language. Wittgenstein 
remarks, 
The problems arising through our misinterpretation of our 
forms of language have the character of depth. They are 
deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the 
forms of our language and their significance is as great as 
the importance of our language. - Let us ask ourselves: why 
do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is 
what the depth of philosophy is.)73 
A metaphysical question is characterised by the expression of "an 
unclarity about the grammar of a word in the form of a scientific 
question". Thus the question "What is reality?" has the same form 
as "What is a cloud?", whereas one is metaphysical (Wittgenstein 
would say grammatical), and the other is empirical. When Poole asks 
the question "What is reality?" he treats the question in a 
scientific manner. 
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For Sarah Benton the problem is something private to Poole. It is 
an accepted assumption that one's sensations are private, and can 
directly affect only oneself. She does not imagine that messing 
around with his "reality-tape" can possibly affect herself. Poole, 
like Descartes before him believes he has found something which will 
guarantee knowledge of reality. Poole has his tape, Descartes his 
"Cogito ergo sum". What characterizes both these is that a 
subjective criterion is posited as the basis of an objective 
enterprise. In Poole's case controlling the world, in Descartes, 
science, ethics, etc. This however is the central dilemma of 
epistemology. Its first principles must be independent of 
observation and the evidence of the senses, yet stand fast. 
"I think therefore I am" is not an empirical statement because it 
cannot be verified by any kind of observation. It relies, in 
Descartes' case, on his inability to doubt his own consciousness, 
and, when presented as the basis of knowledge, it relies on the 
agreement of other 'I's that the statement holds fast. This is why 
Wittgenstein terms the propositions of philosOPhy and epistemology 
. 1" 
"graumat1ca • The consideration of anything which we term 
'private', our sensations, thoughts or feelings, begin and end in 
language. When we try to get at the essence of such things 
language, words, is what we end up with. 
The proposition "Sensations are ~rivate" is comparable to: 
"One plays patience by oneself". 4 
What does it mean when we say: "I can't imagine the 
opposite of this" or "what would it be like if it were 
otherwise?" - For example, when someone has said my images 
are private. or that only I myself can know that I am 
feeling pain, and similar things. 
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Having been thrust into the nournenon, Prentiss finds that all is 
black. 
His senses were useless. 
He even doubted he had any senses. 
So far as he could tell he was nothing but an intelligence, 
floating in space. But he couldn't even be sure of that. 
Intelligence - space - they weren't necessarily the same 
now as before. 
All that he knew for sure was that he doubted. He doubted 
everything except for the fact of doubting. 
Shades of Descartes! 
To doubt is to think! 
Ergo surn!76 
Harness's story resolves itself into a re-run of the Adam and Eve 
story, chiefly because he would like to regard the quest of science 
as principally romantic. A celebration of the supremacy of the 
human mind and of the imagination. The idea of freeing the mind and 
the imagination from the shackles of reality, and ultimately of 
controlling reality, is science and science fiction's greatest 
myth. By demonstrating that such an idea springs from treating a 
grammatical statement "I think therefore I am", as if it were an 
empirical one, Wittgenstein effectively short-circuits the task of 
epistemology. 
Whether you call the propositions of philosophy, analytic, 
structure-dependent, grammatical or linguistic, it is clear that 
they cannot be proved or disproved by observation or the evidence of 
our senses. 
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Thus, 
If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle on the 
gas-flame will not freeze but boil". I seem to be as 
justified in this "I know" as I am in any. 'If I know 
anything I know this'. - Or do I know with still greater 
certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend 
so-and-so? And how does this compare with the proposition 
that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look 
in the glass? - I don't know confidently what I am to 
answer here. - But still there is a difference between the 
cases. If the water over the gas freezes, of course I 
shall be as astonished as can be, but I shall assume some 
factor I don't know of. and perhaps leave the matter to 
physicists to judge. But what would make me doubt whether 
this person here is N.N., whom I have known for years? 
Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and 
1 .. h 78 P unge 1t 1nto c aos. 
In Now Wait for Last Year, The Simulcra, Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep?, in Palmer Eldritch and Ubik, people have reason to 
doubt things on all these counts. When physical things don't behave 
as they should, as in the regressive behaviour of objects in Ubik. 
One's hypothesis must change. When a person turns out to be a 
robot, a fraud or is in some way proven to be other than previously 
thought, a system of beliefs may crumble. In Dick's novels, when 
such beliefs are undermined they drag everything else into chaos. 
These scenes of the disintegration of reality are invariably 
precipitated by the revelation that the character's employer, 
mistress or god is a fraud. In Androids, J. R. Isidore's reaction 
to finding that Mercerism is a swindle, is typical. 
The spider is gone; Mercer is gone; he saw the dust and the 
ruin of the apartment as it lay spreading everywhere - he 
heard the kipple coming, the final disorder of all forms, 
the absence which would win out. It grew around him as he 
stood holding the empty ceramic cup; the cupboards of the 
kitchen creaked and split and he felt the floor beneath his 
f . 79 eet g1ve. 
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In this way, Dick invites us to make a distinction between what we 
know and what we believe. Because his characters are invariably 
mistaken in what they know and believe, and because Dick neither 
favours a particular character'S view nor privileges a particular 
parallel world, or 'illusory' reality, the reader is asked to apply 
criteria and make distinctions which are usually given. He happily 
admits that his characters are often fakes and frauds, deceiving 
themselves and each other and situated in an illusory reality. Thus 
in The Man in the High Castle, Hawthorne Abensden's book The 
Grasshopper Lies Heavy is a fictitious tale of how the allies won 
the second world war, set within the MHC world where the axis powers 
won. Reality poses as fiction. Dick's steadfast refusal to define 
what is artificial and what is real is pivotal to an understanding 
of his work. Anything in his worlds is likely to be artificial, 
ersatz, a simulcrum or a counterfeit. In MHC everyone is pretending 
to be something which they are not. Further Frank Frink is involved 
in the production of replicas of antiques, indistinguishable from 
originals, coroplete with signs of ageing, discolouration, etc. 
Mr. Chi 1 dan , the fawning sychophantic dealer is entirely fooled by 
Frink's merchandise when, disguised as a Japanese admiral's 
gentleman, Frink teases Childan, 
"Is it possible, sir, that you, the owner, dealer in such 
items, cannot distinguish the forgeries from the real?"ao 
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Frink's deliberation on the status of such imitations suggest that 
even in a philosophical context, what distinguishes the real from 
the false is determined by market forces. 
It had never occurred to (the Japanese) to ask themselves 
if the so-called historic art objects for sale in West 
Coast shops were genuine. Perhaps someday they would ••• 
and then the bubble would burst, the market would collapse 
even for the authentic pieces. A Gresham's Law: the fakes 
would undermine the value of the real. And that no doubt 
was the motive for the failure to investigate; after all, 
8 1 
everyone was happy. 
In the scene involving Frink's ex-employer Wyndham-Matson and his 
mistress Rita, Dick emphasises the spuriousness of designating an 
item genuine or real, and begins to suggest the necessity of the 
illusion. Following Frink's exposure of some of the merchandise 
which Childan has acquired from Wyndham-Matson as fakes, one of his 
middlemen Ray Calvin returns a shipment as sub-standard. 
Wyndham-Matson gets into an argument with his mistress about the 
merits of paying Frink to keep his mouth shut and about the fact 
that they are faking antiques. He declares that, 
"This whole damn historicity business is nonsense. Those 
Japs are bats. I'll prove it." Getting up he hurried to 
his study, returned at once with two ci§arette lighters 
which he set down on the coffee table. 8 
He challenges her to identify which lighter had been in 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's pocket when he was assassinated, and which 
one wasn't. Which one had "historicity, a hell of a lot of it." and 
which one not. "Can you feel it?" he asks. Obviously she cannot, 
its all in the head, it's what you know about the object which 
constitutes historicity. 
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Finally she says, 
"I don't believe either of these two lighters belonged to 
Franklin Roosevelt," the girl said. 
Wyndham-Matson giggled. "That's my point! I'd have to 
prove it you to with some sort of document. A paper of 
authenticity. And so it's all a fake, a mass delusion. 
The paper proves its worth, not the object itself!"a3 
He shows Rita the framed Smithsonian Institution's certificate of 
authenticity, 
the paper and the lighter had cost him a fortune, but they 
were worth it - because they enabled him to prove that he 
was right, that the word "fake" meant nothing really, since 
the word authentic meant nothing really.a4 
Rita shows an understandable disappointment at having her joy at 
finding old objects debunked. The idea that it doesn't matter 
whether an object is new or old doesn't sit well with her feelings 
about the past, and much to her lover's chagrin she decides to go 
home. The reader feels an obvious sympathy for Rita's view. After 
all Wyndham-Matson's position effectively relegates our memories to 
the status of unverifiable, and therefore meaningless, statements 
about the past. The determinacy of these statements can only be 
settled by reference to documents, photographs, etc., and only by 
virtue of such artifacts constituting our history. Once one begins 
to doubt the documents and the photographs a situation of infinite 
regress is instigated whereby all things begin to be questioned. 
Stripping away the illusions may be useful, but it can also lead to 
unnecessary confusion. 
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Wyndham-Matson's observations are not so much profound, as the 
justification for sharp business practice. The appeal of 
verifiability does not wipe out the fact that he is in the business 
of fooling the public. Where the fooling around becomes fraud is 
not so clear. 
The characters in Ubik are similarly thrown back on the resources of 
the marketplace, in order to resolve their epistemological 
problems. Because apart from the malevolent influence of Jory, 
there is another force at work, apparently assisting these 
characters in search of reality'; the absolute in a spray can, 
Ubik. Ubik is not just everywhere, as its name suggests, but it is 
everything. The advertising jingles which head each chapter, 
proclaim the merits of this product in each of its successive 
manifestations. As a roll-on deodorant, a bra, a razor, a 
germicide, a breakfast cereal and finally as God. 
I am Ubik. Before the universe was, I am. I made the 
suns. I made the worlds. I created the lives and the 
places they inhabit; I move them here, I put them there. 
They go as I say, they do as I tell them. I am the word 
and my name is never spoken. The name which no one knows. 
I am called Ubik, but that is not my name. I am. I shall 
15 
always be. 
This passage, appearing at the head of the final chapter, is the 
last word on the ultimate commodity. Fitting describes it as a 
"theological super-ad".a& For me, it encapsultates the chief 
problem which many readers find with Dick. On the one hand, Ubik is 
a commodity, an all-purpose "reality support", and advertised thus: 
by making use of one of the most advanced techniques of 
present day science, the reversion of matter to earlier 
forms can be reversed, and at a price any canapt owner can 
afford. Ubik is sold by leading home-art stores throughout 
Earth." 
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On the other hand, it is all that Dick allows them. Despite its 
shoddy advertising, despite the humour, so typical of Dick, at the 
expense of another over-hyped product of the American dream, it 
remains, in terms of the book, the symbol of vitality and life. As 
in The Man in the High Castle, one's attitude toward the products of 
a crazy technological society, (about which Dick remains ambiguous), 
is crucial to the characters' perceptions concerning the 
epistemological dilemma. 
The invocation of the pragmatic and prosaic in the face of the 
apparently profound is characteristic. By dissecting the problem of 
false vs real in such terms Dick takes the metaphysics out of 
metaphysics. The terms in which Wyndham-Matson casts the argument 
are what Kennick describes as 'explicitly' grammatical; it is an 
argument about the use of the word 'fake'. When Dick invokes the 
spectre of commercial interest and market forces by casting the 
argument in the mouth of Wyndham-Matson, it ceases to become a 
purely philosophical, i.e. grammatical, issue. One interpretation 
of Dick's obsession with advertising and commercial forces lines him 
up with Ballard in the project he outlines for science fiction. In 
his introduction to Crash! he writes, 
I feel that the balance between fiction and reality has 
changed significantly in the past decade. Increasingly 
their roles are reversed. We live in a world ruled by 
fictions of every kind - mass merchandising, advertising, 
politics conducted as a branch of advertising, the instant 
translation of science and technology into popular 
imagery, •••• we live inside an enormous novel.·· 
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Ballard seeks to break science fiction out of the ghetto by the 
adOption of modernist and most-modern techniques of writing; by 
getting away from space-ships and the far future, "all this stuff 
which I felt was basically rather juvenile, to writing a kind of 
adult science fiction based upon the present".89 "the function of 
the writer" he says, 
is no longer the addition of fiction to the world, but 
rather to seek its abstraction, to direct an enquiry aimed 
at recovering elements of reality from this debauch of 
fiction. 90 
Ballard directs his enquiry at the "internal landscape" of the mind, 
"where old categories of thought would merely be an 
b ,,91 encum rance • This solipsistic withdrawal however, far from 
breaking down the old categories of thought merely re-states them. 
Doubt of reality leading to the classic Cartesian affirmation of the 
reality of our own mental states. I have shown in this chapter how 
Dick's stance vis-a-vis epistemology re-states the sceptic's 
questions in terms of actual behaviour. For Dick, to withdraw into 
the mind in order to resolve these problems would be to submit to 
'reality', he therefore takes these problems of philosophy 'out onto 
the street'. Here I see a major divergence between Dick and the 
so-called 'new-wave' writers, and in this disjunction the key issues 
in the current dilemma of science fiction. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Science Fiction The Speakeasy of Philosophy 
I firmly believe that science fiction, far from being an 
unimportant offshoot, in fact represents the main literary 
tradition of the 20th Century, and certainly its oldest - a 
tradition of imaginative response to science and technology 
that runs in an intact line through H. G. Wells, 
Aldous Huxley, the writers of American science fiction. to 
such present day innovators as William Burroughs. 1 
(Crash! intro.) 
This idiosyncratic view of the history of 20th century literature, 
and of science fiction in particular, forms part of Ballard's 
introductory remarks to his novel Crash~ The tradition he is 
referring to must be "that of some parallel literary world, because, 
far from being the "main literary tradition" of the 20th century it 
has the status of little more than cheap pornography, and is often 
sold in the same stores. Wishing it were otherwise won't make it so. 
Vonnegut is refreshingly candid about why he wishes to estrange 
himself from the "back-slapping coterie who are proud to call 
themselves SF writers". Firstly, because many 'serious critics' 
mistake the "file drawer labelled 'science fiction'" for a 
"urinal"Z, secondly, "because most people regard science-fiction 
writers as interchangeable with comic-book writers, as they 
frequently are", and "finally because I thought it was costing me a 
. t ti "l lot of money 1n repu a on. 
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Lem suggests a series of more literary reasons why writers might 
wish to get out of the ghetto. Science fiction's sense of 
playfulness, he believes, is no longer underwritten by 'serious' 
intent to say something fresh about science or the effects of 
technology. It is content to play in its "domesticated universe". 
The conventions of time and space travel by now so familiar to 
readers of science fiction, have done away with the mystery, the 
vastness, the silent horror of space. 
The universe of SF is not only miniscule simplified and 
lukewarm, but it has also been turned towards its 
inhabitants, and in this way it can be subjugated by them, 
losing thereby the 'indifference which causes man to 
project continually new enigmas to be solved and secrets to 
be lifted, in the vain hope to get there the answer to the 
question of his own meaning. The universe of SF there is 
not the slightest chance that genuine myths and theologies 
might arise, for the thing itself is a bastard of myths 
gone to the dogs. The SF of today resembles a "graveyard 
of gravity", in which that sub-genre of literature that 
promised the cosmos to mankind, dreams away its defeat in 
onanistic delusions and chimeras - onanistic because they 
are anthropocentric. 4 
Lem effectively accuses science fiction of trying to have it both 
ways. When a serious intent is imputed to science fiction, he 
explains, 
for work which would reflect on the place that Reason can 
occupy in the universe, on the outer limits of concepts 
formed on Earth as instruments of cognition, or on such 
consequences of contacts with extraterrestial life. s 
critics and writers tend to shirk their responsibility and assert 
that after all, the devices of science fiction are only 
entertainment. 
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Whoever brings up the heavy artillery of comparitive 
ethnology, cultural anthropology and sociology against such 
devices is told that he is using a cannon to shoot 
sparrows •.. : once he falls silent, the voices of the 
apologists for the culture-shaping anticipative, predictive 
and mythopoeic role of SF are raised anew. 6 
As long as science fiction writers continue to rework the old themes 
of time travel, constructing a robot, cosmic contact, cosmic 
invasion and of course ultimate catastrophe for the human species it 
is likely that science fiction will continue to occupy an ambiguous 
place in literature. Lem characterizes the foregoing list as the 
main "geneological types" in the "evolution of SF". Those exponents 
of the last category known as the 'new wave' (Bradbury, Ballard, 
Brunner, etc.) have consciously attempted to bring science fiction 
in line with 'serious' literature. Lem comments, 
The revolt against the machine and against civilization, 
the praise of the "aesthetic" nature of catastrophe, the 
dead-end course of human civilisation - these are the 
foremost problems, the intellectual content of their 
works. 7 
He suggests that in their eagerness to rid themselves of "the stigma 
of cheap and defective SF" the 'new wave' have given up "all that 
constitutes its cognitive value" 8 The inevitability of global 
catastrophe which Ballard, for example, presents as given, and 
imminent, is a kind of watershed forcing the writer to concentrate 
on 'inner space' rather than the 'outer space' which in Ballard's 
worlds remains unattainable. The lack of time-travel, space-ships, 
robots and mind-reading, seems to guarantee that here at last 
science fiction has come of age. 
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In fact an examination of Ballard's work, and that of other 'new 
wave' writers, shows that the pessimism which characterizes their 
work is merely a cloak of gloom thrown over old science fiction 
themes. 
J. G. Ballard's Literature of Extinction 
Ballard's short story, 'The Voices of Time' for example, is 
remarkable in that it manages to cram together an abundance of stock 
science fiction themes without once appearing stale. I am the first 
to acknowledge the charm of Ballard's tales but I am in a way asking 
"Do we want to be charmed?" 'The Voices of Time' suggests that the 
world is about to end because the sun is getting cooler, this old 
recipe is garnished with concomitant mutations and devolution of 
species, including man, and the precise prediction of when the 
universe will end. Ballard makes the scientist Powers the 
embodiment of Jungian man. A split personality, the one continuing 
with his scientific experiments whilst the other half, the 
unconscious half if you will, is off building a giant mandala, a 
cosmic clock suggesting Powers resonance with the vibrations of the 
universe. In Powers' menagerie there is a Chimpanzee with a 
two-hundred word vocabulary, plants with nervous systems, lead 
shielded mutant frogs, and a 'girl from Mars', elsewhere we find 
crazy scientists, messages from another galaxy, and enforced 
evolution. We have seen these elements before in Bester and Van 
Voqt, but Ballard characteristically treats the paste like it's the 
real thing. 
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\Tan Vogt and Smitz's treatment of the. evolutionary theme in 'Research 
Alpha' will serve to indicate interesting thematic parallels and 
linguistic divergences. In the following scene the prematurely 
evolved Barbara Ellington develops a new awareness, 
She had developed brain mechanisms that could do things 
with space - do them on an automatic level. without her 
conscious mind knowing what, or how. Fantastic things ••••• 
As she lay there. a new nerve centre in her brain moved out 
and scanned a volume of space 500 light-years in diamater. 
It touched and comprehended clouds of neutral hydrogen and 
bright young O-type stars. measured the swing of binaries. 
took a census of comets and ice-asteroids.' 
Eventually of course her mind reaches out and touches the omnipotent 
"Great Galactics" who are the benign Gods watching over life in the 
universe. Compare this with Gully Foyle's evolutionary lunge, his 
jaunt to the edge of the Universe 10 , and then with the description 
of Powers' accelerated evolution in 'Voices'. 
Above him he could hear the stars, a million cosmic voices 
that crowded the sky from one horizon to the next, a true 
canopy of time. Like jostling radio beacons, their long 
aisles interlocking at countless angles, they plunged into 
the sky from the narrowest recesses of space. He saw the 
dim red disc of Sirius, heard its ancient voice, untold 
millions of years old, dwarfed by the huge spiral nebulae 
in Andromeda, a gigantic carousel of vanished universes, 
their voices almost as old as the cosmos itself. To Powers 
the sky seemed an endless Babel, the time-song of a 
thousand galaxies overlaying each other in his mind. ll 
~ith Ballard there is certainly more poetry, a lyrical capture of 
technological jargon, but nothing is cognitively new or different 
fro~ the preceeding examples. The tiredness of the basic idea is 
easily illustrated by the treatment of time in the story. 
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Not only can the plants in Powers laboratory see time, but the 
description of how Powers himself perceives time after his evolution 
embodies precisely the metaphor which in my second chapter I 
identified as the source of many of the misleading notions about the 
nature of time. 
Like an endless river, so broad that its banks were below 
the horizon, it flowed steadily towards him, a vast course 
of time that spread outwards to fill the sky and universe, 
enveloping everything within them. IZ 
This 'river of eternity' image is as old as, dare I say, time 
itself, Ballard moreover is not above interpolating the names and 
numbers of a few constellations to lend a little scientific 
credibility to the description. One suspects with Ballard, that as 
with the Surrealists, the fascination for the trappings and debris 
of technology is mere fetishism. Invariably in his early stories 
there is the scientist, the observer measuring the rate of the 
winding down of some process, or the approach of water, sand, and 
cataclysm. Couched in scientific terminology, we are given to 
believe that the approach of this cataclysm is as inevitable, has 
the overwhelming certainty of a mathematical formula. We can see 
this in The Drowned World, 'The Delta at Sunset', 'The Illuminated 
Man' and 'The Garden of Time', always the steady measured approach, 
sometimes willed, always inevitable, always submitted to. Sublimely 
accepted as a scientific certainty, which by default, catalyses some 
deeper purpose within the heart of man transcending the mere 
physical. With Ballard, scientific procedures are reduced to the 
status of mere ritual in the face of the approaching end. 
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The role of the experiments of Powers and the calculations of 
Kaldren, reduces these activities to psychological tics, 
manifestations of neuroses. Kaldren is the melting pot of the 
artistic and scientific, his response to these doom-laden 
calculations is to assemble his "terminal documents", not least of 
which is the cosmic countdown provided by the radio signal being 
beamed from Canes Venatici. This "thoughtful" indication of the 
"real time", we are led to believe, is being supplied by superior 
beings many light years away. Once again the benign Gods at the 
fringes of the universe. 
Ballard, far from reasoning that the themes so peculiar to science 
fiction demand a more rigorous philosophical approach, has opted for 
a stylistic grafting to match the charm of the ideas. In a letter 
to Norman Malcolm in 1945, Wittgenstein comments on the "charm" of 
Freud's ideas, and comments that although initially he had been 
attracted by the ideas, under the light of reason he found them full 
'k' ,,13 of "fishy th~n ~ng • 
Examples of "fishy thinking" in Ballard are easily found. In 
'Voices' l ' 1 ,,,14 Powers has a plant that " ~teral y sees t~me , and a 
spiderlike insect whose optical sensitivity has "shifted down the 
band" such that it is only sensitive to gamma radiation. We are 
asked to believe that the former is in the same class as the latter 
and that this constitutes the breaking down of old categories. 
Whereas the former is logically impossible and the latter a mere 
extension of an existing sense. 
218 
I noted in my discussion of 'The Country of the Blind', 
that science fiction routinely attempts to weave some mystery 
around the extension of our senses; either the accenting of 
an existing sense or the suggestion of a sixth sense. Telepathy, 
pre-cognition, and synaesthesia all arise from this age old 
fantasy. Ballard routinely confuses the nature of such 
extrapolations. 
Thus, far from throwing off old modes of thought, Ballard has 
slipped back into precisely those patterns of thinking which 
have characterised science fiction since its inception. The 
reasons for this can be discerned through the various 'manifesto' 
statements which Ballard has made. 
The fictional elements in the world around us are 
multiplying to the point where it is almost impossible 
to distinguish between the "real" and the "false" - the 
terms no longer have any meaning. The faces of public 
figures are projected at us as if out of some endless 
global pantomime, they and the events in the world at 
large have the conviction and reality of those depicted 
on giant advertisement hoardings. The task of the arts 
seems more and more to be that of isolating the few 
elements of reality from this melange of fictions, not 
some metaphorical "reality", but simply the basic elements 
of cognition and posture that are the jigs and props of 
our consciousness. lS 
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The aim of getting down to the "basic elements of cognition" Ballard 
shares with Chomsky. How they plan to discover these elements 
however, differs considerably. Colin Greenland comments on the 
parallels which exist between the 'internal landscapes' of Ballard 
and the work of the surrealists. Often the elements will be 
fetishistic. Thus although the 'surreal' effect is often achieved 
through the juxtaposition of a familiar object and a peculiar 
situation, as with Oali's crutches and giraffes and excreta, the 
content is clearly psychological. Greenland points out that Oali's 
pictures often illustrate dreams and make specific reference to 
Freud. 
The imagery of these painting is allegorical, predisposing 
us to examine it analytically. Oali offers his subjective 
landscapes as a comment on memory and perception, and 
encourages us to decipher them according to the generalised 
systems of values first tabulated by Freud. This is 
applied fantasy. Surrealism used psychoanalysis to 
investigate the latent content of reality - an alliance of 
creative and analytic procedures. 16 
Concealed in Greenland's last sentence is a prejudice which 
constitutes in itself the single most powerful obstacle to the 
understanding of Wittgenstein and the purpose and thrust of this 
study. As long as the analytical work which typifies Wittgenstein:s 
method is seen to be in opposition to 'creative' expression which 
characterises literature and art, it is difficult to take my point. 
The demystification which the techniques of Wittgenstein entail 
undermine the enigma which the surrealists seek to create. Where 
Ryle, for example, attempts to expose the manner in which the 
category-mistake effectively short-circuits thinking, leading to 
paradox and enigma, the surrealists seek to make a virtue of it. 
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Greenland goes on to describe how surrealism was an 'artistic' 
school with 'scientific' purposes. And, whilst conceding that 
Einstein and Heisenberg had re-instated the imagination, he concedes 
that for all its scientific posturing, its manifestos and 
pseudo-scientific language, it is quite probable that "the 
surrealists appreciated science not at all",17 Because of the 
apparent contradictions of common-sense which both relativity and 
quantum theory entail, Greenland believes that a blank cheque was 
written for all kinds of imaginative abuse of reality in the guise 
of "scientific imagination" and the exploration of inner reality. 
This cheque was underwritten by the disruption of reality, which by 
the 1950's was under reconstruction through the fictions of the mass 
media. Greenland comments, 
Art, Ballard decided could only 
second principle of surrealism: 
reality. IS 
be re-organised on the 
the critical analysis of 
Recovering reality from the "debauch of fiction", involves Ballard's 
characters in a retreat into themselves which is so complete as to 
render external reality a meaningless tableau. The encroachment of 
external reality on his characters' lives, through whatever kind of 
catastrophe, catalyses psychic forces deep within his characters, 
making accessible "the luminous beaches of the submerged neuronic 
continents",19 the reality of "landscapes of the 
unconscious".20 The poetic amalgam of scientific language and the 
language of various schools of psychology is a Ballardian attempt to 
subvert the official version of reality represented by science. 
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That science is shown in his novels and short stories as impotent in 
the face of some natural disaster. Characters like Powers, Traven 
and Faulkner can know exactly what is happening, and although 
brimming over with scientific knowledge, be powerless to do 
anything. Invariably there is the suggestion, as in 'The Voices of 
Time' and The Drowned World that human beings are an evolutionary 
dead-end and are about to be replaced. In the case of 'Voices' by 
unspecified mutants, and in The Drowned World by reptiles. By 
stressing what Ballard calls man's "biological isolation in relation 
to the universe,,2l, and his finiteness in the face of "this 
panoply of alternatives from wh~ch he is excluded,,22, he sets the 
stage for the spirit of submissiveness in the face of disaster which 
precipitates his characters into plumbing their own psychic depths. 
Maitland's temporary blindness in 'The Gioconda of the Twilight 
Noon' is enough to make him withdraw into the "cliffs" and "caverns" 
(very literally a landscape) of his mind. 
It was almost as if the barriers between the deepest levels 
of the nervous system and the external world had been 
removed, those muffling layers of blood and bone, reflex 
and convention •••• 23 
We are left in no doubt that Maitland feels that the world into 
which he withdraws is more real that the one in which he lives and 
is blind. The atrophy of one of his senses precipitates him into 
this magical world of misty surrealist childhood associations. 
Ballard's aim in his fiction is to indicate that there is a radical 
alternative to current perceptions of reality. 
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He is anti-science in that he believes (as we have seen that many 
other writers believe), that the version of reality science imposes 
upon us is just one of a "panoply of alternatives". To get beyond 
the reality structured by our perceptions, associations, scientific 
knowledge and bodily needs, much as Poole tries to in the 'Electric 
Ant' story, is the aim of his protagonists. Invariably his stories 
are either of willed attempts to perform this trick of 
disassociation, or submissions to such a process. 'The Overloaded 
Man' for example, takes literally the Barthian assertion that modern 
man is overwhelmed by signification. The protagonist's 'talent' is 
that he can "de-identify" signs and objects; break them down 
perceptually until they are unrecognisable to him. He sits upon his 
veranda erasing his awareness of the identity of the houses on the 
other side of the garden, until they became a "cubist landscape", "a 
24 
collection of random white forms beneath a blue backdrop" • 
Faulkner finds that he is particularly successful with 
"over-associated" objects such as washing machines, cars, 
televisions and consumer goods. 
Stripped of their accretions of sales slogans and status 
imperatives, their real claim to reality was so tenuous 
that it needed little mental effort to obliterate them 
altogether. 25 
In this cubist universe Faulkner's conceptual apparatus 
systematically diffuses. Ballard compares it to a kind of trancing, 
where you hear people speaking but deliberately do not listen to the 
words. The sense of the words is blocked out. 
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'I may actual~y.be stepping out of time,' Faulkner 
speculated, W~thout a time sense consciousness i 
difficult to visualize. That is, eliminating the ;ect of 
. f h . or tlme rom t e de-~dentified object frees it from all its 
everyday cognitive associations. Alternatively, I may have 
stumbled on a means of repressing the photo-associative 
centres that normally identify visual objects, in the same 
way that you can so listen to someone speaking your own 
language that none of the sounds has any meaning. 
Everyone's tried this at some time.'z, 
Ballard's failure to provide anything other than mannered prose, or 
cliched science· fictional explanations when addressing 
epistemological issues is indicative of an unwillingness or 
inability to tangle with the problem. It is not simply enough to 
doubt reality, or as we saw with Moore, to assert what we know about 
reality. Moore came along and refuted the sceptics doubts, 
effectively by turning them around and saying that he didn't doubt 
them, but "knew them for certain". Similarly Ballard, to stem the 
tide of juvenile and pointless science fiction, has taken its 
science, its conventions, its optimism and its language, and 
subverted or denied them. Moore's engagement with the sceptic, 
despite appearing to break all the rules, turned out merely to 
confirm certain formal moves and methodologies which characterised 
the epistemological argument. Ballard it transpires has similarly 
taken on science fiction on its own ground. As we have seen his 
interests remain science fictional. He is fascinated by time. He 
is fascinated by the extension of the senses. He wants to talk 
about epistemology, about reality and consciousness. He is 
fetishistic about technology. He is romantic. By looking at these 
features of classic science fiction from the other end of the 
telescope Ballard finds himself in the Moore-like position of 
mistaking form for content. 
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He does this in two ways, firstly by presenting his formal 
innovation, narrative fragmentation, etc., as features of content, 
and secondly, by treating as content those aspects of science 
fiction which have long been established as its formal conventions. 
The roots of the former can be seen in those elements of modernism 
which Lukacs considers characteristic. The negation of reality in 
the face of man's isolation and solitariness found expression in 
modernism in "an incoherent stream of consciousness" or other such 
stylistic distortion designed to emphasize the inalienability of a 
subjectivity which was universal. Lukacs observes that if the 
"dialectic between the individual's subjectivity and objective 
reality"Z1 is denied, "disintegration of personality is matched by 
disintegration of the outer world".z8 In Ballard's stories of 
global catastrophe, often the main catastrophe, and the focus of the 
narrative turns out to be the collapse of the main character's 
personality. 
Lukacs continues, 
Only in the interaction of character and environment can 
the concrete potentiality of a particular individual be 
singled out from the 'bad infinity' of purely abstract 
potentialities, and emerge as the determining potentiality 
of just this individual at just this phase of 
development. z9 
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&ere we see clearly the divergence between Dick and Ballard. Dick's 
response to the epistemological problems posed by technology out of 
control, the decline of civilization and severance of man from 
aature through the increased destruction of the environment. is 
represented in his various characters' stubborn, and invariably 
futile attempts to make sense of it all. Often their only hope and 
de. ire is to preserve some ordinary human value despite the 
surrounding chaos. Ballard, wary of the platitude, attracted by the 
fatalism and emasculation, the abnegation of choice promised by 
ecological disaster, allows his characters to be overwhelmed by a 
combination of natural and unnatural forces. Unlike Dick's 
characters, they know exactly what their predicament is and it is 
often this knowledge which emasculates them. Clearly Ballard is not 
interested in establishing the "concrete potentialities" of his 
cbaracters, neither however is there a notable commitment to 
defining the nature of the "abstract potentialities" which he is 
.anifes t 1Y suggesting as alternatives. The closest one gets to a 
.odel of his alternative to conventional views of reality, is 
contained in his description of the sets of disjointed images which 
comprise The Atrocity Exhibition. In what Ballard himself describes 
as a Surrealist technique, by getting rid of "the great tide forward 
of conventional narrative". and juxtaposing the "important pieces", 
it achieves critical mass as it were. it begins to ignite 
and you get more things being generated. You're getting 
crossovers and linkages between unexpected and previously 
totally unrelated things, events, elements of narration, 
ideas that in themselves begin to generate new matter. 30 
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The suggestion here is that there is so much to say and that the 
themes are so obvious, that if you cram everything together with 
style some kind of meaning will arise. Look after the style and the 
content will look after itself. It is the spontaneous combustion 
theory of literature. Like rubbish tips that spontaneously ignite 
due to the sheer weight of rubbish, Ballard's conglomerations of 
images and ideas are collaged together in the hope that the sheer 
weight of association, or resonances as he prefers to call them, 
will guarantee some kind of meaning or sense. Just as his 
characters submit to the unconscious drift of their own psyche, 
Ballard submits to the unconscious drift of language. We have come 
a long way from Orwell's "let the. meaning choose the word". 
Ballard's technique partakes in many ways of those 'techniques' 
which writers of 'structuralist' novels, notably the Tel Quel group 
espouse. As Culler remarks, Kristeva's statement that "semiotics 
remains an investigation which discovers nothing at the end of its 
" "d I "1 ,,31 t quest but 1ts own 1 eo og1ca moves ,sugges s a programme that 
is a little difficult to imagine. Those "principles of relevance" 
which she might seek in a text, whether they identify rhymes or 
anagrams or whatever, cannot be free of the ideological basis which 
she seeks to escape. The play of significance becomes no more than 
a game. In any novel or text significance is conferred by the 
overall organising principle. This principle must relate to forms 
outside the text in order to constitute more than an intellectual 
exercise. 
227 
What is more, the principle of no organising principle, (which is 
the obvious way of avoiding the ideological influences of form) is 
only interesting once. However, there are a myriad of different 
ways of having no organising principle, Ballard has found one and, 
because he eschews any kind of cognitive principle, talks about 
significance arising from it by default. 
The disruptions of narrative which characterize Dick's work come 
about as a result of his challenging in a concrete way the 
categories of "life", "death", "reality", etc. That is, the form is 
disrupted by the content, rather than vice versa. Changes in style 
and structure will not in themselves bring about altered concepts 
and perceptions. In mistaking the conventions of science fiction 
for its content, and addressing them as such Ballard finds himself 
still trapped by those conventions. To a large degree, he remains 
trapped because he retains a fascination for the thinking which 
generated these conventions. Wittgenstein says that the examples of 
known truths which Moore gives remain interesting because they play 
"a similar role in our system of empirical judgements".32 The 
given truths of the world of science fiction, having sprung from the 
kind of thinking which Moore tries to rationalize, having gathered 
on the way various bits of hardware and an assortment of 
mythologies, time-machines, hallucinogenic drugs, parallel worlds, 
faster-than-light-drives, robots, etc., hardware which 
unquestionably has its blueprint in philosophy, still have their 
roots firmly in that philosophy. 
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It is not simply enough for Ballard to sweep away the hardware, 
because the hardware, as we have seen with Dick, is the only means 
the writer has of controlling a fascination for problems about 
knowledge and thought which Wittgenstein variously describes as 
"superstitious,,33, "deep disquietudes,,34, "bewitchments of our 
intelligence,,35, and all of which appear deep because they are 
deep in the form of our language. Ballard's dislike of the hardware 
leads him to the more extreme position of distrusting language and 
logic. Clearly he is right to distrust certain aspects of language, 
unfortunately the aspect he chooses to reject is its logical face. 
His anti-rational stance opens up for him a battlefield which seems 
to take on logic, science and the whole project of understanding the 
world, whereas he turns out to be fighting himself. Like the 
Cartesian sceptic he distrusts the tools of thinking. Unlike 
Descartes he doubts the reliability of language and sees virtue in 
language's apparent ability to rise above logic. All of the science 
fictional conventions, which Ballard shuns, embody, paradoxically, 
those aspects of language which he seeks to assert; the 
category-mistake, the misleading metaphor, the poetic image. And 
Delany and Russ would probably be the first to point out, they were 
there all the time but nobody noticed them. Which is what I meant 
about them being right, but for the wrong reasons. All of science 
fiction's most persistent themes, its need to get to the bottom of 
the facts of nature, its urge to understand the basis, or essence, 
of everything, (as so cogently plagiarised in the Douglas Adams 
books), is not the search for something new, but as Wittgenstein 
remarks, it is as if "We want to understand something that is 
. ., 36 
already 1.n pla1.n v1.ew". 
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We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our 
investigation however, is directed not towards phenomena, 
but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of 
phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the 
kind of statement that we can make about phenomena. 37 
If I say of someone "He isn't an automation" it seems to raise the 
possibility that he might be, but that I have dismissed it. In the 
normal world this qualifies as a Moore-type statement. Because 
unless the possibility does exist that this person could be an 
automaton it makes no sense to say "I know" he isn't. The "I know" 
is implicit. Firstly, it appears to be a statement about the kind 
of things we can say about bodies and minds, secondly, it seems to 
allow for the eventuality that things may turn out to be other than 
we think. It dares you to prove the statement wrong. When in 
science fiction the statement is proved wrong (or right), it ceases 
to be a statement about what we can know about minds and bodies, and 
becomes simply a statement about minds and bodies. The science 
fiction story as a whole may be construed as treating of the 
possibilities of phenomena, but the individual statements in the 
story treat of those phenomena. Science fiction which contains long 
tracts of scientific, philosophical, or theological discussion, 
often fails in its task because without, good jokes, good 
characters, style, wit, relevance, or genius, one may as well read 
the text book. 
The particular advantage of post-war science fiction in pursuing 
philosophical issues, is that the level of parody of the old forms 
which are, as I say, the formal conventions embodying the 
'paradoxical' world view, allows the writer to paint, 
philosophically speaking, with a very wide brush. 
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By embracing all science fiction's gimmicks and ludicrous ideas 
(instead of dismissing them as Ballard does) Dick finds himself with 
a ready-made vocabulary for dealing with the kind of epistemological 
tangles which fascinate him. Further he does not make the mistake 
of trying to penetrate these phenomena, they are like Moore-type 
propositions in the context of science fiction, it is neither 
sensible to confirm or deny knowledge of aspects of the science 
fictional world view which prevail, because they act like the 
so-called common-sense assumptions which we have about the world. 
Because, therefore Dick's characters can talk in a different way 
about time, minds and life, ~ epistemological disputes point up 
aspects of epistemology in general. A statement like, "I've been 
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waiting a long time for last year" is unusual even in the world 
of Now Wait for Last Year, but we do not find ourselves searching 
for an application for it. That is we do not have to ask ourselves 
what kind of statement it is before we can find a role for it. 
Philosophical statements are often of that kind. They appear deep 
because they have no role outside philosophy, yet can be made in a 
perfectly ordinary context without provoking comment. For something 
to appear deep, or epistemologically astonishing it is clear that 
one needs to be involved in a question about the kind of statement 
that is being made, i.e. what kind of role it has in what kind of 
language-game. 
If one is writing a statement in a piece of science fiction, 
particularly if it is dialogue, one needs to set it within a 
context. (In this sense failing to give it a context is a context, 
but not a very interesting one). 
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Immediately the writer is forced to look for ways of surprising the 
reader and suggesting philosophical puzzles. Using sentences that 
are patently ungrammatical is an obvious way, "I met myself 
tomorrow." for example. Making metaphors and turns of phrase 
literal is another, "1 must pull myself together". Making 
Moore-type statements is another, "I know I'm alive".39 This is 
trivial rule breaking. The appearance of depth which "Machines Who 
Think" and "The Day it Rained Forever" as statements have, is 
largely due to the grammatical construction. The ideas which they 
embody, that a machine might be considered a person, and that it 
might never stop raining, are commonplace. 
Science fiction's relation to language is an ambiguous and 
precarious thing. Many of science fiction's flights of imagination 
are only made possible, and in certain respects only remain 
interesting because of aspects of language which I have 
highlighted. Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics are a mundane example 
of this. Asimov himself confesses that his robot stories relied on 
the fact that "There was just enough ambiguity in the three laws to 
provide the conflicts and uncertainties required for new 
40 
stories". This "ambiguity" inheres in attempting a strictly 
logical interpretation of the English language commands. 'Liar,41 
and 'Satisfaction Guaranteed,42, for example revolve entirely 
around the robots' interpretations of the word "harm" in the first 
law. In the former story a robot tells a lie to protect its 
mistress from the emotional harm which the truth would have entailed. 
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Such stories rest on the assumption that the robots are programmed 
in the vernacular, and rely on finding chinks in the logical 
structure of the English language. 
Other explicit attempts to force a change in our concepts of 
thinking, I noted in the neologisms and invented languages of my 
first chapter. The idea which Newspeak and Babel-17 embod~\that the 
form of language may contain an ideological bias, is taken to an 
extreme in Ballard's work, where the subversion of logic and normal 
narrative patterns are proposed as a means of de-railing the novel, 
and science fiction in particular, from the tramlines of language. 
Between these extremes, I have inserted the view that the formal 
characteristics of language exert an influence on our thinking which 
leads us to formulate models of understanding, thought and language, 
which one needs to recognise and resist before one can begin the 
task of countering any ideological bias which one might discern. 
The failure to grasp why the various models of language suggested by 
Orwell, Searle, Whorf and Chomsky, and embodied in the stories of 
Delany, Bester, etc., are wrong, disarms any putative attempt on 
inherent ideological colouring in language. 
Science fiction is particularly susceptible to puzzles about 
language and thought because of an inherent tendency to metaphysics, 
and because of widespread misunderstanding about the relation of 
language and the imagination. 
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The idea that breaking the formal rules of language, or of a genre, 
can generate new ideas, and condense complex ones, is part of the 
mythology of 20th century literature. 
However, misunderstandings about how language works combined with a 
series of slipshod models, often renders such rule breaks trivial, 
or leads one, in the case of science fiction to imagine impossible 
things and to wrestle with imaginary problems. These imaginary 
beasts, like magic carpets and genies in lamps in Arabian Nights, 
are part of the fabric of science fiction and as such are not 
phenomena to be penetrated, but,. because they are images of the 
impossible, serve to remind us of the relationship between 
imagination and language. 
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